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But the Sun is eclipsed by the Moon 
"There is no dark side in the Moon really. 
Matter of fact it's all dark." 
Roger Water 
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Introduction.  
Irregular and Labour Market Flexibility: a problematic nexus 
 
The purpose of this research to put in a common analytical interface the concept 
of irregular Work together with the one of labour market flexibility is indeed a 
challenging task. At first glance, these two concepts may appear to be totally separate 
and for a certain extent even contrasting. This might be due to the traditional approach 
adopted by a large majority of the academic establishment to the study of irregular 
work in a context of continuous evolving of labour markets and social institutions.  
The predominant view has seen irregular work as a “backward” component of the 
economy that will die out with the further “modernization” of the labour market and 
social institutions. According to the modernization theory, as long as the economy has 
not yet been comprehensively modernized and democratic institutions and state 
regulation are not yet broadly stable, its use might even be seen as an option for the 
low-cost establishment of new small enterprises in uncertain markets and as an option 
for the integration of marginalized workers during modernization processes.  
Similarly, several scholars explained the phenomenon of irregular work as a 
reflection of the “segmentation” of the labour market in a national economic system. 
The so-called Segmentation theory developed by several American economists 
(Doeringer and Piore 1971, Contini 1979) indicated the existence of two types of labour 
markets: a primary "regular" labour market in the more advanced sectors that is highly 
structured and protected, and a residual secondary one that is extremely informal and 
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precarious in the backward sectors. Irregular work, commonly related to the secondary 
segment of the economy was seen as legally and economically well defined and 
separated from the formal work regulation. 
 
In Italy the phenomenon of irregular work has been for many years one of the 
most relevant issue in the political debate on reforming the labour market. The 
mainstream approach was based on the assumption that the tendency to enter into the 
range of irregular work is tied to the rigidity of the labour market and to the 
“employment excessive guarantees”, which have always been cause of a clear 
segmentation Insiders/Outsiders. Following this approach, many scholars have argued 
that the process of deregulation of employment relations and the process of 
flexibilization of the labour market would have a positive impact on the reduction of 
the extent of irregular work. This argument is based on the two following assumptions.  
From the demand side, the rigidity of labour market institutions constitutes one of 
the most important factors leading companies to engage into irregular forms of 
employment. According to this argument less stringent regulations in terms of hiring, 
dismissal and wage would increase the incentive for companies to adopt regular and 
declared workers.  
From the supply side, it is argued, the creation of new occupational opportunities 
through an enlargement of the number of flexible employment arrangements would 
reduce the necessity for unemployed to fall into the domain of irregular work. This 
argument is connected to the assumption that the propensity of workers to be offered in 
irregular segments of the labour market is positively related to the high rate of 
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unemployment, and that irregular work constitutes an option of last resort in front of a 
low probability of finding regular employment.  
 
From the perspective of this research, however, these viewpoints are too narrow, 
and fail to properly describe the complexity of the phenomenon today. The continuous 
processes of internal and external organizational restructuring of enterprises and the 
introduction of new forms of work flexibility are redefining many parts of the official 
and unofficial sector of the economy. Two empirical cases in this research show the 
emergence of new forms of irregular work linked to the widespread use of nonstandard 
contracts. 
Therefore, from an analytical point of view, the concept of Irregular Work cannot 
be ascribed to a uniform phenomenon. Rather, it covers a variety of forms of work 
involving different degrees of social integration, as they are based on different motives 
of employees and strategies of employers or contractors, and their interplay. Irregular 
work indeed represents a complex field of differing forms of work relations that are 
based on different motivations of the actors involved, and the evolution of which is 
determined by different sets of factors in each case. 
It has been often recognized by several scholars (Williams and Windebank 1998, 
2001, 2005, Bonolo and Lucifora, 2002, Semenza and Samek-Lodovici 2003) that 
dimensions and characteristics of irregular work in Europe are rather shaped by its 
fundamental interplay with the continuous change of labour market institutions, 
systems of production, and welfare state framework. Irregular work is not considered 
by these authors just a hidden economic issue to be discovered, but it is seen as a 
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complex phenomenon itself embedded into the social behaviours and dynamically 
interacting with official labour market institutions. 
From this starting point, the main interest of this thesis is to investigate on the 
linkage between irregular work and the complex mechanisms of the contemporary 
labour market in Italy, and in particular, on the consequences of the expansion of a 
more striking external flexibility. The theoretical assumption asserting that the 
increasing use of nonstandard forms of employment has always a positive effect on the 
reduction of undeclared work, which is usually considered as a phenomenon never 
intersecting with the formal work regulation, will be put under question in this thesis. 
We focuses on those nonstandard work situations actually characterized by “grey areas” 
very difficult to identify within a clear legal framework. We will finally underline the 
existence of direct and complementary relationship in Italy between flexibility and 
irregularity in the Italian context.  
 
The thesis is divided into 6 chapters. 
The first Chapter provides a detailed definitional framework of the objects of 
research and discusses on the terminology in relation to the definitions provided by 
national and supra-national institutions and by the literature.  
The second Chapter is an overview of the main theoretical and empirical 
literature on the issues of irregular work and regulation of nonstandard employment. 
We will identify the main gaps of literature and, from here, we will develop our 
analytical approach and the guiding questions of the research. 
The third Chapter presents the main hypotheses of the research. Specifically: a) 
the existence of a direct relationship between nonstandard and irregular work, b) the 
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existence of territorial specificities of irregularities in nonstandard work, c) the 
emergence of new social risks for nonstandard workers. Immediately afterwards, the 
research design explains the way those hypotheses will be verified. 
The fourth Chapter concerns the methodology and the results of the empirical 
research. The two case studies, the territorial areas (province) of Cagliari and Brescia, 
are presented separately.  Successively we discuss the main theoretical implications of 
the empirical findings in relation to the literature and the research hypotheses. 
The fifth Chapter reviews the main policy strategies adopted to fight the 
phenomenon of irregular work and the abuses on nonstandard work. It will be firstly 
given a critical assessment of the Italian approach to the phenomenon along the last two 
decades, with also a short look to the last reform of the labour market (Fornero 
Reform). Secondly, the European approach is presented and criticized, while it will be 
stressed the need of a new strategy approach to contrast the phenomenon.  
Finally, conclusive remarks will summarize the most important empirical research 
findings and discuss on the theoretical implications for future research.  
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Chapter 1. Definitions and legislative framework 
 
1 Undeclared and Irregular Work 
 
The descriptive design of this Section has been shaped step-by-step having 
encountered some conceptual ambiguities among the definitions provided in a part of 
the literature and having found incompatibilities with the definitions given by EU 
commission and International System of National Accounts. The ultimate aim of this 
section is to explain why in this thesis the term “Irregular Work” is preferred over the 
term “Undeclared Work”.  
The issue of finding a conventional definition of the phenomenon investigated in 
this thesis has been object of a controversial academic and political debate, and still 
today there remain considerable ambiguities among the literature concerning its precise 
nature. The abundance of terms provided by a broad sociological and economic 
literature to describe the same phenomenon (such as “Irregular”, “Undeclared”, 
"Shadow”, "Underground”, "Unrecorded", the "Unofficial Economy", "Informal", 
"Unobserved") not always helped to clearly define its boundaries and dimensions within 
national economies while it created considerable difficulties in the process of its 
measurement and quantification. 
The difficulties to reach a common definition have to be found on the different 
interpretations of the phenomenon within specific cultural, social and economic 
contexts. Different authors addressing different questions have employed a variety of 
alternative definitions and this has led to the criticism that they are "exceedingly fuzzy 
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concepts"  (Peattie, 1987). It happened often that terms semantically different such as 
informal, irregular, hidden, parallel have been used as synonymous, attached to the 
different concepts of “work” and “economy” and wrongly used to refer to the same 
phenomenon. To give an example: 
 “The National Committee for the Formalisation of irregular work was created in 
1998. The main objectives of the initiative include: creating an institutional network 
between the central government and regional authorities, with the aim of gaining 
knowledge about the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of the informal 
economy and proposing formalisation policies, encouraging commitment among 
workers and employers to be tax compliant, and fighting undeclared work” 
(Eurofound)
1
. 
Here irregular work is associated to informal economy. However, as it will be 
better explained further on, irregular work should not be understood as a branch of 
Informal economy given that, according to the SNA93, it represents a separated area of 
the non-observed Economy. 
 
Another problem concerning the definitional framework is that official definitions 
may differ substantially among different countries. In fact, legal boundaries defining 
informal/formal, undeclared/declared, strongly depend on the differences between 
national accounting systems that, in turn, contribute to the creation of different patterns 
of identification of the phenomenon between national systems. 
From a definitional approach, one of the first problems to solve when defining a 
complex phenomenon such as the “Irregular” or “undeclared” work is to sketch out its 
conceptual domain in order to provide a common ground for studies and research. 
                                                          
1
 Eurofound -http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/labourmarket/tackling/cases/it007.htm 
 
 
18 
Therefore, making light of the definitions shared in the literature and the official 
definitions provided by public institutions represent a crucial prerequisite for a better 
understanding of the research object.  
Within this thesis the term “irregular work” is considered more appropriate than 
the term “undeclared Work”, most used in the international literature. This section aims 
to provide an operationalization of the two concepts in order to justify this choice.  I 
will start firstly analysing the definitions of “Undeclared Work” provided by the 
International System of National Accounts and by the European Commission through 
the classical method of categorization provided by G. Sartori (1984). The aim of this 
approach is to design the taxonomy of the concept for a better understanding of the 
phenomenon itself. Following, I will focus on the term of “irregular work” and apply 
the method provided by D. Collier and S. Levtitsky (1997) of  “shifting the overarching 
concept” in order to explain the use of the term “irregular work” from the perspective of 
this research.  
 
Starting with the term “Undeclared work”, a conventional definition has been 
provided by The International System of National Accounts in 1993 (SNA 93). All 
European countries, implementing the constraint for the comparability of data, have 
joined the international definition. Particularly, the SNA93 proposed a clear separation 
between three fundamental areas: illegal economy, underground economy, and informal 
economy.  
In the area of Illegal economy are traced all activities that involve an illegal object 
and / or mode of employment. It is that area of activities including the production of 
goods and services forbidden by law and provided by non-authorized persons.  
The Informal economy refers to those activities performed within interpersonal 
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relationship or activities directly unobservable by statistics because of their economic 
characteristics.  Within this area economic activities are mainly based on inter-personal, 
family and social relations, and, in general terms, they don’t have to be declared to 
public authorities. Generally this type of economic activity has modest size and the 
management is carried out by small amounts of capitals. Examples of this type of 
economy are family activities and trading and unpaid activities such as volunteering. 
The 15th International Conference of Labour Statisticians in 1993 provided a further 
definition of informal sector. It states:  
“Art. 5 (1) The informal sector may be broadly characterized as consisting of 
units (… which) operate at a low level of organization, with little or no division of 
labour and capital as factors of production and on a small scale. Labour relations – 
where they exist - are mostly based on casual employment, kinship or personal and 
social relations rather than contractual arrangements with formal guarantees.  
Art. 5 (3) Activities performed by production units of the informal sector are not 
necessarily performed with the deliberate intention of evading the payment of taxes or 
social security contributions, or infringing labour or other legislations or administrative 
provisions.”  
 
The Underground economy refers to “certain activities that may be both 
productive in an economic sense and also quite legal but deliberately concealed from 
public authorities for the following reasons:  
(a) To avoid the payment of income, value added or other taxes;  
(b) To avoid the payment of social security contributions;  
(c) To avoid having to meet certain legal standards such as minimum wages, 
maximum hours, safety or health standards, etc.;  
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(d) To avoid complying with certain administrative procedures, such as 
completing statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms.” (SNA93) 
This area concerns, the legal production of goods and lawful activities that are not 
properly registered to the competent tax and/or social security authorities. They are 
characterized by the deliberate intention of violating labour regulations (tax evasion, 
circumventing the legislative frameworks on minimum wages or working hours, and 
tax-regulation), without the activity constituting a criminal offense itself. In turn, 
Underground economy may concern two different branches.  On the one hand it can be 
represented by undeclared enterprises of variable sizes completely or partially unknown 
to the tax authorities and official statistics. On the other hand it can be constituted of 
undeclared working activities, where the working partnership is characterized by the 
total or the partial absence of a formalized relationship. 
 
Having explicitly defined these different areas of Non Observed Economy, in 
which area does  the concept of “Undeclared Work” must be collocate?  
A conventional definition of Undeclared Work has been provided by the European 
Commission in a Communication in 1998 (COM (1998) 219) and readopted in a 
communication in 2007 (COM (2007) 628). Here, Undeclared work is described as 
"any paid activities that are lawful as regards their nature but not declared to the public 
authorities, taking into account differences in the regulatory systems of Member States".  
In this definition three main attributes can be identified. 
 
1) It must be a paid activity 
2) It must be lawful as regard its nature 
3) It is not declared to public authorities as required by national regulations 
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In other words, “Undeclared Work” refers to all situations where work 
performance is not accomplished in accordance with laws and contracts in force: these 
violations may be of various sizes and can determine the total concealment of the work 
activity (totally undeclared work), and in several cases only its partial concealment 
(partially undeclared work).  
Therefore, from the EC’s definition of Undeclared work it is possible to exclude 
Illegal work, i.e. those illegal and criminal monetary-gain activities including 
production of goods and services forbidden by law because it doesn’t satisfy the 
attribute 2. In addition, Informal Work, i.e. those kind of informal working activities 
performed within interpersonal relationship that do not have to be declared to public 
authorities, must be also excluded for the fact that does not satisfy the attribute 3. 
 
From a conceptual point of view, a further differentiation between undeclared, 
informal and illegal work can be provided by applying Sartori’s “ladder of Generality” 
theory (1984). 
Within this approach the concept of “Undeclared Work” can be considered as a 
specific subtypes of the Root concept “work”: “Undeclared” is an adjective which 
characterizes our concept as a Secondary Category in the “ladder of Generality”. 
Moving down the Ladder of Generality from the Root Concept “work” and adding the 
attribute  “undeclared” it is specified a subcategory with its own specific characteristics. 
In fact, the adjective Undeclared semantically differs from the adjective “illegal” or 
“informal” and these differentiations might help to avoid any possible “conceptual 
stretching”. This approach also allows us to draw the taxonomy of the concepts in 
question and their hierarchic relations for a better identification of the field of the 
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research (see Figure 1).  
Today it is jointly recognized that “Undeclared Work” it is a branch of 
“Underground Economy” which is a diminished subtype of the “Non-observed 
Economy (NOE)” and at the same time it is excluded from the areas of “illegal 
economy” and “informal economy”.  
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Here we arrived in the second step, consisting on differentiating the term of 
‘irregular work’, most used in this thesis, from the one of ‘undeclared work’. An 
important aspect that can determine the use of different terms to indicate the same 
phenomenon is represented by the perspective of the field from which the phenomenon 
is observed: commonly there are three main aspect of the non-observability of the 
phenomenon:  the statistical aspect, the juridical aspect and the economic aspect.  
NON OBSERVED ECONOMY 
UNDERGROUND ECONOMY 
UNDECLARED WORK 
(irregular work) 
Partially undeclared 
(Semi-irregular) 
ILLEGAL ECONOMY INFORMAL ECONOMY 
Totally undeclared 
(totally irregular) 
Figure 1 The concept of Undeclared work and its Hierarchic relations 
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In Italy, an official definition of the phenomenon has been established only 
recently and it has been put under the more general concept of Irregular Work. The law 
248/2006 (the so-called Bersani decree), art 36-bis, modified by the law 106/2009, 
defines irregular work as “employee who is not recorded in the accounting and 
compulsory administrative books”. In a document of 2008, ISTAT defines Irregular 
Work as "a non-regular job positions held without respect for the laws on tax-
contributory, and not directly observable in the enterprises, institutions and 
administrative sources" (ISTAT 2008). 
According to ISTAT it concerns mostly the following working positions: 1) 
continuously carried out in contravention of the regulations, 2) occasionally irregular 
carried out by students, housewives or retired, 3) carried out by irregular immigrants 4) 
more activities not declared to tax authorities carried out together with the formal 
activity" (ISTAT 2008). 
Overall, we can deduce that: irregular work refers to employment performed for 
financial gain in violation of legal requirements. We may notice that the definition of 
irregular work given by the law n.248 in 2006 and by ISTAT in 2008 almost coincides 
with the definition of Undeclared Work given by the EU. Taking in account the 
fundamental attributes we can argue that it satisfies all requisites because it describes 
the situation of a worker performing in a legal activity (attributes 1 and 2), and for 
which the employers evade completely or partially the legal obligations (attribute 3).  
Notwithstanding, the use of the term “irregular” in the latter definition it may be 
questioned for the fact that “irregular” is semantically different from “undeclared”. The 
term itself may be referred to any job position which is still totally declared to public 
authorities, but it is applied not in compliance with regulations concerning different 
aspects of the work relationship, such as health and safety procedures, administrative 
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procedures, and so on and so forth.  In few words, the domain of the concept of 
"Irregular Work" is more extensive than that of the "undeclared work", which, instead, 
refers to those specific kinds of irregularities that aim to conceal, completely or 
partially, the work performance to public authorities.  
However, ISTAT specifies in a note that “from a juridical point of view, 
irregularities considered are those concerning fiscal and contributory regulations, while 
are not considered irregularities regarding payments and regulations on health and 
safety”.   
By this assertion, we may assume that the term “Irregular Work” used by ISTAT 
refers to the same phenomenon the EC calls “Undeclared work”, being specified that 1) 
the phenomenon is observed from a Juridical point of view and 2) the field of research 
is limited to those irregularities concerning regulations on tax and fiscal contributions.  
 
In this specific case we may apply the method that Collier and Levitsky (1997) 
call “shifting the Overarching Concept”2 . When observing the object of this research 
from a Juridical joint of view rather than from an Economic point of view, we may call 
the same phenomenon “Irregular Work” rather than Undeclared work.  The overarching 
concept so far considered, i.e. the Non observed Economy, is here shifted to the concept 
of “Irregularity” and the phenomenon in question may be considered as a subtype of 
Irregularity of work while concerning more specifically the non-compliance to the tax-
contributory legislations in force.  
In the present Research I will mostly use the term "Irregular Work" as defined by 
                                                          
2
 In their analysis of the concept of “Democratic Regime” a shift in the overarching concept can yield an 
alternative standard for declaring a particular case to be a democracy, yet without either modifying or 
stretching the concept of "Democratic Regime". Scholars have used this strategy to create a standard that 
can be either less or more demanding than the concept in question. The strategy of shifting among 
alternative overarching concepts can serve to introduce finer differentiation by creating an additional 
analytic category, in this way making therefore possible to term differently the root concept in question. 
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ISTAT in order to emphasize, from a juridical point of view, its non-compliance to the 
Italian legislative framework on regulation of employment relations and, in particular, 
to underline the irregular use of nonstandard contracts. Differently, the term 
"Undeclared Work" will be used only when it is referred to the EC definition and when 
the phenomenon is looked from a statistical or economic point of view, emphasizing its 
character of non-observability.  
 
 
2 Defining Flexibility of the labour market and nonstandard 
employment 
 
2.1 Labour market Flexibility  
 
The second object of the research, as mentioned in the introduction, is Labour 
Market Flexibility (LMF). The term itself is elusive and ambiguous and can be subject 
of very different interpretations.  It has been defined in very different ways, from the 
most restrictive to the most extensive, from the simplest to the most sophisticated and 
has been examined at very different levels of analysis and often from conflicting points 
of view. This Section starts from the premise that it is necessary to clarify the different 
meanings the term 'flexibility' may have in the context of labour market policies. 
On the one hand different authors have proposed a quite general level definition 
of Flexibility as  “the capacity to adapt to change”. Boyer (1987) refers to "the ability of 
a system or subsystem to react to various disturbances". For Michon (1987) "flexibility 
becomes imperative in a context of rapid change: it signifies an aptitude for change". 
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Atkinson (1986) provides the following definition of what he calls "dynamic 
flexibility": "...changes to institutional, cultural and other social or economic 
regulations and practices which permanently increase the capacity to respond to 
change”.  
On the other hand, for other scholars, flexibility is a very precise concept 
consisting of either adjustments of the labour force and hours of work to an economic 
situation that has become unstable, or the possibility of bringing wages into line with 
the "demands" of the economic situation, and thus the reorganization of wage structures 
(Meulders and Wilkin 1991). 
In both cases the supporters of flexibility stated that a less rigid labour market 
regulation would be beneficial for both the demand side, because it allows an extension 
of the undertaking's scope for manoeuvre, and for the supply side, because it gives more 
chances to unemployed to enter in the labour markets and it would better satisfy the 
different needs of workers concerning the work-free time balance.   
 
Nevertheless, flexibility is not per se a univocal concept. Indeed it may concern 
different dimensions directly connected to different aspects of the labour market and of 
the employment relations. In this aspect, the literature has broadly discussed about 
different forms of flexibility. The most famous distinction of the forms of flexibility is 
given by Atkinson (1984). Following his suggestion the literature has successively 
agreed in dividing the concept of flexibility in four types: a numerical flexibility (or 
'external'), a functional (or technical-organizational), a wage flexibility  and a temporal 
flexibility.  
 
Wage flexibility affects the ability of changes in wages and wage structures. From 
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a static point of view it refers to the ability to apply different wages according to 
differences on productivity, sector, occupation, age, or geographical area. From an 
economic point of view, wage flexibility means the adaptation of wages to cyclical 
fluctuations (inflation and productivity) and external shocks and variations in wages 
resulting from the performance of undertakings  
The first aspect is generally considered external and refers essentially to a 
macroeconomic dimension while the second may be described as internal and of a 
microeconomic nature. The adjustment of wages can operate at two levels: the 
adjustment of the direct wage (gross remuneration paid to the wage earner) and that of 
contributions and charges paid by the employer (another component of wage cost). The 
first involves, in the case of downward adjustment, the problem of deflation; the second 
raises the problem of the intervention of the public authorities in a context of lasting 
budgetary deficits. The adjustment possibilities must obviously be set against 
"rigidities" which arise from various kinds of provisions: wage indexing systems, 
guaranteed minimum wages, the high level of replacement incomes and various charges 
(leaves and contributions) related to the use of the labour factor. 
The advocates of this kind of flexibility generally argue that the drop of the wage 
cost should increase profits and stimulate investments, thus reducing structural 
unemployment and strengthen the competitive position of undertakings which would 
see an increase in the demand for their products. 
 
External or numerical flexibility means the adjustment of the volume of work to 
the needs of undertakings in response to cyclical or structural variations in demand 
and/or technological changes. It interests three aspects: the institutional regulation of 
layoffs and hiring, the use of temporary and nonstandard forms of work, various forms 
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of externalisation such as subcontracting and outsourcing of functions or phases of the 
production to other companies. 
Any measures which free employers from a lengthy employment relationship 
with their employees are part of this form flexibility: reduction in so-called termination 
constraints, massive recourse to temporary work, fixed-term contracts or task-specific 
contracts, or the use of self-employed workers, or even home work. 
The mechanisms whereby numerical flexibility would guarantee the creation of 
jobs are identical to those which are generally put forward regarding wage flexibility. 
Thus, for example, the suppression of redundancy payments would limit overall labour 
cost and should encourage the substitution of labour for capital, which would favour 
employment. 
The other side of the coin is that there would be a tendency towards the 
proliferation of employment relationships of a precarious nature. This would lead to the 
institutionalisation of a dual labour market which would include on the one hand poorly 
paid, unstable jobs (most of which would be held by young people and women) and on 
the other hand, stable and well-paid occupations. 
 
The functional flexibility (or "internal" and organizational) indicates the ability of 
companies to adapt the tasks performed by employees to changes in demand, moving 
employees from one job to another or from one department to another or changing the 
contents of the task itself. Technical-organisational flexibility thus results from the 
capacity of the production unit to combine new techniques of organisation and 
diversified equipment into an overall structure, the purpose of which is to satisfy a 
demand which is uncertain, both in volume and in composition. This kind of flexibility 
also encompasses various ways of using labour and human resources. These include the 
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adaptation of operators to a variety of tasks of varying levels of complexity: 
multiskilling, job rotation, work units, changes in the functional division of labour, 
retraining, upgrading, etc.  
Workers, therefore, are required to a high professional versatility and willingness 
to accept a good regeneration processes and frequent changes in working conditions. It 
should be noted that this flexibility is related to the mobility of workers within the 
undertaking and, by extension, to their deployment across a number of skill levels 
which are contractually established and thus subject to modification. 
In many respects technical-organisational flexibility appears hardly compatible 
with the other two forms of flexibility. Because of the major investments in human 
capital which it requires, it would in fact be counterproductive to pursue a policy of 
training and versatility whilst allowing a permanent threat of lay-offs or wage 
reductions to remain.  
 
A fourth kind of flexibility, the temporal flexibility, it concerns the ability to use 
different time schemes that differentiate from traditional daytime hours and the ability 
to vary the time according to the needs of the production, using the forms of overtime 
or seasonal work. This form of flexibility covers such aspects as: the fixing of normal or 
maximum weekly (monthly, yearly) hours of work, various forms of staggered work, 
the organisation of overtime and compensatory leave, alternate periods of work and 
training, weekend work, personalised work schedules, etc. The best known examples 
are the shift to allow the continuous cycle of production, a public holiday and night 
work and various forms of part-time work.   
Theoretically, this kind of flexibility seems capable of reconciling the conflicting 
objectives of workers and employers, at least in the short term. Thus, it appears possible 
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to harmonise these objectives through the free choice of timetables, productivity 
demands and the individual assignment of working time, which is more satisfactory to 
the worker. Nevertheless, the employment effects of this kind of flexibility depend on 
the political and social objectives within which it is set. The most promising 
possibilities are to be found in the sharing of available jobs between a greater numbers 
of workers. But here again, doubts remain as to the real effects of such a practice, which 
may vary from sector to sector. 
 
Having introduced the forms of flexibility most mentioned in the literature, it is 
important to specify here that non all forms of flexibility are object of this research.  
The present work will focus mainly on two types of flexibility: firstly external or 
numerical flexibility and in particular the use by companies of contractual forms of 
temporary and nonstandard employment and, secondly, temporal flexibility as far as 
part-time contracts are concerned. For the purposes of research, functional and wage 
flexibility are not direct objects of analysis.  
The following two Sections will focus more specifically on the issue of 
nonstandard forms of work and will provide a short legislative overview of the different 
nonstandard contracts introduced in the two last Italian labour market reforms. 
 
2.2 Nonstandard work  
 
European institutions have largely promoted the development of different forms 
of nonstandard work. As the Lisbon strategy illustrates, Europe’s achievement of the 
labour market targets fixed in 2000 and revised in 2005 relied on developing forms of 
‘atypical or nonstandard’ work arrangements that allow ‘for more flexibility, either 
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numerical or external flexibility. Nonstandard forms of employment allow for adapting 
hours of work, organization of working time and the responsiveness of work to 
fluctuations in the demand for production or services’3. 
In this perspective, it is argued that global economic changes increased 
competition and uncertainty among firms and put greater pressure on them to push for 
greater profits and to be more flexible in contracting with their employees and 
responding to consumers.  
In its Green Paper on modernising labour law of November 2006, the European 
Commission noted that: ‘Rapid technological progress as well as globalisation have 
fundamentally changed European labour markets. Fixed-term contracts, part-time work, 
job on-call, hiring through temporary employment agencies and self-employment 
contracts have become an established feature of the European labour market, 
accounting for 25% of the workforce’ (European Commission, 2006). 
 
Various definitions in the literature of nonstandard employment refer to those 
work arrangements that fall outside the definition of standard employment in which it 
was generally expected that work is done full-time, continues indefinitely, and is 
performed under the employer's direction. Standard work arrangements were the norm 
in many industrial relation systems for much of the twentieth century and were the basis 
of the framework within which labour law, collective bargaining, and social security 
systems developed (Goldthorpe 1984, Casey 1991, Green et all993, Kalleberg et 
al2000).  
Although during the past two decades nonstandard employment has grown in all 
European Union, the share of these types of employments as well as their modes of 
                                                          
3
 (European Council 2000,‘Presidency Conclusions’. Lisbon) 
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regulation within the systems of industrial relations differ quite substantially between 
the European Countries (OECD 2004). 
Our research will focus on the specificities of the Italian labour market and on the 
(unintended) consequences of the implementation of different forms of nonstandard 
contracts provided by the recent labour market reforms.  
 
2.3 Nonstandard work in Italy: a legislative framework 
 
Institutional reforms aimed at deregulate the Italian labour market through the 
introduction of nonstandard contracts have been gradually introduced since the middle 
nineties. To describe how Italian labour market has evolved with respect to the other 
OECD countries and how Italy places in terms of external flexibility, we may have a 
first idea, simply by looking to the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indicators 
(OECD 2009).  In 2008 EPL index in Italy has a value close to the OECD mean (1.89 
versus 1.94) and Italy is ranked 25th out of 40 countries.  A similar picture emerges if 
we consider the EPL on temporary contracts: in 2008 Italy occupies the 13th position 
out 42 countries.  The share of temporary workers has increased of 5 percentage points, 
passing from a 6% of workers employed with a fixed term contract in the 90s to a 11% 
of workers in the last 5 years.  The general growth of nonstandard work is particularly 
relevant for the young cohort as it is shown in the Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 Nonstandard employment 18-29 years old 
 
Source: ISTAT 2011 
 
Following we provide an excursus of the main legislative measures in direction of 
flexibilization of the labour market in Italy. 
A first crucial reform of the Italian Labour market was the Treu Law, introduced on 
June, 24 1997 (law 196/97) with the aim to increase the flexibility of the labour market and 
to reduce unemployment rate. An important intervention concerned the area of legal 
provisions of labour outsourcing (articles from 1 to 11). Specifically it concerned the 
abolition of the public monopoly on temporary agency work (Act No. 1369/1960) and 
the recognition of the legitimacy of private employment agencies. This reforms 
intended to provide specific organizational and management resource operating in 
favour of external flexibility to give more effective responses to the needs of the 
enterprise wishing to make use of external human resources. It also works in favor of 
the modernization of the productive system by providing models of contractual 
integration between companies coordinated by actors offering a range of services with a 
high degree of specialization.  
The Treu Package also modified the discipline on apprenticeship contracts. This 
contractual form obliges the entrepreneur to give the worker the basic notions necessary 
to transform him in a qualified worker. Art. 16 raised the age limit for apprenticeship 
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contracts from 22 to 24. The legal duration of an apprenticeship contract ranges 
between 18 months and 4 years, with some exception for the handcraft sector
4
.  
 
Following the Treu reform, another important measure concerned the regulation 
of fixed-term employment in 2001.  The Legislative Decree No. 368/2001 
implementing EU Directive No. 99/70/EC decided to adopt a clear formulation as found 
in other European systems:  “the employer may hire employees on fixed-term contracts, 
on condition that at the same time written motivation is provided of a technical, 
productive, or organizational nature, or for the substitution of personnel”.  
The Decree had the objective of curtailing the power of the employer, that would 
otherwise be discretionary, to place a limit on the duration of the employment contract. 
In addition, the reform of 2001 establishes the minimum interval (20 days) between two 
fixed-term contracts for the same worker within which the worker cannot continue to 
work regularly in the enterprise. In terms of safeguards for the employee, the burden of 
proof concerning the legitimacy of certain organizational and managerial decisions falls 
on the employer.   
 
A further step towards the flexibilization of the Labour Market has been the Biagi 
reform (N.30/2003, Legislative decree 276/2003) in 2003. The aim of the reform was to 
liberalize the employment regulation system, giving more spaces to nonstandard 
arrangements in order to create new job opportunities and to make more fluid the labour 
market to better meet the needs of firms operating in a broader, more uncertain and 
more unstable economic context.  
The reform redesigned existing employment contracts (part-time work, 
                                                          
4
 Apprenticeship contracts were introduced with law 25/55 and were not modified until the introduction 
of the Treu reform. 
 
 
36 
apprenticeships) and introduced new forms of nonstandard employment, to be used 
according to the needs of employers and employees. Following I briefly list the main 
new contractual forms. 
The job on call consists of a working activity to be performed on a discontinued 
or intermittent basis, according to the requirements specified in the collective 
agreements or, in their absence, in a specific decree to be issued by Italian Ministry of 
Labour. Under such type of contracts, the employee shall guarantee his/her availability 
to perform the work and shall be entitled to be paid an adequate stand-by allowance. 
Job on call contracts shall contain certain specific contractual elements, including the 
duration, the objective and subjective circumstances legitimating this type of contract, 
the place and terms according to which the employee shall be available, and the related 
notice of call, which shall in no event be less than one working day. 
A job-sharing contract is established when two or more employees jointly share 
the responsibility for the supply of a sole work obligation. Job sharers can decide how 
to replace one another at any time and at their own discretion. This type of contract 
should be regulated by collective agreements, in compliance with the rules set forth in 
the relevant decree. 
Occasional work has been defined as a self-employment relationship with the 
same principal not exceeding 30 days in a calendar year, and with a remuneration of 
less than EUR 5,000 per year. Outside such boundaries, the relationship shall be 
deemed a coordinated and continuous collaboration, with application of the limits 
described above. 
The Biagi law introduced also a new self-employment contract so-called ‘project-
base work’.  The project shall be determined in written form and shall specify, inter 
alia, the duration of the relationship (either determined or determinable), the criteria to 
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be adopted for determining the remuneration (proportioned to the quantity and quality 
of the work performed), the expiration dates, the terms of payment and the rules 
governing the reimbursement of expenses. Generally, collaboration contracts expire 
upon the completion of the project, but early termination is permitted according to the 
methods agreed upon by the parties. This area has resulted quite controversial for policy 
and academic debate for the fact that it combines typical conditions of subordinate 
employment with those of self-employment.  
The Reform has also provided for procedures enabling the "certification" of the 
new flexible contractual forms illustrated above. According to the legislator's intentions, 
the "certification" of employment contracts should clearly and correctly qualify the 
employment relationships, in relation to the distinction between independent and 
subordinate employment, between the content of staff supply and the contract 
concerning the supply of other services, and amongst similar contractual typologies (job 
on call, job sharing, part-time). The aim of such "certification" is to reduce disputes 
over the qualification of the employment relationships. In other words, the 
commencement of a certification procedure should provide prior qualification of a 
contract. 
The reform of 2003 has also reconsidered the relations between collective and 
individual bargaining. Individual autonomy seems to have been given greater 
recognition by the legislator with the reform. In particular, on numerous occasions, the 
legislator delegates the negotiation of certain matters (for example, certain aspects of 
part-time and training contracts, and occasional work) to individual autonomy when 
such matters are not addressed by collective agreements. However, it must be 
underlined that the main aim of this new approach by the legislator is to prevent the 
trade union from exerting power in such a way as to hinder the creation of a regulative 
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framework for individual bargaining (Tiraboschi 2010). 
 
3 The irregular use of nonstandard contracts in Italy 
 
Having briefly introduced the most important characteristics (for the purpose of 
the research), of the two recent Labour Market reforms in Italy, this Section aims to 
provide a clear definition of the main object of research of this thesis: the phenomenon 
of irregularities in nonstandard work.  
As far as the definitional framework is concerned, while the definition of 
"Irregular Work" including the two phenomena of "totally irregular and semi-irregular" 
in this way seems to be consistent with the definitions given by various national and 
international institutions, the paradigmatic features of recent developments of the Italian 
labour market contribute to further complicate the definitional framework.  
From the point of view of this research, the improper use of nonstandard contracts 
fall into the sphere of “Irregular work” when it satisfies the three requirements 
discussed above - i.e. a) it must be a paid activity; b) it must be lawful as regard its 
nature; c) it is (partially) not declared to public authorities. 
In the case of irregular nonstandard work, the first requirement is satisfied. 
According to Article 62 of the legislative decree 276/03, nonstandard forms of contract 
must be stipulated in written form, and contain specific details on the working 
partnership. In particular it should indicate the pay and method of payment, the working 
time, and the project in case of project-base contracts.  This means also that the lawful 
nature of the paid activity is, by necessity, certified (second requirement). 
In this analysis the main question is to which extent and, most important, under 
which contractual nature the employment performance is declared to the public 
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authorities (third requirement)? 
 
The official registration of the employment contracts in Italy involves different 
public authorities. They generally are: 1) specific offices managed at the regional level 
(Centri per l’impiego, law 59/1997); 2) National institute for the social security (INPS); 
3) National institute for health and safety at work (INAIL).   
Currently, the employer is obliged to send a compulsory notifications to the Job 
Centre (centri per l’impiego) one day before the hiring date. Employers must deliver to 
the employee a copy of the notification, which must contain all of the following 
information: 
- The worker's profile; 
- The workplace. In the absence of a fixed or main place of work, an indication 
that the worker is employed at various places, and the domicile of the employer; 
- The date of the begin of the employment relationship, the duration of the 
employment relationship and whether it is employment-time definite or indefinite; 
- The duration of the trial period if required - the placement, level and status 
attributed to the worker, and a brief description of the job,  
- The initial amount of the remuneration with an indication of the payment period  
- The duration of paid leave to which the employee is entitled  
- The working hours.  
The Job centers are required successively to transfer this information to INPS and 
INAIL. Such information must also be contained in the company employee register 
(libro unico) to be held at the work place.  
 
The factual application of the contract may be subject to inspection by public 
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authorities. Labour inspectors should collect "all the elements to assess the correct 
qualification of the contract, comparing the contents of the contract and the information 
contained in the company employee register, with the statements made by the worker 
and his or her colleagues” (Legislative Decree 124/2004). In case of a clear discrepancy 
between the nonstandard contract and the factual employment relationship, inspectors 
must proceed to reject the contract and qualify the employment relationship under a 
different contract (see box 1).  
Often, this discrepancy is evident when the working performance of the 
nonstandard worker is characterized by elements of subordination and/or permanent 
work.  As a result the real nature of the employment relationship turns to be unknown to 
the official statistics and to the tax authorities
5
. This undeclared aspect of the 
employment relationship fits into the ISTAT definition of Irregular Work and the 
European Commission definition of undeclared work. The employment relationship is 
declared with a false nonstandard contract, while its real nature is unknown to the 
public authorities.  
In conclusions, the cases of nonstandard employment de facto characterized by 
elements of subordination or permanent work represent a form of what in literature is 
commonly referred as grey work, in which the employment relationship is only partially 
(or wrongly) declared to the public authorities. 
Following the same descriptive design, the following chapter will have a deeper 
look at the theoretical framework surrounding the issues introduced in this first chapter. 
  
                                                          
5
 The specific cases of irregular nonstandard work analyzed in the research are listed in Chapter 3, 
Section 1. 
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Chapter 2. General theoretical approach and background 
literature  
 
1 Different explanations of irregular work: sociological and 
economic literature 
 
The studies attempting to understand the phenomenon of irregular work have 
concerned different field of research, from social sciences to economic and political 
studies, and it has involved very different perspectives.   
One of the main approaches towards the explanation of the evolution of irregular 
work refers to theories of modernization and to neoclassical economics. Modernization 
theory approaches in particular were common in the earlier academic discourse on 
irregular work in developing countries. In this perspective irregular work was seen as a 
‘backward’ component of a national economy (Geerz 1963; Hart 1973) not yet included 
in the modern economy. Later, other researchers have contested this view. Portes et al. 
(1999) argued that the irregular work has its own dynamic and innovative capacities for 
capitalist development and it represents an absolutely integral element in the 
contemporary economy. 
In the more recent debate on the development of welfare states, which is in part 
influenced by neoliberal thinking, in contrast to arguments based on modernization 
theory, a high level of state regulation is seen as the main cause of the increase in 
irregular work. It results from the over-regulation and heavy state intervention in the 
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economy through tax and social security system. According to this argument, 
individuals create the ‘underground economy’ by circumventing legal regulation and 
thereby establishing the ‘real’ free market. However, this is contradicted by the finding 
that in generous welfare states irregular work is rather lower than in less generous 
welfare states systems. Thus, according to the estimation of the underground economy 
conducted by Schneider and Feld in 2010 (see Table 1), the estimated pro-portion of 
irregular work in the GDP of the Northern European welfare states is comparatively low 
even though these are the most generous welfare state systems. The problem with this 
approach is that it sees the development of irregular work as taking place according to a 
single, unique ‘logic’. From the point of view of the thesis, there are different types of 
irregular work that vary with respect to the way in which they are embedded in societal 
contexts and in terms of the factors that influence the way in which they develop.  
 
 
43 
 
Table 1 Size of underground economy on national GDP 
OECD-countries 2007 
1. Australia 10.7 
2. Belgium 18.3 
3. Canada 12.6 
4. Denmark 14.8 
5. Germany 14.6 
6. Finland 14.5 
7. France 11.8 
8. Greece 25.1 
9. Great Britain 10.6 
10. Ireland 12.7 
11. Italy 22.3 
12. Japan 9.0 
13. Netherlands 10.1 
14. New Zealand 9.8 
15. Norway 15.4 
16. Austria 9.4 
17. Portugal 19.2 
18. Sweden 15.6 
19. Switzerland 8.2 
20. Spain 19.3 
21. USA 7.2 
average for 
21 OECD countries 
13.9 
  Source: Schneider and Lend 2010 
 
Large part of the economic and sociological literature has concentrated on the 
determinants of irregular work with the purpose to identify a pattern of policies to be 
imprinted at national and subnational level that could contrast the spread of the 
phenomenon. Nevertheless, even though the literature has so far mentioned a very 
broad number of possible causes of irregular work, it hasn’t reached a common and 
clear position on the pattern that generates and amplifies the phenomenon. 
In order to better delineate the approach of the research, in this section we 
proceed with a differentiation of the main factors producing irregular work between 
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those commonly accounted in the economic literature and those analysed by the 
sociological literature.  
Departing from the economic-type determinants of irregular work, most of the 
literature agrees on attributing to a high level of taxes and social security contributions 
one of the main reason to fall into irregular activities. Already in the document of the 
European Commission (1998) on Irregular Work it is argued that the propensity of 
economic activities to engage in irregularity of work is related to the general costs of 
labour, for which taxes and social security contributions represent an important part. 
Schneider (Schneider and Enste 2000; Schneider 2005) in its studies on the 
underground economy in Europe attributes an important role to the increase of taxes 
and social contributions in the labour market. This outlook considers in particular the 
high tax level as an incentive for workers and entrepreneurs to escape from formal rules 
and engage in irregular work.  
However, although the weight of the tax burden represents an important factor, it 
is not always decisive for the development of irregular work. OECD (2004) argues that 
it is not so much the amount of taxes to influence the spread of irregular work, but 
rather the characteristics of the tax systems and the attitudes of citizens toward the state. 
Also Schneider (2005) in his more recent empirical study of irregular work in Europe 
indicates that an important element is the acceptance and the subjective perception of 
the degree of fairness of the tax system. Accordingly, the higher level of tax morality 
(the positive attitude of citizens towards the state) corresponds to the less use of the 
irregular work. In the Table 2 it is shown an estimated percentage of the variables 
accounted by Schneider in 2005, including the influence in percentage of Tax and 
Social Security contribution Burdens and the tax morality.  
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Table 2 Causes of the Shadow Economy  
Factors influencing the shadow economy Influence on the shadow economy (in %) 
(a) (b) 
(1)     Increase  of  the  Tax  and  Social  Security 
Contribution Burdens 
35-38 45-52 
(2)     Quality of State Institutions 10-12 12-17 
(3)     Transfers 5-7 7-9 
(4)     Specific Labour Market Regulations 7-9 7-9 
(5)     Public Sector Services 5-7 7-9 
(6)     Tax Morale 22-25 - 
Influence of all Factors 84-98 78-96 
(a) Average values of 12 studies. 
(b) Average values of empirical results of 22 studies. 
   Source: Schneider (2005) 
 
With respect to the case of Italy there is a wide national-level economic literature 
particularly focusing on the phenomenon of tax evasion in employment relations (Tanzi 
1999, Boeri and Garibaldi 2001, Valentini 2004, Marignani and Pisani 2006).  The 
empirical literature investigated on several determinants of tax evasion, such as the 
firms’ size, the geographical location, the sector of activity and the firms’ legal 
framework.   
Valentini (2004) studied the causal link between the level of contributions for 
Social Security and the tax evasion, showing that the effects of the level of contribution 
rate may turn to be different for the parties. For companies, the contribution rate is an 
additional cost, while for workers it represents a deferred income more or less relevant 
depending on the structure of the contribution system. According to Valentini, with 
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regard to the pension systems, when the retirement age is too high it may encourage 
irregular work because it averts the prospect of retirement and shortens the period of 
enjoyment of the pension. In this way the worker’s expected benefit is reduced.  
 
Apart from the studies on the very economic-type determinants of irregular work, 
which constituted an important contribution to the understanding of the phenomenon, a 
large part of the quantitative research has focused also on other factors more linked to 
the dynamics and the composition of the labour market in a given society.   
In this direction, a common argument of the economic research is that a very 
important factor for the growth of irregular work is represented by the role of immigrant 
work. Most of this research is conducted with the intent of determining whether the 
function of immigrant work may be considered an additional rather than a competitive 
element with respect to the local workforce of a given country (Donolo and Capparucci 
2002). In this regard, the majority of scholars of immigration are agreed that the 
transformations occurring in the advanced economies generate phenomena of 
segmentation of the labour market, therefore, the use of immigrant doesn’t impact 
employment and wage levels of native workers (Venturini 1996). According to this 
perspective, Immigrant workers are those who are most likely to fall into irregular 
work.  
Other Empirical studies on the determinants of the irregular work have generally 
revealed a positive correlation between the spread of irregular work and unemployment 
and activity rates. According to several authors (Boeri and Garibaldi 2002; Barbieri 
2000) the reason why unemployment and irregular work are correlated phenomena is 
because they respond interactively to the formal economy. Specifically, the hypothesis 
held that when the average duration of unemployment is particularly long it discourages 
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the finding of a regular job, and irregular positions may become stable. In addition it 
has been proved that a large amount of unemployed are not totally inactive but rather 
engaged in undeclared activities (Lucifora 2003, Williams and Windebank 2002) not 
easy to be grasped by statistical reports.  
 
The economic literature has certainly the merit of having provided a number of 
tools for the measurement of the phenomenon and for the analysis of the interactions 
between macro and micro variables in “contextualized economies”. However it has 
generally provided a description of irregular work as a uniform phenomenon clearly 
defined and circumscribed by legal boundaries. Within this outlook irregular work is 
mostly intended as a market-like phenomenon conducted for profit-motivated purposes, 
generally based of alternative modes of existence with respect to the official rules.  
This thesis will particularly refer, instead, to those sociological studies that have 
highlighted the more elusive and less explicit, but no less significant, aspects of the 
phenomenon. From the analytical perspective of the thesis, irregular work represents a 
complex field of differing forms of employment relations that are based on different 
motivations of the actors involved and involving different degrees of social integration.  
For the purpose of the research it is therefore important to look more closely at 
the impact of the process of flexibilization and the attitude of individual actors to 
engage into different forms of irregular work. Following this approach, the presence of 
structural and environmental resources in a specific territory, informal networks, social 
norms, individual risks in a context of flexible labour market, are all crucial aspects for 
a deeper understanding of the phenomenon.  
Williams and Windebank have conducted a broad sociological research in this 
direction. They challenged the common interpretation of irregular work exclusively as a 
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market-like phenomenon conducted for profit-motivated purposes. Instead, they 
highlighted its social function when conducted for motives more akin to unpaid mutual 
aid and informal reciprocity (Williams and Windebank 2001, 2005). This interpretation 
broadly considers the fundamental interplay between informal networks, systems of 
production, welfare state framework and labour market institutions as determinants of 
irregular work. What is very important for our purpose here is that irregular work is not 
considered by these authors just an hidden economic issue to be discovered, but it is 
seen as a complex phenomenon itself embedded into the social behaviours and closely 
interacting in a dynamic way with official Labour Market institutions.  
It has been argued that the underground economy, often arises from a reciprocity 
between workers and enterprises or between the suppliers and users of services, and on 
the implicit social norms that regulate division of the spoils deriving from evasion of 
the rules (fiscal and contributory). It is through informal relational networks based on 
complicity that irregular firms can find workers willing to be hired ‘off the books’. In 
specific territorial contexts, these networks represent a necessary condition for the 
match between demand and supply or for accessing to the market (Williams and 
Windemback 2002;  Regalia 2004).  
In sociology, social norms are crucial in determining individual behaviours. 
Bonaventura (2005) has studied the role of social norms as an important factor 
conditioning the extent of irregular work in Italy. He describes a mechanism of 
formation and maintenance over time of a social norm that "coordinates the choices of 
individuals" in the selection of a regular / irregular economy. The author concludes that 
the establishment of commonly accepted social norms that “justify” or “reject” the 
phenomenon of irregular work is determinant for the polarization of a micro-economic 
systems toward a situation of complete regularity of working positions on the one hand 
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or irregularity on the other hand. In few words the social norm is crucial for the 
collective choice toward a certain type (regular or irregular) of labour market. 
A critique can be done to the thesis of Bonaventura. His thesis does not consider 
those situations of "partial irregularity" of the employment relations (Samek Lodovici 
and Semenza, 2002) actually existing, albeit often in a latent form, in certain working 
contexts. The main assumption of the Bonaventura’s thesis is that irregular and regular 
work are related by a structural trade-off. The choices of actors, determined by social 
norms, can lead over time toward a polarization of situations of generalized irregularity 
or, in the other case, of regularity of the labour market. Contrastingly, in this thesis it 
will be argued that regular and irregular work can have a different relationship not 
always characterized by inverse proportionality. Often, a certain kind of regular 
working contracts may be accompanied by irregular aspect of the performance of the 
employment relation, therefore regular and irregular may "walk" together in a dynamic 
interaction.  
 
Another branch of the sociological literature (Dalago 1991, Williams and 
Windebank 2005; Bonolo 2002; Pfau-Effinger 2009) has focused on the territorial 
context as a crucial determinant for the establishment and spread of certain type of 
undeclared work. 
In the Italian case Bonolo and Lucifora (2002) identify important differences 
between two different areas. In Center and South of Italy, we find an irregular work “by 
necessity” given that the phenomenon of undeclared work is a physiological component 
deeply embedded in informal network and in micro-systems of small and medium 
enterprises. Differently, in the North we find an irregular work “by convenience” 
mostly related to the search for greater flexibility and lower production costs. Following 
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this perspective, the thesis considers the territorial context as a determining factor in 
defining the various forms of irregular work and it is the dimension on which we’ll 
focus the empirical research (See chapter 3, Section 1.2). Through the consideration of 
economic and social characteristics of different geographic areas we consider the 
different shape and dimensions of irregular work stemming from its interaction with the 
productive structure and networks of a specific territorial context. 
It is also essential to consider the literature that reconstructs the profile of 
individuals who are most likely to engage in irregular work. Most of irregular workers 
are generally represented by those categories that lack of substantial requirements to 
enter in the regular labour market. A low educational level is usually accounted as an 
important determinant for individuals to engage in irregular work (Blossfeld and Mayer 
1988; McKeever 2006), given that irregular work has traditionally concentrated in the 
low professional-profile sectors. Nonetheless, the results of a study by Barbieri and 
Fullin (2001) shows that the shortening of demand for professional labour pushes also 
high-educated workers to provide services within the underground economy. For high 
skilled workers and professionals such as doctors, dentists, therapists, psychoanalysts, 
the irregular provision of services may represent an attractive option when there is a 
lack of demand in the regular market.  According to the analyses of Ahn and De la Rica 
(1997) a high education offers more occupational opportunities both in the regular and 
in the irregular sphere of the labour market when employment prospects are uncertain. 
Another important factor to consider is age. Barbieri and Fullin argue that the 
spread of irregular work occurred by excluding the youngest cohorts from the labour 
market. According to these authors, the young generation is not able to provide the 
types of skills required in the regular work and is not willing to accept repetitive tasks, 
and therefore they are more likely to fall into irregular work. Moreover, another age 
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group at risk of irregular work is composed of the population under retirement. A report 
by the European Commission (2004) found that the retirement age does not mean the 
permanent withdrawal from the labour force. Where regulatory issues do not allow the 
accumulation of retirement income, the retirees may opt for irregular work to 
supplement their income. 
Finally, the studies of individuals most at risk of irregular work have considered 
gender inequalities as another important factor. Pfau-Effinger (2009) suggests to look at 
at the "gender arrangement" of a given society. This concept refers to the relations 
between the cultural system, social structure and institutions, and it represents the 
framework in which the gender division of labour occurs. She assumes that the "gender 
contract" in a country is the result of a previous conflict, but also a process of 
negotiation and compromise among social actors. This factor varies significantly 
depending on the welfare regime (Esping-Andersen 1990). Therefore, particularly in 
Mediterranean countries the subsidiary role of the state in providing services - in 
particular household services, childcare and services for the elderly - in comparison to 
the Nordic European countries, increases women's participation in the underground 
economy.  
 
What has emerged from this brief review is that over the years there have been 
many theoretical and empirical perspectives dealing with irregular work. In particular, 
important differences remain between the economic literature, which adopted a more 
explicative and descriptive approach, and the sociological literature, which embraced a 
more interpretative perspective. Nevertheless, the phenomenon has shown such a 
multifaceted character that is difficult, and sometimes superficial, to be explained 
through a single discipline. Cooperation among social sciences has resulted essential in 
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the use of multiple interpretive instruments, such as analysis of informal networks and 
the constant reference to the “embeddedness approach”. By these "crossovers", the 
study about irregular work has been certainly enriched.  Still, several aspects of the 
phenomenon remain broadly unexplored. The processes of internal and external 
organizational restructuring of enterprises, the impact of the financial crisis on 
contextual productive systems and the continuous changes of the legislative framework 
on regulation of the labour market and social security are redefining many parts of the 
formal and informal sector of the economy. The next section will focus more deeply on 
the close interaction between irregular work and the characteristics of todays of labour 
market framework and productive structures. 
 
2 The more flexible, the less irregular? 
 
Within the European Union in the last twenty years there has been a growing call 
for flexibility in the labour markets. The debate over labour market flexibility has had 
an increasing influence over the direction of social and economic policy in all European 
Countries. The view that the “rigidity” of labour markets in terms of institutional 
constraints, legislation on employment relations and collective agreements, constituted 
a significant obstacle to economic growth have gained support at the level of policy 
makers, employers and, not least, in part of the academic establishment. Concerns over 
high levels of persistent unemployment and low levels of employment in many Member 
States has led many to argue that a rigid regulative framework has obstructed the 
operation of labour markets, limiting the necessary adjustments to changes in demand, 
hindering innovation, and restricting job creation.  
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Flexibility of the labour market through the provision of higher levels of 
nonstandard work was considered by the majority of the economic and sociological 
literature the most effective tool in the fight against mass unemployment of the eighties 
and nineties (OECD 1994).  
Advocates of this viewpoint claimed that employment growth in EU countries 
could only be achieved through the deregulation of employment legislation and the 
dismantling of institutional barriers to flexibility. Thus, from the ‘90s there have been 
growing calls for the elimination of 'rigidities' in labour markets in order to increase 
sectorial and occupational mobility within the labour force, and to encourage the use of 
non standard working patterns, all with a  view  to expanding overall employment 
levels (Esping-Andersen and Regini 2000). 
However, the relationship between labour market rigidity and unemployment 
rates has never had a strong empirical support (Blanchard, 1998; Bertola, 1990). What 
has been demonstrated, instead, is the incidence of rigidity on the average duration of 
unemployment, and on the strong segmentation between insiders and outsiders. 
Countries with a more rigid labour market offer greater protection to employees and 
provide them with greater bargaining power, while the unemployed, particularly those 
who are seeking their first job, meet high institutional barriers to access into the labour 
market (Semenza, 2004). 
Accordingly, the growth of nonstandard forms of employment may represent an 
enhancement of employment opportunities for groups previously discriminated by the 
law's emphasis on protecting workers in 'standard' employment relations. There has 
been some evidence that nonstandard employment may work as an entry into stable 
employment, not least, because flexible employment might be used as a screening 
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period with the ‘good matches’ being converted into permanent contracts after some 
time (McGinnity et  al., 2005; Addison  and  Surfield, 2006).  Ichino et al. (2003) find 
support for the ‘atypical-push’ hypothesis for Italy, showing that temporary forms of 
employment enhance the workers’ chances to subsequently enter in a stable, secure job.  
On the other hand, commentators have pointed out that the process of 
flexibilization of employment conditions and the decomposition of the production 
systems are accompanied by a decay of the traditional regulation of the labour market. 
This has raised concerns that these ‘new’ flexible jobs may crowd out more stable 
employment  (Kahn, 2007) becoming an additional source of insecurity for workers and 
increasing labour market dualism between workers finding stable career jobs and those 
failing to do so (OECD 2007; Barbieri and Scherer 2008).  
 
A common assumption in the literature is that a rigid labour market leads to a 
segmentation of working status whereby the excluded segment would be more likely to 
fall into irregular work. 
One of the first theoretical contributions in this direction is the so-called 
segmentation theory, developed by several American economists (Doeringer and Piore 
1971). The authors discussed about the existence of two types of labour markets: a 
primary "regular" labour market in the more advanced sectors that is highly structured 
and protected, and a residual secondary one that is extremely informal and precarious in 
the backward sectors. In Italy, Contini (1979) talks about a particular dualism of the 
economic system having an official-declared side, where all economic activities are 
regulated in compliance with law, and an unofficial-undeclared side, where activities 
mostly rely on informal regulation. In his analysis on the industrial production systems 
in Italy in the 1960s he found that a growing fraction of the production of goods and 
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services was achieved through the use of the labour force out of the wage legislation. 
During the era of fordism, the composition of domestic production was characterized by 
rigidity, high standardization, and strong employment protection for employees that 
exacerbated the dichotomy insiders / outsiders. Irregular work, as a phenomenon 
existing exclusively in the secondary sector, was seen as legally and economically well-
defined and separated from the formal work regulation, but it also represented a form of 
unreported flexibility extremely useful to respond to short-term adjustments of 
production. 
Many interpretations for this dualism refer to the “functional” nature of the 
undeclared work that is able to respond to the needs of employers searching for lower 
production costs and higher numerical flexibility in a rigid labour market. However, this 
dualistic interpretation has been subject to many criticisms. In particular, Meldolesi 
(1997) argues: "irregular work and secondary labour market are not always directly 
related, as there exist many areas of undeclared work carried on by high skilled workers, 
with wage earnings even higher than those in the official market”.  
 
From this starting point, the main interest of this thesis concerns the link between 
irregular work and the mechanisms of the contemporary Labour Market in Italy, and the 
consequences of the expansion of a more striking external flexibility, particularly after 
the Labour Market reform occurred in 2003 (Law 276/2003).  
More specifically, the question of greater scientific interest is the following: Has 
the spread of nonstandard employment reduced the incidence of irregular work? 
 
The question raised a peculiar debate among the literature on irregular work. 
Some studies have shown that the process of flexibilization of the labour market is able 
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to contrast the underground economy (Loayza 1996; Johnson 1997; Valentini 2004). 
Other empirical evidence supports this hypothesis: Boeri and Garibaldi (2002) argue 
that external and numerical flexibility, whenever it facilitates the matching of supply 
and demand, may be able to reduce irregular employment. This is for the following 
reasons: From the demand side, the rigidity of labour market institutions constitutes one 
of the most important factors leading companies to engage into irregular forms of 
employment. According to this argument less stringent regulations in terms of hiring, 
dismissal and wage, would increase the incentive for companies to regularize and 
declare employees at work. From the supply side, it is argued, the creation of new 
occupational opportunities through an enlargement of the number of flexible 
employment arrangements would reduce the necessity for unemployed to fall into 
irregular work. This argument is connected to the assumption that the propensity of 
workers to be offered in irregular segments of the labour market is positively related to 
the high rate of unemployment, and that Irregular Work constitutes an option of last 
resort in front of a low probability of finding regular employment. Therefore, being 
assumed that flexibility of the labour market increases employment rate, it is also 
reasonable to consider that it reduces at the same time the incentive (or need), for 
workers to accept irregular forms of employment. 
The assumption of a trade-off between nonstandard and irregular work in the 
case of Italy, however, has been questioned by several research. The National Institute 
of Statistics (ISTAT 2005) in a publication that takes into account the time series of 
estimates of nonregular work units in the period 1980-2004 concludes that flexibility 
has not reduced the extent of irregular work. This is because the phenomenon responds 
to both employers needs to reduce costs, and employees themselves, whenever it 
facilitates the entry into the regular labour market. Other studies have pointed out that 
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many types of nonstandard employment relations entails the risk of an enlargement of 
semi-irregular work. Samek Lodovici and Zanzottera (2002) and Lucifora (2003), 
although they clearly underline the complexity in tracing the relationship between 
nonstandard employment and irregular work, they claim that nonstandard employment 
provided by the labour market reform Treu (1997) and the Biagi (2003) may create the 
conditions for the development of semi-irregular work such as the irregular application 
of working-time flexibility (in part-time contracts) or irregularities in self-employment 
contracts in order to hide very typical-subordinated employment.  
An attempt to evaluate empirically the effect of substitution between nonstandard 
work and irregular work in Italy has been conducted by Viviani (2010). The author tries 
to investigate whether the spread of nonstandard employment has or has not provided 
an opportunity to legalize undeclared occupations. The strategy used is to study the 
workers’ career mobility from a status of ‘totally undeclared’ toward a status of regular 
nonstandard worker in the last years. The longitudinal analysis underline the fact that 
only a very small number of irregular workers have found a job under new forms of 
nonstandard contracts, concluding that it is unlikely that there are direct shifts within 
these two status. Overall, the author argues that the empirical results reject the 
hypothesis that in Italy the spread of nonstandard types of employment has been able to 
reduce the extent of undeclared work.  
 
In conclusion, the literature that attempted to analyse the relationship between 
irregular work and flexibility of the labour markets has shown a twofold fundamental 
shortcoming.  
On the one hand, a consistent part assumes that (external) flexibility and 
irregularity are analytically separated and linked by a substitutive relation, implying that 
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a quantitative variation of irregular work is only indirectly related to the quantitative 
variation of nonstandard form of employment. Irregular work and flexible work are 
considered as two separate spheres and never overlapping, and influenced by external 
mechanism determining their quantitative dimension. In few words, the basic 
assumption encountered in the literature is that irregularity and flexibility are “mutually 
exclusive” (the two phenomena are always separate and therefore substitutable).  
On the other hand the literature in some cases mentioned that flexibility and 
irregularity may coexist in the same working conditions and be directly linked to each 
other, but it didn’t provide a theoretical framework and empirical support that can 
explain this relationship.  
Following the analytical direction suggested by the sociological literature on 
irregular work, the thesis develops a theoretical framework with a closer focus to those 
individual risks stemming from the characteristics of the contemporary regulative 
framework and the economic context in Italy. In this aspect, it is therefore necessary an 
assessment of the literature dealing with the effects of the process of flexibilization of 
the labour market on the individual sphere and on the dynamics of employment 
relations. The next section will further develop this point.   
 
3 New practices in employment relations: an open issue 
 
This thesis considers the transformations of employment practices as an 
inseparable issue from of the individual sphere and from the changing strategies of 
actors in employment relations. The focus will be in particular on the behaviour of 
actors at the firm and individual level as regards the way nonstandard contracts may be 
implemented. It is therefore crucial to consider the different perspectives of the demand 
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and the supply side on the new possibilities nonstandard contracts may offer within 
employment relations.  
 
As far as the demand side is concerned, theoretical and empirical literature 
(Christensen 1995; Kalleberg 1999; Schmid and Storrie 2001) has broadly discussed 
over the advantages and disadvantages of a widespread use of nonstandard work in a 
firm. Among the advantages, the availability of nonstandard contracts was reflected on 
new possibilities for the management with regard to the form in which labour is 
contracted. The use of new forms of employment may correspond to explicit strategies 
of flexible production and organization of the firm. In this case, the reasons for the 
increase in the use of nonstandard contracts can be traced on the fluctuations of demand 
of goods or services and the need to secure specific skills to be canalized to 
circumstantial marketing goals. Moreover, the use of nonstandard forms of employment 
is related to the avoidance of the so called termination costs (costs for individual 
dismissals), and to the decrease of labour costs linked to a lower pay and less 
contributory constraints (Sacchi, Berton, Richiardi 2009). 
However, there is a wide variety of problems for the management related to the 
use of flexible work: difficulties in relying on specific human resources with specific 
skills when needed; increase of work force coordination and management costs; the risk 
that contingent or peripheral workers will be less committed to the firm and unreliable 
in their work; the consequent risk of an overload of responsibility on permanent 
workers; the risk that the quality of products or services will deteriorate (Christensen 
1995; Schmid and Storrie 2001; Regalia 2006). 
In human resources management, two different needs must be balanced. Firstly, 
the management needs flexible work to better respond to the fluctuations of demand of 
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goods, but at the same time it should avoid the negative effects that nonstandard 
contracts, low wages and modest protections may have on workers commitment 
resulting in unproductiveness of the investments in specific human capital. The internal 
segmentation between a group of more stable workers and other workers employed 
from time to time in order to satisfy temporary needs of production is one of the main 
strategies used by employers to respond to this problem. From this point of view, in 
fact, a dualistic model of work organization based on the distinction between a central 
and a peripheral work force have been confirmed by several empirical studies (Rubery 
and Wilkinson 1994; Regalia 2006).  
 
As far as the supply side is concerned labour market flexibilization policies may 
have a twofold effect. On one hand, it may represent a way to increase the employment 
chances for those categories traditionally weaker and less represented in the labour 
market (especially women and young persons), and a way to reduce the risk of 
unemployment and to fall into the irregular labour market (Francesconi and Garcia-
Serrano 2004). Furthermore, it can help workers to collect working experiences and 
knowledge in order to reach an optimal bargaining power within the labour market 
(Reyneri 2005). Nevertheless, there is a wide variety of risks for workers: risk of lower 
level of earning security and higher uncertainty of future unemployment; risk of 
limitations on human capital, given that, in general, nonstandard workers are subject to 
less investment in their training and career development by firms; risk of reduced rights 
and entitlements ( Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano 2004. Regalia 2006). 
In Italy, economic and sociologic literature on the effects of the spread of 
nonstandard employment (Barbieri 2008; Sacchi, Berton, Ricchiardi 2010; IRES 2011) 
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has raised several concerns about the risks on which Italian nonstandard workers may 
occur.  
In an empirical study, Barbieri (2008) higligths that educated school leavers are at 
risk of finding themselves in repeated nonstandard employment contracts, due to the 
specific way labour market deregulation has been targeted. Therefore, they are more at 
risk to remain entrapped in precarious economic conditions or to face periods of non-
employment increases with successive episode of nonstandard employment, creating 
the picture of an increasingly segmented labour market.  
Sacchi et al. (2009) have identified three main determinants of a condition of 
‘precariousness’ of work: (1) lack of employment continuity, (2) lack of a decent wage 
level and (3) non-access to income-maintenance schemes in case of unemployment. 
They clarify that a nonstandard worker is not, per se, precarious, as far as they are able 
to provide in the medium term for their own economic support through the labour 
market or through access to income maintenance schemes. Thus, they found out that 
even if numerical flexibility and precariousness cannot be conflated at the analytical 
level, it turns out that, in Italy, they are strongly associated at the empirical level. The 
main finding of their analysis is that the peculiar partial and targeted flexibilization of 
the Italian labour market led to new and enduring cleavages in the society. This process 
fosters concrete risks of persistent exclusion for nonstandard workers from full social 
citizenship rights. 
A substantial portion of nonstandard workers tends to be in low-paid jobs and 
have a lower job protection. Consequently, they often experience periods of 
unemployment and are usually not entitled to benefits aimed at either replacing income 
or reducing poverty. Part-time, fixed-term and temporary agency workers despite being 
formally covered in case of unemployment, are likely to meet insurmountable obstacles 
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in accessing ordinary unemployment benefits due to the strict eligibility requirements 
and the existence of minimum thresholds for contributions (cf. Madama and Sacchi, 
2007). The So-called project workers (named as co-co-co and co-co-pro workers) are in 
the most critical condition; in fact, they are formally self-employed and, as a 
consequence, they not entitled to any kind of unemployment benefit.  
The focus on employment relations in this research leads us to deepen on the link 
between institutional regulative framework and actor’s behaviours and strategies at the 
individual level. For this reason, a part of the theoretical framework will refer to the 
actor-centered institutionalism perspective. The following section aims to further 
elaborate the theoretical approach in this direction.   
 
4 The choice of an actor-centered approach  
 
Mechanisms of interaction between individual employers and employees among 
formal and informal rules in nonstandard work have been generally overlooked by most 
of the economic and sociological literature. My contribution attempts to underline the 
importance of actors’ strategies and behaviours at the level of employment relations for 
the emergence of irregular practices within the regulative framework of nonstandard 
work in Italy.  
According to the actor-centered institutionalism perspective (Maynz and Sharpf 
1995; Sharpf 1997), central to the literature on institutional change in political economy, 
the behaviours of individual actors is not completely determined by macro-level 
institutional settings. Actors have always a room at one’s disposal for a change in 
strategic action and therefore a way to deviate from the formal regulative framework 
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when implementing the rules in line with their interests. In this perspective, individuals 
exploit the implicit ambiguity of rules to gain advantages in a context of conflicting 
interests given a certain space of action, their capabilities and power, and their 
normative and cognitive orientation. These aspects are crucial for individuals to engage 
in irregular employment practices.  
The actor-centered institutionalism in sociology attempts to bring together the 
various perspectives in the social sciences by using domain-bridging concepts such as 
choice, bounded rationality, and social embeddedness. It revitalizes the classical 
sociological focus on context-bound rationality and integrates sociological with 
economic approaches, i.e. the interplay between social institutions and economic action. 
Scharpf (1997) has developed a model that similarly integrates the rational choice 
model with the institutional perspective, focusing explicitly on how the institutional 
environment influences the preferences and capabilities of, and interaction between, 
actors.  
This approach also brings together formal and informal rules in structuring 
behaviour of individuals. According to Scharpf, actors’ behaviour depends on socially 
constructed formal and informal rules to orient their actions that reduce the range of 
potential behaviour. In other words: the institutional setting affects both their 
orientations and capabilities.  Nonetheless, actions are not related to interests that can 
objectively be defined; rather actors behave on the basis of their subjective and variable 
preferences. An actor is pragmatist and preferences develop through interaction. 
Preferences are not pre-existent, but are constructed and shaped in  the  course  of  the  
interaction  between  actors  and  their environment.  
Therefore preferences cannot only be deduced from the social role actors play 
within a certain institutional setting but also from their strategic behaviours given a 
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certain space of manoeuvre in a context of conflicting interests. Thus, individual self-
interest always plays some role and should also be taken into account. In this sense, the 
framework still contains elements of a rational choice perspective whereby individuals, 
acting purposefully on the basis of their preferences, are rather capable of determining 
policy outcomes in line with their own interests.  
In our analysis of irregular nonstandard contracts, three main issues mentioned in 
the actor-centered institutionalism and institutional change are here crucial for the 
emergence of irregular practices in nonstandard work:  
a) Re-interpretation of the rules by individual actors, b) differential power 
resources, c) normative and cognitive individual orientation. 
 
a) Re-interpretation of the rules individual actors 
In their work “Institutional change in advanced political economies”, Streek and 
Thelen (2005) argue that:  
“implementation of a certain policy implies a dynamic process of interaction of 
the actors involved. Institutional settings can be interpreted differently by different 
actors and interpretations and outcomes of the institutional environment are closely 
linked to the interests of actors … They act strategically and even those not involved in 
the design of an institution will do everything in their power to interpret its rules in their 
own interest … The aim is to compete for market share or strategic assets by exploiting 
the human, financial and economic resources available in an open market”. 
This process also depends on the extent to which rules are open to different 
interpretations. Rules often contain a certain degree of under-definition and this 
provides space for discretional behaviours over how rules should be interpreted and 
applied. Therefore individual actors do not just implement the rules made for them, but 
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also try to revise them in the process of implementation and exploit their inherent 
ambiguity on behalf of their own interests. 
 
b) Differential of power resources between actors 
In an actor-centered institutionalism approach individual actors are characterized 
by specific action capabilities. Capabilities are all resources that allow an actor to 
influence an outcome in certain respects and to a certain degree. Particularly important 
here are the action resources defining competencies and granting or limiting rights of 
participation and autonomous decision of individual actors. They include personal 
qualities, institutional resources, technological capabilities, and privileged access to 
information (Scharpf 1997). Accordingly, the extent to which an individual actor can 
secure its own interest depends on its capability to influence an outcome given a certain 
degree of power resources vis-à-vis the other actor. 
This concerns the issue of power relations. Deviations from the institutional 
framework may thus be the results of unbalanced power resources of the actors. Today 
it is commonly recognized that the process of globalization strengthens the power 
position of capital over labour, and that to an important extent employers and managers 
over employees (Keune and Schmidt, 2009). Given this asymmetry of power, 
employers, rather than employees, have a higher capacity to strategically mediate, and 
opportunely deviate from, the regulative framework of nonstandard work on behalf of 
their own interests.  
 
c) Normative and cognitive orientation of individuals 
Action orientations are roughly the characteristic perceptions and preferences of a 
particular actor. The actor-centered institutionalism assumes that actors do not act on 
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the basis of an objective reality but on the basis of a perceived reality. Additionally, it 
assumes that actors do not only act on the basis of objective needs, but also on the basis 
of preferences reflecting their normative convictions of how it is right or good or 
appropriate to act under different circumstances. As Sharpf states “…human action is 
based on culturally shaped and socially constructed beliefs about the real world. Most 
human action will occur in social organizational roles with clearly structured 
responsibilities and competencies with assigned resources that can be used for specific 
purposes” (Sharpf 1997). 
Similarly, Streeck and Thelen have pointed out that the meaning of a rule is never 
self-evident and always subject to interpretation and clarification of the operative 
meaning of formal norms that presupposes a culturally shared understanding of those 
norms. Life in a normatively ordered community requires ongoing efforts to develop 
and maintain a shared understanding of what the rule says exactly that one has to apply 
to a given situation. This holds for highly formalized norms, like written law, no less 
than for informal ones (Streeck and Thelen 2005). Accordingly, it can be argued that an 
institutional regulative framework may be challenged by a specific cognitive and 
normative orientation of individuals that is in contrast with its logic and the normative 
purposes of a certain macro regulative framework.  
Summarizing, the extent to which individuals can use the normative framework to 
pursue their own interests will depend on their capacity to mediate the rules in line with 
their interests given a certain power and according to their normative and cognitive 
preferences. Interaction of employers and employees within the evolving of the 
institutional framework is therefore crucial to understand the mechanisms of 
development of informal employment practices among the use of nonstandard contracts 
in Italy.  
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Chapter 3. Hypotheses and research design: irregularities in 
nonstandard work 
 
1 Hypotheses 
 
1.1 A direct relationship between irregular and nonstandard work? 
 
The process of deregulation of employment relations and the process of 
flexibilization of the labour market was considered essential to make the labour market 
more fluid and efficient, to reduce the high rates of unemployment (total and youth) and 
to increase productivity and facilitate economic growth.  
The needs for a renewed Labour Market were reflected in important legislative 
reforms, the Treu Law (June 1997, n.197) and the Biagi Law ( December 2003, n.276), 
which liberalized the employment regulation system, giving more spaces to 
nonstandard work. The underlying scope of the reforms was to reduce the extent of 
irregular work on which many enterprises rely in order to avoid unsuited constraints 
and be more dynamic within the market. In particular one of the objectives of the Biagi 
law was the creation of a “transparent and efficient labour market that can increase job 
opportunities and ensure everyone has equal access to a regular employment and 
quality”. The introduction of new contractual arrangements (such as on-call work, 
occasional work, etc.) was in fact the purpose of providing a tool to reduce the extent of 
 
 
68 
irregular work, basically because it would represent an incentive for both the demand 
and the supply side to declare their irregular activities.  
 
Despite the generalized application of different contractual forms of nonstandard 
work, no empirical evidence has proven that a more flexible have reduced the extent of 
Irregular Work within the national economic system.  
On the one hand, nonstandard employment has increased rapidly over the last two 
decades. In 2008 more than half the increase in employment took the form of 
‘nonstandard’ contracts (CNEL, 2009). The so-called project workers (named as co-co-
co and co-co-pro workers) were estimated to a number between 400,000 and 1 million 
(Ministero del Lavoro, della Salute e delle Politiche Sociali, 2008): that is, 2–4 per cent 
of the working population. The percentage of temporary contracts jumped from 5 
percent in mid-nineties to more than 13 percent in 2010 (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3 Temporary employees on total employees (%) 
 
Source: Tealdi 2012 from OCSE data 
 
It has to be noted, however, that nonstandard jobs are unevenly distributed across 
the different cohorts: in 2008 the incidence of fixed-term jobs, for example, varies from 
42.3 per cent of total employment for those aged 15–24 to 12.2 per cent in the 35–49 
age group and 6.4 per cent for those over 50 years of age (ISTAT 2009). This means 
that nonstandard work has been mainly pursued for those entering the labour market or, 
more generally, for the youngest cohort.  
On the other hand, the reduction of the extent of irregular work did not occur.  
The irregularity rate (Figure 4) was maintained at fairly high levels until 2001 and 
2002, when two major amnesties have been approved. The first is the law 383 of 2001, 
which provided incentives such as tax and benefit systems to employers that provided 
to stabilize the undeclared employees, and the second is the Bossi-Fini law of 2002 
which provided for the immediate expulsion of illegal immigrants and proposed an 
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amnesty for the emergence of undeclared foreign workers. More than 300 thousand 
illegal workers have been legalized in 2001 and 700 thousand migrant workers have 
been legalized after the second amnesty. After 2003, estimates by ISTAT (2010) 
demonstrate irregularity rate in Italy presents a new increasing trend. From a total of 
2811700 thousand of irregular work units in 2003, we moved in 2010 to more than 3 
million of units (ISTAT 2010).  
A recent empirical study conducted by Tealdi (2012) shows that the reform have 
had no significant effect in absorbing irregular work in Italy: employers traditionally 
using totally undeclared workers, after the reform continue to do so, while those 
employers regularly declaring the workforce, after the reform prefer to hire workers 
with temporary contracts rather than permanent contract.  
 
Figure 3 Estimation of Irregularity rate 
 
Source: elaboration from Istat data 2011 
 
An important aspect must be underlined as regard the real trend of the extent of 
irregular work: estimation on irregular work provided by Istat (based on irregular “work 
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units”) does not include the phenomenon of semi-irregular work. From this perspective 
this thesis aims to outline an unexpected consequence of the spread of nonstandard 
work: the application of nonstandard contracts may generate forms of grey work not 
accounted in the official statistics on irregular work. These are the cases in which there 
is an inconsistency between the effective working relationship and the contract applied. 
The non-compliance of contractual requirements established by law for nonstandard 
work determines its economic and statistical concealment of the real employment 
relationship, therefore we are in front of forms of semi-irregular work, whereby 
nonstandard contracts are often used improperly by employers in order to lower 
production costs and often conceal standard subordinated working relations.  
 
Specifically, the cases of irregular nonstandard employment involved in the 
research are described below and summarized in Table 3.  
 
1) The abuse of self-employment or independent contracting (project-base work).  
From a juridical point of view, the issue is very delicate because it is very difficult to 
distinguish the lawful use of self-employment from the abuse. In these cases the partial 
concealment of the working activity consist in the inconsistency between the contract 
and the factual employment relationship.  In other words the employee’s work 
performance, in most cases following explicit employer requests, is provided in ways 
that do not match the characteristics of the “project-base work” contract, which is rather 
used to conceal a very typical and subordinate employment partnerships.  
The Civil Code (CC) is the principal normative source for the distinction between 
subordinate employment and self-employment. It defines a self-employed worker as a 
person who ‘undertakes to perform a work or a service for remuneration, mainly by 
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means of his/her own labour and without a relationship of subordination to the client’ 
(CC, art. 2222). According to the CC, the principal characteristic of self-employment is 
therefore the absence of the subordinate status. 
The Biagi Law requires the negotiating parties to specify in advance the 
characteristics of the partnership, identifying in a written form the project or program or  
particular phase of it. Moreover, the requirements prescribed by the law characterizing 
the project-base contract are the following: a) the independence of the employee on the 
basis of the results; b) the subject of the employment relationship must be a project; c) 
the irrelevance of the time taken for the implementation of the service; and d) the 
absence of a subordinated relation with the employer. With the absence of one of these 
requirements, the job contract is definitely irregular and must be “re-qualified” into a 
subordinated work contract.
6
 
 
2) The irregular use of part-time contracts. This can represent very clearly the case 
in which the search for flexibility is accompanied by the presence of work irregularity. 
In fact part-time work often hide irregularities in working hours, given the widespread 
practice of hiring part-time workers but making them overcoming the legal working 
time indicated in the contract or using them as of full-time workers. In this case the 
partial concealment of the working activity is represented by the illegal overtime work, 
which is not declared to public authorities.  
 
3) The illegal use of labour outsourcing. Illegal labour outsourcing 
(somministrazione irregolare e fraudolenta) is prohibited by art. 27-28-29 of legislative 
decree 276/2003.  It concerns the illegal exchange of workers by two or more 
                                                          
6
 Art. 69 legislative decree 276/2003. 
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enterprises. According to that legislation, only authorized temporary work agencies 
(TWA) may provide workforce and only these agencies are allowed to intermediate 
between the workers and the user firm.  
The nature of labour outsourcing can be twofold, given that it concerns a 
triangular relation between the worker, the employer, and the user firm. On the one 
hand, it correspond to a form of subordinate relationship between the worker and the 
employer; on the other hand it represents a form of nonstandard work (and clearly a 
form of external flexibility), given that it requires the absence of the subordinate 
relationship between the worker and the user firm (workers must be direct and 
organized only by the employer and not by the user firm). In case of illegal outsourcing 
the formal relationship is disguising a very typical-subordinate employment relationship 
between the workers and the user firm that directly organize and instruct the outsourced 
workers in violation of art. 29 of dlg.s 276/2003
7
.  
 
4) The irregular use of temporary work contracts (fixed-term and occasional work). 
In this case improper repetitions of the same contract with false changes of tasks and 
duties can be made in order to conceal long-term partnership. The application of the 
temporary contracts must respect the requirement of temporariness, and therefore 
cannot be repeatedly stipulated for an indefinite range of time. Particularly in case of 
fix-term work, legislative decree 368/2001 establishes the minimum interval of twenty 
days between two fixed-term contracts. In this interval the worker cannot continue to 
work regularly in the enterprise. When two successive fixed-term contracts are not 
                                                          
7 The phenomenon of illegal labour outsourcing is often concerning cooperatives providing services 
(usually repairing and maintenance) to other firms. In these cases the object of the cooperative-user firm 
relationship ends up being the mere provision of the workforce from the cooperative to the user firm and 
not precisely the provision of services.  
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respecting the minimum interval, the labour inspector must intervene to convert the fix 
term contract into permanent contract. In addition,  
 
5) The irregular use of apprenticeship contracts. Finally, even cases of 
apprenticeships contracts may disguise a real long-term employment relationship. 
According to Legislative decree 276/2003, prerequisite for these forms of contract is the 
apprentices’ technical-practical training period.  Employer must ensure the technical 
and practical training and provide coaching to the apprentices by qualified personnel. 
With the absence of such requirements the work relationship is beyond the scope 
required for the implementation of the contract.  
 
Table 3 Types of irregularities 
Type of contract Irregularities  
Self-employment (co.co.pro and co.co.co) Subordinate relationship 
Part-time work Over time – full time work 
Labour outsourcing Direct coordination and organization of 
the worker by the user firm 
Fix-term Long term relationship 
Occasional work Long term relationship 
Apprenticeship Standard relationship and absence of 
training programs 
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The emergence of these forms of irregularities would question the theoretical 
assumption that the increasing use of nonstandard labour contracts has always a positive 
effect also on the reduction of irregular work. Therefore as, the first hypothesis of the 
research, we argue that:  
 
H1: a more diffused use of nonstandard contracts may produce different forms of semi-
irregular work. As a consequence, a direct relationship between flexibility and 
irregular work it may exist in the Italian case. 
 
Indeed, the cases of irregularities in nonstandard employment contracts mean that 
flexibility and irregularity in Italy can match each other in a sort of complementary 
relation. The term ‘complementariness’ in this sense means that certain characteristics 
and mechanisms of two factors (flexibility and irregularity) match and interact to 
produce and reinforce a certain result, which in this case is the phenomenon of the 
abuse of nonstandard contracts. For this reason, what we put under question here is, 
firstly, the principle of "mutual exclusivity" between irregular and nonstandard work 
(the two phenomena are always separate and therefore substitutable) supported by the 
mainstream literature, and, secondly, the principle of inverse proportionality (the 
increase of nonstandard work leads to a decrease of the phenomenon of irregular work). 
From an analytical point of view the boundaries between regular and irregular 
work appear to be more fuzzy and permeable given that undeclared working relations 
emerge within formal labour regulation settings. Thus, we find a development of 
nonstandard working situations not easily identifiable in the sphere of legal rules. 
Rather, they show an “overcrossing” of both regular and irregular features in the same 
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working circumstances, resulting in a continuum of employment conditions in which 
the two characters are coexisting. 
 
A theoretical implication of this hypothesis concerns the theories of segmentation 
developed since the 1970s (Doering and Piore 1971, Contini 1979). These theories 
argued that the underground economy was mostly present in the secondary segment of 
the labour market characterized by informality and marginality (See Chapter 2, Section 
5).   
However, the reality in Italy is different today: the process of flexibilization of 
employment conditions was reflected in the emersion of a new dualism in the advanced 
as well as in the backward sectors: the standard - subordinated - full time model and the 
nonstandard model. In this context, the regulation of nonstandard employment have left 
some openings in its new structure through which irregularity takes place in different 
forms, and where legislation has failed to remedy. As a consequence, irregular work 
may be present in both primary and secondary labour markets. 
 
1.2 A multiform phenomenon?  
 
Within the comparative political economy literature some scholars defined the 
Italian case as a regionalized capitalism (Burroni and Crouch 2007). This definition has 
been provided in order to differentiate the Italian case from the two ideal types of 
capitalism identified by Hall and Soskice (2001): the coordinated market economies 
(CMEs) (Austria, Germany, Japan and Nordic European countries) and the liberal 
market economies (LMEs) (Anglo-Saxon Countries). In fact, in the varieties of 
capitalism approach the main focus is on the national dimension for the analysis of the 
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organizational architecture of firms and the governance of the economy. Nevertheless, 
Hall and Soskice acknowledge that this typology is less effective in classifying 
countries such as Italy, Spain and France; in this regard, they refer to the definition by 
Martin Rhodes of ‘Mediterranean capitalism’. This is characterized by a past tradition 
of extensive state intervention, persistence of non-market coordination in the corporate 
governance arena, together with a growing liberalization of the labour market (Rhodes 
& Apeldoorn, 1997).  
This leads to consider the specificity of the Italian case. According to Burroni and 
Crouch (2007) it is not possible to understand the institutional structure and the 
performance of Italian capitalism without taking into account the importance of local 
and regional specificities.  
The Italian model can be defined as ‘regionalized capitalism’ because of the 
following main features. First, most innovative and competitive firms that are open to 
international competition rely on formal and informal coordination mechanisms. Their 
competitiveness is based on cooperative structures based on informal social ties 
involving both entrepreneurs and their employees and, at the same time, they rely on 
formal relationships with collective organizations, local and regional governments 
(Borroni and Crouch 2007).  
A second important feature of the Italian model as a regionalized capitalism is 
related to the strong and persistent territorial differences in terms of organizational 
architecture of firms (large firms, industrial districts and clusters of small firms) and 
regulatory mechanisms of local economies.  
Where sectoral specialization and horizontal integration between small firms were 
more developed, the local systems took the form of ‘industrial districts’ especially in 
northeast and in the center of Italy. A district is formed by many SMEs, each 
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specializing in a particular stage or in the production of a particular component of the 
productive process. Within the production chain, only a small group of these firms has a 
direct relation with final markets. 
In other words, production takes the form of a decentralized process and requires 
a high level of collaboration between specialized subcontractors and buyer firms. In this 
context, productivity is influenced by important factors, such as a high level of trust 
among small entrepreneurs and between workers and entrepreneurs as well as the 
circulation and rapid diffusion of knowledge and information. As a result, districts can 
have a high productive dynamism, and a capacity to sustain both high salaries and 
employment. This helps to explain the persistent regional disparities that characterize 
the Italian case and the reasons for the success that some regional economies 
experienced during the 1970s and the 1980s. 
 
In this perspective, the evolution of the phenomenon of irregular work in Italy 
presents a non-uniform pattern, but rather differentiated on the base of the specificity of 
the productive system, informal networks and institutional framework of different 
territorial contexts.  
Already in the previous chapter we have mentioned a basic difference identified 
in the literature on irregular work between the characteristics of Irregular work in North 
and in the South of Italy (Bonolo and Lucifora 2002). According to this literature, while 
in South of Italy, the phenomenon of undeclared work is a physiological component 
deeply embedded in informal network and in micro-systems of small and medium 
enterprises, in the North, the phenomenon is mostly related to the search for greater 
flexibility and lower production costs. 
Accordingly, the second hypothesis is the follows:  
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H2: irregularities in nonstandard employment assume different dimensions and shapes 
in different territorial contexts.  
 
In other words, the relevance of a certain type of irregularity in nonstandard work 
will depend on the specificity of the productive activities and the networks of 
enterprises of a localized context. In the South of Italy the underground economy is 
traditionally widespread and enjoys a legitimacy that arises from a series of social and 
historical factors. In this context the introduction of a nonstandard contracts is likely to 
create new types of irregularities more akin to conceal the factual employment 
relationship. This might be for example the case of the abuse of the project-base 
employment, whereby the written contractual conditions may be under-defined and 
ambiguous, in this way leaving space to employers to use project-base workers as very 
standard and subordinate workers.  
In the north, where the productive system is more dynamic and characterized of a 
high number of industrial districts, irregularities in nonstandard contracts may be more 
connected to the search of more flexibility for the needs of production. This would be 
for example the case of irregularities in part-time contracts and occasional work. 
Furthermore the decentralization of stages of production to specialized subcontractors 
may create the condition for a large extent of irregular labour outsourcing.  
 
1.3 Undeclared flexibility: a source of new worker’s social risks?  
 
The last hypothesis derives from a closer focus on actors’ behaviour and 
strategies in individual employment relations. According to the actor-centered 
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institutionalism perspective (Maynz and Sharpf 1995; Sharpf 1997), the extent to which 
individuals can use the institutional framework of nonstandard work to pursue their own 
interests will depend on their capacity to mediate the rules in line with their interests 
given a certain bargaining power and according to their normative and cognitive 
preferences. It is therefore possible to expect a multitude of practices in which one actor 
will try to gain the most advantages vis a vis the other actor in a context of conflicting 
interests. 
In this perspective, final outcomes may result more favourably for employers 
rather than workers. Employers may have the power to strategically adopt nonstandard 
work in favour of their interests and deviate from the formal rules. The increase of 
numerical flexibility through the provisions of new nonstandard contracts may provide 
employers the sufficient spaces of action to dynamically combine formal and informal 
strategies and exploit a larger number of possibilities.  
In fact, from the point of view of the employers, the improper use of nonstandard 
workers as very subordinated and/or full time workers would provide them two main 
advantages. Firstly, they can adjust their workforces more efficiently and more rapidly 
to variations in demand. Secondly, irregular use of nonstandard work provides 
substantial savings for the employers for the fact that implies lower labour costs with 
low risks of punishment (considering the difficulty of labour inspectors in finding 
evidence of those irregularities). The improper application of the rules laid down for 
nonstandard contracts, therefore, determine an enhanced ability to evade controls, 
leading to new working situations in which different types of irregularities are 
combined and repeated.  
In this thesis we call “undeclared flexibility” the strategy of employers to use part 
of the workforce in a flexible way within and outside the legal framework regulation 
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according to the requirements of production, without, in turn, affecting the absolute 
level of tax payments and of social contribution required for each worker, which are 
kept at the minimum costs. 
 
For the supply side, irregularities in nonstandard work may assume a totally 
different meaning. Most of the sociological literature on individual risks and 
precariousness (see chapter 2, Section 2) has concentrated on the emergence of 
employees’ insecurities of nonstandard employment deriving from the institutional 
Social Security framework and from the legal features of nonstandard contracts. By 
adopting an individual level perspective, we shifted the focus instead on the 
employment relations and on the modes the non-standard contract may be applied. In 
this perspective, we hypothesize that: 
 
H3: the widespread use of nonstandard forms of employment may generate new social 
risks for workers in Italy. 
 
A first risk derives from the asymmetry of bargaining power between employers 
and employees in employment relations. Given that an irregular use of nonstandard 
work represent a profitable strategy for employers in terms of decrease labour costs and 
gain further flexibility on internal organization, we may reasonably believe that an 
irregular application of nonstandard contracts is likely to be imposed by employers, 
and not voluntary chosen by workers
8
.  
                                                          
8
 An exception should be made for the case of irregular part-time work, whereby a room of reciprocity 
between the employer and the worker may still exist whenever the overtime-undeclared work is paid to 
the worker with a higher wage compared to those provided in the regular labour market. 
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The second risk comes consecutively. Workers involved in such irregularities are 
de facto excluded from full citizenship social rights. Access to Social Security Schemes 
(such as a certain level of unemployment benefit in case of unemployment, provision 
for their retirement) will depend on the extent to which their activity is effectively 
declared, and to the extent to which employers pay the effective amount of social 
security contributions in relation to the effective worker’s performance.  From this point 
of view, what seems striking here is the fact that workers involved in such irregularities 
are subject to a double discrimination: one deriving from being a nonstandard worker 
(given the limited access to welfare entitlements and the lower wage level), and the 
other arising from being an irregular worker, which condition, by necessity, denies the 
access to the entitlement the worker should have obtained if his activity was regularly 
declared.  
 
 
2 Research design 
 
The empirical research intends to investigate on the characteristics and dimension 
of irregularities in nonstandard contracts in two case studies: the territorial area of 
Cagliari in Sardinia and the area of Brescia in Lombardy. In both cases, data collection 
on irregularities in nonstandard employment are conducted at the respective territorial 
Labour Inspection departments (Direzione Provinicale del Lavoro, DPL). 
 
2.1 Empirical case studies on local Labour Departments 
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According to the legislative decree 124/2004 the labour department (DPL) is 
responsible of the organization and coordination of labour inspection in the local area. 
At the departments are collected and implemented the inspection requests from workers 
and union organizations, which are addressed successively to the other inspection 
agencies for more detailed evaluation: INPS (Istituto Nazionale Previdenza Sociale) 
inspectorates in the case of fiscal irregularities, INAIL (Istituto Nazionale Assicurazioni 
Infortuni sul Lavoro) for insurance irregularities, criminal court in the case of a criminal 
offense. 
The law 124/2004 addresses the issue of irregular work as one of the main 
activities of labour inspectors. Besides the application of high penalties in cases of 
totally undeclared work (maxisanzione per lavoro nero), the law contains practical 
guidelines for inspectors to detect also the forms of nonstandard employment to assess 
the correct qualification of the contract.
9
.  
Nonstandard forms of contract must be stipulated in written form
10
, and contain 
specific details on the working partnership. In case of a clear inconsistency between 
what resulted from the inspection and what declared by the parties, inspectors must 
proceed reconverting the contract into permanent/full-time contract (in case of project 
work
11
, part-time and occasional work
12
. See Box 1). 
In addition, the inspectors must draw up an official document, the inspection 
report (Verbale di ispezione), representing the coercive act for the recovery of INPS 
social security contributions and imposing the penalty to the legal offender. 
                                                          
9
 Detection cannot be carried on towards those employment contracts that have already undergone the 
scrutiny of a commission for certification (legislative decree 276/03). 
10
 legislative decree 276/03 art. 56, 62; legislative decree 368/2001 art 2. 
11
 legislative decree 276/03 art 62. 
12
 artt. 35, 37, 38 D.Lgs. n.276/03 
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Irregularities in nonstandard contracts within the Labour department are certified 
also by conciliation practices (conciliazioni monocratiche). It is a procedure introduced 
by legislative decree 124/2004 which purpose is to resolve disputes among workers and 
employers through a conciliation agreement. It can be brought forward after a request 
inspection by the worker or his union organization (preventive conciliation), but can 
also arise after the normal inspection procedure, whenever the inspector find consensus 
by the two parties (contextual conciliation). In case of failure of the preventive or 
contextual conciliation, the case goes back under the normal inspection procedure. 
Conciliations take place whenever the subjects of the dispute are pay and insurance 
issues, as the legislation states that the effectiveness of conciliation comes from the 
payment of social security contributions insurance
13
. The conciliatory resolutions must 
be determined in accordance with the rules in force, and referred to the payment of 
amounts owed to the worker, in relation to the period of work recognized by the two 
parties.  
The study of the characters and dimensions of irregularities in nonstandard 
contracts throughout the collaboration with the territorial labour departments will 
attempt to contribute on the understanding of the phenomenon and to sketch out its 
relevancy in the case studies considered.  
                                                          
13
 Conciliation practices cannot be brought forward whenever there is evidence of violations of criminal 
law:  in such cases inspectors must proceed with the normal inspection procedure 
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BOX 1 Power of Labour Inspectors on re-classification of employment relationships 
The law (Article 7 of Legislative Decree N.124/04) assigns to inspectors the power to verify 
compliance with the legislation on employment relations, in particular through the following tasks: 
- Detection on the implementation of all laws concerning civil and social rights that must be 
guaranteed throughout the national territory,  
- Detection of the protection of employment and social legislation wherever it is paid work 
activities regardless by contractual scheme, typical or atypical; 
- Ensure the proper implementation of contracts and collective bargaining agreements. 
 
Concerning inspections on employment relationships, inspectors have the power to establish a 
different legal framework of contracts whenever they do not respect the parameters set by law. This 
happens when the real employment relationship presents a discrepancy between what declared by the 
parties in the contract and what resulted from the inspection. 
In this respect the Supreme Court states that in violation of contractual rules on nonstandard work the 
contract must be reconverted into a subordinated labour contract and inspectors should establish the 
nature of the relationship (part-time or full-time). (Cfr. Cass., Sez. lav., n.849/04). This applies 
specifically in the case of workers wrongly classified as: 
- Project-base collaborators; 
- Occasional collaborators.  
Another case of re-classification concerns the case of part-time employment, which actually conceals 
a full-time employment. It may happen, in fact, the contract chosen by the parties does not respect the 
prescription of the law or contract, because the worker performs the service in a systematic and 
continuous full-time work, rather than part-time.  
In the other cases considered in the research, namely, in the case of illegal outsourcing, fix-term and 
apprenticeship, the law doesn’t assign inspectors the power to directly re-classify the the false 
contract. However the inspectors can start a procedure of conciliation that may end up in a new 
classification of the employment relationship. In these cases, inspectors have also the power to warn 
the employer to stabilize the workers through an official contestation (diffida accertativa).  
For all these inspectors must contest the employer violations (and implement the penalties) relating 
to: 
- Employment relationship notification (full time or part time) to the local job center (omessa 
comunicazione al centro per centro per l’impiego) since the previous communication has 
been incorrect in terms of the type of contract previously chosen;  
- The hiring notification (omessa consegna della lettera di assunzione) 
- Pay prospect notification (omessa consegna dei prospetti paga) containing the appropriate 
salary and contributions qualifications.  
- Payment of the relative social security contributions. 
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2.2 Verification of hypotheses 
 
The data and information collected are systematically used for the verification of 
the hypotheses following the logic described below:  
 
Hypothesis 1 (existence of a direct relationship between irregular and nonstandard) 
This hypothesis is verified trough the data collection and data analysis on irregularities 
in nonstandard work provided by the inspection labour departments and extracted from 
the inspection and conciliation reports. The aim of the empirical research is to provide 
a quantitative framework of the emergence of the different types of irregularities in 
nonstandard work and to describe the trends of those irregularities.  
In this analysis, a sector differentiation will try to verify the hypothesis of the 
emergence of irregularities in nonstandard work within the more “advanced” productive 
sector of the economy, in contrast with the theory of segmentation mentioned above.   
Units of analysis in this case will be:  
a) The irregularities in non standard contracts; 
b) The number of enterprises involved; 
c) The number of workers involved; 
d) The sectors. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (irregularities in nonstandard employment assume different dimensions 
and shapes in different territorial contexts) 
The choice of two different case studies, one territorial area in the north and one in the 
south of Italy, is aimed to study the link between the characteristics the productive 
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system and the relevance of specific types of contractual irregularities in the different 
territorial areas.  
For this hypothesis it is therefore necessary to provide a quantitative data 
framework on the characteristics of the local productive context and labour market
14
. 
This will allow a better contextualization of the data on irregular work found by 
inspection activity. 
Units of analysis will be: 
a) Different types of contractual irregularities; 
b) The characteristics of the productive system in the case study. 
 
Hypothesis 3 (Emergence of new workers social risks) 
The empirical research will focus also on the individual dimension of the employment 
relationship and it will attempt to investigate on the real motivations of individual 
actors for the emergence of those irregularities. 
The analysis of the content of inspection and conciliation reports  will attempt to 
delineate and better understand actors’ behaviour among the irregularities in 
nonstandard work. The emergence of new workers’ social risks and new employer’s 
strategies hypothesized here are therefore verified through the information that can be 
directly extracted from the reports. 
Units of analysis in this case will be: 
a) The causes of disputes between employers and workers extracted from the content of 
inspection and conciliation reports; 
                                                          
14
 A descriptive data-Sources Table is provided in the Section dedicated to the methodology  (Chapter 4, 
Section 2. Table 5) 
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b) The type of inspection (whether the inspection stems from an official request by the 
workers or it has been independently programmed by the labour department)
15
. 
In addition, non-structured and semi-structured interviews to key informants will be 
conducted during the fieldwork in order to better investigate on the social factors 
determining those irregularities within the territorial area.  
 
Following, in Table 4 we summarize the research design in relation to the 
hypotheses previously presented. 
                                                          
15
 See Section 2.1 of this Chapter. 
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Table 4 Hypothesis and research design 
Hypotheses Research design 
- 2 case studies 
- Collection and data analysis conducted at 
the inspection labour departments 
Hypothesis 1: existence of a direct relationship 
between irregular and nonstandard  
Data collection on:  
a) Irregularities in non standard contracts 
b) Number of enterprises involved 
c) Number of workers involved 
d) Sectors 
Hypothesis 2: irregularities in nonstandard 
employment assume different dimensions and 
shapes in different territorial contexts 
Data collection on: 
a) Different types of contractual 
irregularities 
b) Characteristics of the productive context 
in the case study 
Hypothesis 3: Emergence of new workers social 
risks 
Data collection on: 
a) Causes of disputes  
b) Type of inspection 
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Chapter 4. The empirical analysis: methods and research 
findings 
 
1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter is aimed to present the results of the empirical research and discuss 
the main research findings on the base of the main hypotheses presented and described 
in Chapter 3. The research conducted at the two territorial departments consisted in the 
collection of confidential data on irregular work. This has allowed the construction of 
two different databases and to conduct a data analysis specifically intended to study the 
trends and the dimensions of irregularities in nonstandard work in two local contexts.  
However, in order to better contextualize the results of the research, it has been 
necessary to take into account two important aspects. The first is constituted by the 
composition and the internal organization of the Labour Department, which differ in 
each of the two case studies. The extent to which the inspection activity is effective in 
contrasting irregular work in the province is highly conditioned by the amount of 
human resources available in a certain period at the labour department. Moreover, the 
internal organization of the department affects the quality of the data from which we 
base our empirical research.  The second aspect is linked to the structure and the 
characteristics of the productive context in each territorial area. In this perspective, it 
would not be possible to understand the evolution and the specificity of irregular work 
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in a specific territory if the characteristics of the economic activity and the social 
environment are not taken into account.  
The chapter is set as follows. An accurate and detailed description of the 
methodology adopted in the empirical research will be provided at the first place. In 
particular, it will be described the different phases of the research, which have involved 
different methods and instruments for the data analysis. Following, the results of the 
empirical research on the two case studies are presented separately. Firstly it will be 
presented the case of Cagliari (Section 3.1), and secondly the case of Brescia (section 
3.2).   For each case a framework of contextual data concerning the productive system 
and the performance of the labour market is provided, followed by the description of the 
structure of the provincial labour department. The research findings on irregularities in 
nonstandard work based on the results of inspection activity are showed immediately 
afterwards. 
Finally, the theoretical implications in relation to the hypotheses of the research 
are discussed in Section 4.  
 
2 Reseach Methods  
 
The research has interested two case studies: the territorial areas of Cagliari and 
Brescia. In both cases, data collection on irregularities in nonstandard employment was 
conducted at the respective territorial Labour Department
16
 (DPL), in collaboration with 
the labour inspectors.  
                                                          
16
 The research was conducted firstly at the territorial labour department of Cagliari (Director: Dr. 
Cristina Madeddu) from February 2010 to July 2010, and successively,  From December 2010 – March 
2011 at the territorial labour department of Brescia (Director. Dr. Paolo Vettori) 
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The empirical research in each territorial involved four different phases.  
 
PHASE 1: data collection 
 
Data on irregularities in nonstandard work in each territorial context have been 
collected through the content analysis of two different official documents
17
 prepared by 
inspectors after an accurate procedure of verification of the irregularities.  
 
a) Inspection reports. They provide important information on the cases of contractual 
irregularities. Specifically, data extrapolated from this documents concerned: the types 
of irregularities, activity of the enterprise, number of workers involved and time range 
to which apply the recovery of social contributions (See Box 2 and Annex 6).  
 
b) Conciliation reports. These documents concern the positive or negative resolution of 
individual disputes between employer and workers (see box 2 and annexes 7 and 8). 
Besides the same types of information contained in inspection reports, from these 
reports it was also possible to gather information on causes of disputes (regularization 
of the working contract, overtime work, unpaid social contributions), particularly 
relevant for the successive phase 4.   
 
In each labour department, access to these documents (available both in digital 
and in paper format) was achieved through the use of digital archives and internal 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
17
 Access to sensitive data through the analysis of inspection reports has been possible through a 
collaboration agreement between the two territorial labour departments and the University of Milan and 
through an official communication to the Data Protection Authority (autorità garante della privacy). The 
agreement has also required a draft of a statistical report based on the research results of the inspection 
activity to be available internally at the labour departments (See annexes 9, 10 and 11).  
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databases, commonly used by operators of the labour departments. Internal databases 
also provided detailed important information on the characteristics of the enterprises 
(size, activity, sector) and inspections (year of inspection, type of inspection, civil 
penalty applied). 
 
PHASE 2:  quantitative analysis 
 
The methodology of the research has mainly concerned a quantitative analysis of 
data on irregularities in nonstandard employment gathered from the inspection activity 
of the labour department. This phase concerns four important aspects: 
 
1) In each case study, the starting point of the quantitative research was the 
construction and the organization of the databases. The basic method consisted in the 
collection of all the cases of enterprises that have been irregularly employing 
nonstandard workers. Specifically, these are the cases whereby labour inspectors have 
found an inconsistency between the contract applied and the factual employment 
relationship.  
2) The most relevant variables constituting the databases are: a) Number of 
irregular nonstandard workers; b) type of irregular contract for each worker. Namely: 
elf-employment, part-time, Labour outsourcing, occasional work, fixed-term contract, 
apprenticeship, d) size of enterprises; e) sectors; f) activity of the enterprise; g) 
conciliation report/inspection report; h) type of inspection (stemming from an official 
denouncement of workers or programmed by the department)
18
. 
3) The time range covered by the research includes the years from 2005 to 
                                                          
18
 See annex 1 for a detailed description of the database variables. 
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2009, following the Labour Market Reform of 2003 (TheBiagi Law 30/2003), and the 
so-called Inspection Service Reform (Legislative Decree 124/2004). 
4) Data processing and statistical analysis has been run with SPSS and 
EXCEL. 
 
This phase aimed in particular to build a quantitative framework of irregularities 
in different nonstandard contracts and sketch the trends of those irregularities from 
2005 to 2009 in the case studies. However, the quantitative analysis should be 
considered with caution. Inspections are often “addressed” to those enterprises that are 
likely to be irregular. Therefore, the cases considered in the research (enterprises 
employing irregularly nonstandard workers) are not statistically representative for all 
enterprises in the territorial context but only for all the enterprises involved in 
inspections. For this reason the quantitative results can be only taken as indicative.  
 
PHASE 3: context analysis  
 
Besides the data and information provided by the labour department, it has been 
necessary to complement the quantitative analysis with other important data that will be 
used to contextualize the results.  This concerns a data framework on the productive 
system and the general trends of nonstandard and irregular work in the local context and 
in the region in question (Table 5). All these data are of crucial importance in order to 
properly assess and understand the relevancy of the phenomenon in the territorial area. 
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Table 5 Context data 
Data from 2005 to 2009 Source 
Labour market indicators: national, regional and local 
level 
ISTAT 
Trend of irregular work: national and regional level ISTAT 
Trends of nonstandard work contracts at regional and 
local level 
INPS 
Productive activities at local level Excelsior-unioncamere 
Employment forecasts Excelsior-unioncamere 
Results of inspection activity on irregular work at 
national and regional level 
Ministry of labour 
Results of inspection activity on irregular work at 
territorial level 
Territorial Labour departments (DPL) 
Trends and characteristics of irregular work in the 
local contexts. 
CLES (territorial committee for emersion of 
undeclared work) 
 
 
PHASE 4: qualitative information and interviews  
 
Finally the empirical research has involved also a phase of collection of important 
qualitative information. This phase mainly concerned three main aspects. Firstly, the 
analysis of the content of inspection and conciliation reports. This allows gathering 
information on the individual employment relationship and, in case of conciliation 
practice, the causes of the dispute between employers and workers. Furthermore, 
declarations of the parts contained in the documents in case of conciliation practices 
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provide the elements to investigate on a) the workers individual risks
19
, and b) the 
advantages for the employers by abusing of nonstandard contracts.  
The second aspect concerns the analysis of internal documents regarding the 
organization of the inspection activity. This is a crucial aspect given that the results of 
inspections can be influenced by a number of exogenous variables more related to 
issues concerning the procedures and methods used by labour inspectors, including 
financial and human resources availability, that every year are allocated by authorities 
for the inspection activity.  
Finally, the third aspect concerns non-structured interview and semi-structured 
interviews to key informants (8 inspectors and 2 local trade unionists in Cagliari and 9 
inspectors and 2 local trade unionists in Brescia). Object of the interviews are 
motivations of the parties for the abuses of nonstandard contracts and the role of 
inspectors in discovering the abuses. Furthermore, policy measures to contrast these 
forms of irregularities are discussed in the interviews (See annexes 3, 4 and 5). 
                                                          
19
 Especially in case of conciliation practices deriving from an official denouncement by the worker for 
the abuse or non-compliance of contractual requirements by the employer.  
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BOX 2: Content of reports 
 
Inspection reports 
The inspection report in case of civil tort (and not criminal offence) describes the irregularity and 
the relative civil penalty in which the employer incurred.  
In case of irregularities in nonstandard contracts, the inspection report provides official act for the 
recovery of social contribution, the application civil penalties and, in some cases according to 
legislative decree 276/2003, specifically in cases of false self-employment, part-time, and 
occasional work, it may also provide the conversion of the contract into permanent-full time 
contract (See Chapter 3, Section 2).   
The report does not contain official declaration of the opponents. 
 
Conciliation reports 
Legislative decree 124/2004, art. 11, states that conciliations practices take place when disputes 
involve monetary issues and insurance issues, as the legislation provides that the resolution of 
conciliation comes through an agreement between the parts on the recovery of the monetary loss. 
In the case of a failure of the conciliation between the parts, the case goes back under the normal 
inspection procedure. Conciliation practices cannot be brought forward whenever there is evidence 
of violations of criminal law:  in such cases inspectors must proceed with the normal inspection 
procedure.  
Conciliation reports entail official declarations of the opponents explaining their motivations of the 
dispute.  
The content analysis of conciliation practices conducted through the empirical research revealed 
that in the cases of irregularities in nonstandard contracts disputes were about social security 
contributions issue, in which the employees claimed a non-proportioned payment of social 
contribution in relation to the factual work performance. At the same time, the content analysis 
didn’t provide evidence of clear claims for reconversion of the contract.  
The dispute is positively resolved when the employer accepts the payment of the owned social 
security contributions. In case of negative resolution the inspectors proceeds with the normal 
inspection procedure, and in specific cases required by law (see box 1 Chapter 3) they can convert 
the nonstandard contract into a permanent or full-time contract.  
 
Facsimile of the documents are in Annexes 6, 7 and 8. 
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3 Research Findings 
 
3.1 Case study 1 – Cagliari 
3.1.1 The local economy 
The territorial area of Cagliari represents the 46.4% of the all population in 
Sardinia and contributes for 51,3% to the production of the entire region and the 80% of 
the regional trade (Camera di commercio di Cagliari 2009). From these data it is 
evident that the area is a fundamental part of the entire regional economy. It constitutes 
the main hub of the island, thanks to the major petrochemical complexes and some 
large companies, and thanks to the port of Cagliari, which has "created" the 
development of transport services, logistics and storage, giving a further impetus to the 
growth of other activities and to some traditional manufacturing. 
However, the local economy presents some critical aspects that adversely affect 
the competitiveness of enterprises, including the lack of infrastructural facilities and 
difficulties deriving from high energy costs (camera di commercio di Cagliari 2009). 
In 2009 the area of Cagliari results to be less dynamic than the national average in 
terms of economic trends (enterprises for 1000 inhabitants in Cagliari 59, Sardinia 58,6, 
Italy 65,7 - Istat 2010) as well as in terms of Labour market performance (employment 
rate: Cagliari 54,8, Sardinia 53,5, Italy 56,9; Unemployment rate: Cagliari 11, Sardinia 
13,3, Italy 8,3 - Istat 2010). 
The Excelsior Survey for 2009 (Unioncamere 2009) reveals that the economic 
downturn in 2008 strongly affected the region of Sardinia and the province of Cagliari. 
Employment forecast decreased by 6.2% compared to the previous year. This reduction 
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applies in particular to companies with over 50 employees in industry and construction. 
The trend is in line with the forecasts concerning the entire region (-6.3%) and Italy (-
8.7%) (Unioncamere 2009). 
Some data regarding the structure of the productive system and the extent of 
irregular work accordingly to ISTAT are presented in the Table 6.  
 
Table 6 Context data - Cagliari 
Productive Context 
Prevailing of services for transportation and touristic activities. 2 large 
industrial sites. No industrial districts. 
Number of production 
units 
38775 (Istat 2007) 
Number of enterprises 
every 1.000 inhabitant 
Cagliari 59, Sardinia 58,6, Italy 65,7 (Istat 2009) 
Irregularity rate 
Sardegna 
Total Economy 18,10%; Agriculture 25%; Industry 12,9%, Construction 
18,6%, Services 18,4% (Istat 2009) 
Irregularity rate 
Cagliari 
Total Economy 16%; Agriculture 25%; Industry 9%; Services 24% (Istat 
2005) 
Source: ISTAT 2005, 2007 2009. 
 
3.1.2 The labour department  
 
In 2010 the Labour department of Cagliari was composed of 61 inspectors, 
divided into 4 operative units of ordinary inspections and 2 operative units of technical 
inspections; 8 operators for administrative support; 5 operators for statistical analysis 
and 5 operators for conciliation practices.  
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Given the dimension of the productive system of the province constituted of 
38775 enterprises, the DPL of Cagliari is provided of relatively high amount of 
resourced for inspections. Coverage of inspections is 6.15% of the entire provincial 
productive context while the national average is around 3% (Ministero del lavoro, 
risultati attività di vigilanza 2009). The labour department is also a member of the 
CLES (Commetee for ermersion of undeclared work), which presents every year the 
results of inspection activity on undeclared work in collaboration with other detective 
institutions such as INPS, and INAIL.  
 
3.1.3 Research results 
 
3.1.3.1 Irregular work in Cagliari  
 
Economic and sociological literature (Dallago 1991, Williams and Windebank 
2005; Bonola and Lucifora, 2002; Pfau-Effinger 2009) has commonly related the 
dimension of irregular work to the characteristics of the productive system of a certain 
territorial contexts and the social environment. In Cagliari irregular work represents a 
phenomenon deeply rooted in the working relations. In this perspective, the high 
irregular work rate in the territorial area of Cagliari (between 14,7% and 19,3% - Istat 
2005) and in the whole Sardinia (18,10%, Istat 2009), is likely to be associated to the 
high unemployment rates (in average 13,3%, Istat 2010) and to the common practice of 
relying on informal networks for the recruitment of the workforce. 
Moreover, through the results of the labour department inspection activity we 
have collected data on irregularity linked to nonstandard contracts which seems to 
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represent a critical issue of the dynamics of the labour market in the local context. 
However, a methodological detail must be here specified. 
In the following data we consider three types of irregularities at three different levels: 
 
a) All irregularities concerning payment of social contribution, insurance, 
working time, pay, safety and health, etc.  This level may include the other two levels 
listed below, but it doesn’t necessarily represent the type of undeclared work as defined 
by the Commission in 2007 (see Chapter 1).   
b) Totally undeclared workers (workers completely undeclared to the 
public authorities);  
c) Irregularities linked to the abuse of nonstandard contracts; 
 
For these three types of irregularities we collected the number of enterprises and 
workers involved (Table 7) 
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Table 7 Results of inspection activity - Cagliari 
year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average 
Enterprises involved in 
inspections (absolute value) 
1768  1562 2414 2866 3297  
All irregular enterprises 
(absolude value) 
758  823 1456 1608 1680  
Enterprises with irregular 
nonstandard workers (%) 
3,45 4,61 5,34 5,20 5,76 4,87 
8,05 8,75 8,86 9,27 11,30 9,27 
Enterprises with totally 
undeclared workers (%) 
n.d 4,67 5,72 12,60 11,95 7,78 
n.d 8,87 9,48 22,46 23,45 16,06 
Workers involved in 
inspections (absolute value) 
9547 10778 13036 14187 13353  
All irregular workers 
(absolute value) 
n.d. 2845 4061 5259 3709  
Irregular nonstandard 
workers (%) 
2,52 3,07 18,39 9,01 4,19 7,44 
n.d. 11,63 59,04 24,30 15,09 27,51 
Totally undeclared Workers 
(%) 
5,36 4,14 6,64 7,90 9,28 6.66 
n.d. 15,68 21,32 21,2 33,41 22,9 
Source: elaboration of Labour department data - Cagliari  
Note: percentages in italic are calculated on the total enterprises and workers involved in inspections every year. Those in bold are 
calculated on the total irregular enterprises and workers found by inspection.  
 
Overall, what emerges from the Table 7 is that irregular nonstandard workers are 
quantitatively relevant in the case study: they represent in average the 7,44% of all 
detected workers and the 27,51% of all irregular workers from 2005 to 2009
20
. The 
average of irregular nonstandard workers is higher from 2005 to 2009 results higher 
than the average of totally undeclared workers. For what it concerns the enterprises 
employing irregularly nonstandard workers, they represent the 4,87% of all enterprises 
                                                          
20
 The trend of irregular nonstandard workers found by inspections is largely affected by the “call center 
inspection campaign in 2007-2008, whereby a huge amount of nonstandard contracts, mostly self 
employment contracts, resulted to be irregular (2200 were found only in 2007).  
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involved in inspections and the 9,27% of all irregular enterprises with an increasing 
trend from 2005 to 2009.  
 
Figure 5 presents the dimension of different form of irregular work in the 
territorial area of Cagliari, including both totally undeclared work and semi-irregular 
work represented by the cases object of the research
21
. It is shown that undeclared work 
is mainly constituted of totally undeclared workers. Nonetheless, significantly relevant 
are also cases of false self-employment and irregular part-time. Figure 6 shows the 
trend percentages of irregular work normalized for the yearly amount of inspections and 
not biased by call center campaign. Both totally undeclared workers and irregular 
nonstandard workers present an increasing trend from 2005 to 2009.  
 
Figure 4 Composition of irregular work - Cagliari 
 
Source: elaboration on labour department data – Cagliari 
 
 
 
                                                          
21
 This elaboration has excluded data biased by the call center campaign. 
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Figure 5 Percentage trend of irregular workers - Cagliari 
 
Source: elaboration on labour department data – Cagliari 
 
 
The cases of irregularities in nonstandard contracts have been found both through 
a normal procedure of the inspection activity programmed by the labour department and 
by an official “inspection request” claimed by workers to the labour department. Table 
8 shows that the number of enterprises involved in irregularities in nonstandard work is 
601 (9,27% of all irregular enterprises) and it has involved 4806 workers (27,51% of all 
irregular workers). Almost half of those have been found through an official 
denouncement of the workers.  
In the specific cases provided by the law 124/2004, namely when there is no 
evidence of criminal offence and when objects of the irregularities are payment and 
social contributions issues (See Chapter 3, Section 2), the inspector must propose a 
procedure of conciliation between the employer and the worker(s). If the attempt of 
conciliation is not resolved positively, the inspector proceeds with the normal 
inspection procedure. The analysis of the content of the conciliation reports (see box 2 
for details), which entails a declaration of the parties, has revealed that workers 
involved in those irregularities mostly claimed a loss of social contributions payments 
that have been not proportionated to their factual work performance. This would mean 
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therefore that in all cases concerning an official denouncement of workers (47,9%) 
there is an evidence of an imposition of the contractual irregularity by the employer. 
However, an accurate examination and verification of those denouncements have been 
possible only for the cases of conciliation practices (41%) through the analysis of the 
motivations of the parties contained in the conciliation reports.  
 
Table 8 Cases of irregularities in nonstandard contracts from 2005 to 2009 - Cagliari 
  total 
Resolution by conciliation 
practice (%) 
Resolution by normal 
inspection procedure 
(%) 
Cases of irregularity in 
nonstandard contracts 
enterprises 601 (Absolute value) 46,76 53,24 
workers 4806 (Absolute value) 26,53 73,47 
Denounced by workers 
(%) 
enterprises 47,92 41,26 6,66 
workers 33,37 18,77 14,61 
Found by inspections 
(%) 
enterprises 52,08 5,49 46,59 
workers 66,63 7,76 58,86 
Source: elaboration of labour department data  
 
 
3.1.3.2 Types of irregular contracts - Cagliari 
 
This section focuses on the extent of irregularities in each type of contract. Table 
9 presents two series of percentages, the firsts are those including the call center 
campaign of 2007 and 2008 and the seconds (in red) are those not biased by such 
campaign, showing a more linear percentage distribution.  Considering the first 
percentage series, the false self-employment contracts resulted to be the most relevant 
with a total percentage of 78% (See Box 3). In these cases the employment relationship 
lacked the legal requirements provided by law for the implementation of the contract, 
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especially requirements of non-subordination and temporariness
22
. The other contracts 
appear to be less quantitatively relevant. However, the general picture change 
drastically if we consider the second percentage series excluding the call center 
campaign: while self employment contracts drops at 40,8%, quantitatively relevant 
becomes also cases of irregular part-time (23,1%), and irregular temporary agency 
workers (21,1%). 
 
Table 9 Types of irregular contracts - Cagliari 
Years 
Irregular Nonstandard 
contracts (Absolute 
Value) 
False self-
employment 
(Co.co.pro/co.co.co) 
Part-time 
Irregular labour 
outsourcing  
Irregular 
Apprenticeship 
Occasional work Fix term 
2005 241 40,70% 24,10% 2,50% 18,30% 4,60% 10,40% 
  40,70% 24,10% 2,50% 18,30% 4,60% 10,40% 
2006 331 64,30% 11.4% 12.6% 10% 40.7% 6.6% 
  42,10% 17.1% 19% 14% 11,30% 10% 
2007 2397 92% 3.6% 1,.6% 2.3% 0.6% 0.5% 
  36.6% 34.4% 18.3% 13.7% 6.8% 5.5% 
2008 1278 76.3% 7.3% 13.3% 2.2% 1.8% 0.4% 
  50.4% 17.1% 31% 4.3%) 3.6% 1% 
2009 559 42.3% 24.3% 18.3% 5.2% 12,30% 2% 
  29.3% 28% 21% 6% 14.2% 2.2% 
Total 4806 78% 8,30% 7,50% 3.9% 5.2% 1.5% 
  40.7 % 23.1% 21.1% 9.1% 8.1% 4.4% 
Source: elaboration of DPL data. 
Notes:  
a) Percentages in red are those excluding irregular workers involved in the call center campaign of 2007-2008. 
b) The sum of all irregular workers split by type of contract overcome the hundred per cent: this is because in some case it 
was found that the same worker within the same year had worked irregularly under several nonstandard forms of 
contract. These cases affected more than one percentage representing the types of irregular contracts. 
 
 
Official requests of inspection claimed by workers have occurred for an important 
extent in the cases of irregular part-time, false self-employment and irregular 
apprenticeship (Table 10).  
                                                          
22
 for the definition of the different irregular contracts considered in the research see Chapter 3, Section 1. 
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A peculiar data emerge when considering worker’s denouncement of illegal 
labour outsourcing, which represented only the 1% of the cases. This data may denote a 
widespread reluctance toward an official denouncement of such irregularity in the 
context of Cagliari. The reasons might be more connected to the dynamics of power in 
these specific form of employment, whereby the worker, in case of denouncement of 
the irregularity, would find himself in a dispute with more employers (the actual 
employer and the user firm) in a situation in which it would be rather difficult to 
provide evidence of the irregularity to labour inspectors. 
 
Table 10 Cases of irregularities denounced by workers - Cagliari 
 total 
False self-
employment 
Part-time 
Illegal labour 
outsourcing 
Irregular 
apprenticeship 
Occasional 
work 
Fix term 
Enterprises with 
irregular nonstandard 
work  
(absolute value) 
601 202 238 86 71 31 36 
Denounced by workers 
(%) 
47,92 44,55 70,17 1,16 52,11 32,26 44,44 
Found by inspections 
(%) 
52,08 55,45 29,83 98,84 47,89 67,74 55,56 
Source: elaboration on labour department data – Cagliari 
 
 
Following, to better contextualize our results we compare the trends of 
irregularities found by inspections with the trends of the number of nonstandard 
contracts in the territorial area provided by INPS from 2006 to 2009
23
 (Figure 7 and 8). 
From the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007 the use of project work and 
                                                          
23
 National Institute of Social Security (INPS) database.   
http://www.inps.it/portale/default.aspx?iMenu=12&bi=03&link=DATI+E+BILANCI  
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apprenticeship decreased while part-time and fix term contracts increased (figure 7). 
Nonetheless, irregularities in self-employment, part time and labour outsourcing 
increased while irregular fix-term, occasional work and apprenticeship decreased 
(Figure 8). It is therefore likely that false self-employment, which represents the most 
relevant phenomenon among irregular nonstandard within inspection activity, are 
effectively increasing as an effect of the crisis in the territorial area.   
We cannot speculate the same hypothesis for the increased number of irregular 
part-time (Figure 8) given that it can be proportionated to the higher use of those 
contracts within the territorial area (figure 7).  
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Figure 6 Trend of nonstandard contracts - Cagliari 
 
Source: Elaboration from INPS data, 2005-2009. 
Note: data on labour outsourcing and occasional work are missing in this elaboration 
 
Figure 7 Trend of irregular contracts found by inspection - Cagliari 
 
Source: Elaboration on labour department data – Cagliari 
Note: percentage are calculated on the total workers involved in inspections every year and are not biased by the call center 
campaign.  
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3.1.3.3 Enterprises’ size and sectors - Cagliari 
 
A further analysis involves the enterprises’ size with irregularities in nonstandard 
work and the sectors in which they operate. The most involved in this phenomenon are 
the small enterprises, with an upward trend over the years (Figure 9). The sector most 
affected is the Service sector (services for enterprises, call centers, personal service) 
followed by Business and Trade Activities  (Retail and Wholesale trade). The 
phenomenon also affects for an important extent the sector of construction, while the 
agriculture sector seems only roughly involved (Figure 10).  
These results therefore are showing that irregularities in nonstandard employment 
represent a constitutive phenomenon of those sectors usually not affected by traditional 
types of irregular work (totally undeclared work). Conversely, the sectors of Agriculture 
and Construction, in which irregular work traditionally represents an endemic aspect, 
are comparatively less affected in this case.  
 
Figure 8 Size of enterprises involved - Cagliari 
 
Source: Elaboration from Labour department data - Cagliari 
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Figure 9 Sectors - Cagliari 
 
Source: elaboration on laour department data – Cagliari 
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BOX 3: The abuse of self-employment contracts in the call center sector in Cagliari 
 
A call center is a service network in which agents provide telephone-based services. In Sardinia, call center work is a 
widespread phenomenon.  The number of operators in this sector was around 12,000 in 2010 in the entire region, 
7,000 of which were present only in the province of Cagliari (Camera di commercio 2010).  
Generally, call centers activities in Italy were characterized for the extensive use of  project work contracts 
(co.co.pro.). For this reason, In June 2006, the Ministry of Labour Cesare Damiano issued a ministerial decree which 
included an inspection campaign in all call centers to detect the irregular use of the contracts applied to the call 
center operators
1
. During the call centers Campaign in 2007-2008, the Labour Inspectorate of Cagliari has visited 
about 80 call centers and around 2800 project workers resulted to be irregular (they where working as collaborators, 
but in fact their work requirements were related to a subordinate employment relationship).  
An interesting data emerging from the inspections is that more than half of Irregular enterprises had legal 
headquarter outside the region and have outsourced “outbound activities” to local call-centers.  
 
Opinions of key institutional actors such as inspectors and trade unionists have been reported in order to better 
understand the mechanisms contributing to the spreading out of this phenomenon in the context of Cagliari. 
According to the interviews, two main factors are here outlined. 
The first is a normative factor. From the opinion of most of inspectors one of the main reason for the abuse of self 
employment, is represented by the space of strategic action provided by the legislative framework: “The definition 
of the “project” in the written contract can be ambiguous and open to discretions in particular in the case of 
outbound activities, and this leaves space to employers to use project workers as very subordinated and typical 
employees” (Labour inspector).  
The second is a contextual factor. The province of Cagliari has resulted to be particularly attractive for call-centers 
investors. This is because of the general low real estate cost in the province, which attracts also “outsiders” call 
centers investors. The choice to start a call center business in the area of Cagliari is likely due to a the presence of 
cheap large spaces, such as warehouses abandoned by industries, easy to be adopted to new activities such as call 
centers. The initial costs for allocation are almost insignificant and it can be easily faced by investors: rents in the 
wide and desolate hinterland of the province of Cagliari are cheaper than elsewhere”  (Labour inspector).  
From the supply side, “The high unemployment rate and the condition of young qualified people of being isolated 
induce them to accept such jobs is contributing to the spread of the phenomenon more than in any other places” 
(Labour inspector).  
In this context, from what emerges by the interviews, local trade unions find themselves having a limited space of 
action in contrasting the phenomenon. Some unionists stated that tackling this type of irregularity still remains a 
very difficult issue. This is mainly due to the low union density among call centers work in the province. However, 
the collaboration between trade unions and the labour department has been recently intensified. From this 
collaboration in 2008 the CGIL-NIDIL has signed an agreement with two call centers involving hundreds of 
workers. “The agreement was especially aimed to the stabilization of project workers used irregularly as 
subordinated workers” (trade unionist, Cgil-Nidil Cagliari).  
 
 
 
114 
 
3.2 Case study 2 - Brescia 
 
3.2.1 The Local economy 
The province of Brescia is one of the most economically dynamic provinces in 
Italy (enterprises every 1000 inhabitants: Brescia 74,2, Lombardia 73,8, Italy 65,7 - 
Istat 2009) and presents a relatively good labour market performance (employment: 
Brescia 64,8, Lombardia 64,8, Italy 56,9; unemployment: Brescia, 5,3, Lombardy 5,4, 
Italy 8,3 – Istat 2010).  
The local productive system is mainly composed of manufacturing industry, 
advanced tertiary sector and services for enterprises. A high number of industrial 
districts (9 industrial districts: 4 engineering, 4 textile, 1 rubber and plastic) constitute 
the main peculiarity of the economic context.   
 
According to estimations provided by Istat, irregularity rate in the area of Brescia 
is particularly low (between 5,5% and 10,1%, Istat 2005) compared to the regional and 
national average (Lombardy 9%, Italy 10.5% - Istat 2010).  
Nevertheless, the literature on undeclared work (Lucifora 2003, Isfol 2010) 
already mentioned that widespread forms of semi-irregular work, which are not 
included in the official estimations, are likely to prevail in the north of Italy. These 
phenomena are mostly related to the search of flexibility in a context of economic 
dynamism. In this perspective, we attempt to provide empirical evidence of the 
relevance such phenomena in Brescia and a descriptive framework underlining their 
characteristics.  
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Table 11 Context data - Brescia 
productive 
context 
Prevailing of Manufacturing industry, advanced tertiary sector and services for 
enterprises. 9 industrial districts: 4 engineering, 4 textile, 1 rubber and plastic. 
Number of 
enterprises 
103678 (Istat 2007) 
Enterprises 
every 1000 
inhabitants 
Brescia 74,2, Lombardia 73,8, Italy 65,7 (Istat 2009) 
Irregularity rate 
Lombardia 
Total Economy 9%; Agriculture 24,8%, Industry 1,9%; Construction 6,9%, 
Services 9,1% (Istat 2009) 
Irregularity rate 
Brescia 
Total Economy 8%; Agriculture 18,6%; Industry 6%, Services 13% (Istat 2005) 
Source: Istat 2005, 2007, 2009 
 
3.2.2 The Labour department  
 
Following the discursive logic adopted for the case study 1, we intend to provide 
here more details about the structure and the internal organization of the local labour 
department in order to better assess the quantitative data collected in the empirical 
research. The labour department of Brescia is currently composed as follows: 50 
inspectors, organized in 1 operative units for ordinary inspections and 1 for technical 
inspections; no administrative support offices; 2 operators for statistical analysis; no 
special units for conciliation practices (all inspectors are assigned to conduct 
conciliation practices). The entire structure of the labour department in Brescia is 
provided of less resources for inspections (in term of number of inspectors and 
technical support) than in Cagliari. This gap becomes much relevant when considering 
the size of the productive context of the two provinces, which is much wider in Brescia 
than in Cagliari.  
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3.2.3 Research results 
 
3.2.3.1 Irregular work in Brescia 
 
A General framework of the results of inspection activity from 2005 to 2009 is 
shown in Table 12 below. 
Main findings of the analysis on inspection activity is that irregular nonstandard 
workers represent in average the 7,23% of all detected workers and the 25,21% of all 
irregular workers
24
. In average, the percentage of irregular nonstandard workers from 
2005 to 2009 is higher than the percentage of totally undeclared workers (5,7% of all 
detected workers and 20,22 % of all irregular workers).  
In Brescia the total number of irregular workers has increased from 2006 to 2008 
and decreased in 2009. Moreover the number of enterprises employing totally 
undeclared work has increased.  
                                                          
24
 As regards to the Call center Campaign of 2007-2008, it didn’t find a very high number of irregular 
workers (408 irregular workers) compared to those found in Cagliari. 
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Table 12 Results of inspection activity - Brescia 
year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average 
Enterprises 
involved in 
inspections 
n.d. 1447 2599 2464 1717  
All irregular 
enterprises 
n.d 776 1557 1523 983  
Enterprises with 
irregular 
nonstandard 
workers 
n.d. 5,94 4,23 8,81 8,74 6,93 
n.d. 11,8 7,6 14,25 15,26 11,91 
Enterprises with 
totally undeclared 
workers 
n.d. 4,49 5,5 15,42 32,96 14,59 
n.d. 8,38 9,18 24,95 57,58 25,02 
Workers involved 
in inspections 
n.d. 14325 23131 18234 12706  
All irregular 
workers 
n.d. 3253 6150 6070 4229  
Irregular 
Nonstandard 
workers 
n.d. 6,67 6,14 9,04 7,06 7,23 
n.d 29,36 23,09 27,17 21,21 25,21 
Totally undeclared 
Work 
n.d. 5,96 5,33 5,6 5,91 5,7 
n.d. 26,25 20,05 16,82 17,76 20,22 
Source: elaboration on labour department data - Brescia  
Note: percentages in italic are calculated on the total enterprises and workers involved in inspections every year. Those in bold are 
calculated on the total irregular enterprises and workers found by inspection.  
 
 
Composition of irregular work (Figure 11) in Brescia is constituted for more than 
half of irregular nonstandard workers (excluding the call center campaign). An 
Important phenomenon within the territorial area is the illegal labour outsourcing 
(somministrazione fraudolenta) in particular involving irregular cooperatives.  
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Normalizing the trend of irregular work for the yearly amount of inspections we 
find a stable trend for totally irregular workers while irregular nonstandard workers are 
slightly increasing (Figure 12).  
 
Figure 10 Composition of irregular work - Brescia 
 
Source: elaboration on labour department data - Brescia 
 
Figure 11 Trend of irregular work - Brescia 
 
Source: elaboration on labour department - Brescia 
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As shown by Table 13 the number of enterprises involved in irregularities in 
nonstandard work is 620 (11,9% of all irregular enterprises) and it has involved 5082 
workers (25,21% of all irregular workers).  
The percentage of enterprises found irregular through an official denouncement of 
the workers is the 60%. Accordingly, in a high number of cases workers were likely to 
be subject of an imposition of such irregularities by the employers. However, we could 
verify such imposition end explore the motivations of the disputes (through the analysis 
of the content of conciliation reports) only for the 21,94% of the cases.  
 
Table 13 Cases of irregularities in nonstandard contracts from 2005 to 2009 - Brescia 
  total 
Resolution by 
conciliation practice  
Resolution by normal 
inspection procedure  
Cases of irregularity in nonstandard 
contracts 
enterprises 620 (absolute value) 24,52 75,48 
workers 5082 (absolute value) 19,72 80,28 
Denounced by workers  
enterprises 60,00 21,94 38,06 
workers 56,83 17,55 39,28 
Found by inspections  
enterprises 40,00 2,58 37,42 
workers 43,17 2,16 41,01 
Source: elaboration on labour department data - Brescia 
 
3.2.3.2 Types of irregular contracts - Brescia 
 
In Brescia irregularities in nonstandard contracts found by inspection activity 
(Table 14) are mostly concerning Illegal labour outsourcing (somministrazione 
irregolare e fraudolenta) which is prohibited by art. 27-28-29 of the legislative decree 
276/2003.  It concerns the illegal exchange of workers by two or more enterprises. 
According to that legislation, only authorized agencies may provide workforce and only 
these agencies are allowed to intermediate between the worker and the user of that 
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service. The phenomenon itself constitutes the 46% of all irregularities on non standard 
work and 12% of all irregular workers (See box 4).  
 
In the case of Brescia the percentage of workers’ denouncement (Table 15) 
mostly concerned false self-employment (65%), irregular part-time (63%) and irregular 
apprenticeship (58%). The cases of denouncement for illegal outsourcing, which is 
comparatively the most relevant phenomenon in the data, has been the 48%.  
 
Table 14 Types of irregular contracts - Brescia 
Years 
Irregular 
Non 
Standard  
(Absolute 
Value) 
False self-employment 
(Co.co.pro/co.co.co) 
Part-time 
Irregular labour outsourcing 
(somministrazione 
irregolare- fraudolenta) 
Irregular 
Apprenticeship 
Occasional work Fix term 
2005 151 18,50% 16,60% 33,10% 8,60% 11,90% 8,60% 
  18,50% 16,60% 33,10% 8,60% 11,90% 8,60% 
2006 955 7,70% 7,20% 81,90% 2,30% 1,00% 3,60% 
  7,70% 7,20% 81,90% 2,30% 1,00% 3,60% 
2007 1420 38,20% 10,10% 49,00% 1,30% 1,10% 1,10% 
  20,40% 13,00% 63,20% 1,60% 1,40% 1,50% 
2008 1649 37,50% 17,10% 30,60% 6,00% 1,60% 13,30% 
  36,90% 17,20% 30,90% 6,00% 1,60% 13,40% 
2009 897 53,80% 9,90% 24,60% 9,10% 2,50% 6,90% 
  53,80% 9,90% 24,60% 9,10% 2,50% 6,90% 
Total 5072 35,00% 11,40% 46,00% 4,20% 1,50% 6,00% 
  28,80% 12,50% 49,60% 4,70% 1,90% 6,50% 
 
Source: elaboration of DPL data  
Note: percentages in red are those excluding irregular workers involved in the call center campaign 
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Table 15 Cases of irregularities denounced by workers - Brescia 
 total 
False self-
employment 
Part-time 
Irregular labour 
outsourcing 
Irregular 
Apprenticeship 
Occasional 
work 
Fix term 
Enterprises with irregular 
nonstandard work 
(absolute value) 
620 153 149 184 85 5 9 
Denounced by workers  60,00 65,36 63,76 48,37 58,82 40,00 44,44 
Found by inspections  40,00 34,64 36,24 51,63 41,18 60,00 55,56 
Source: elaboration on labour department - Brescia 
 
In Brescia, the effective use of self-employment and apprenticeship contracts 
decreased since the beginning of the crisis (Figure 13) while irregularities found by 
inspectoral activities over those contracts have increased (Figure 14). For this reason it 
is likely that in the territorial context there is an actual increase of the irregular use of 
those types of contracts. Accordingly, the increase of irregularities over part-time and 
fix-term contracts can be due to the wider use of those contracts in the territorial area in 
the last years (Figure 13). 
Figure 12 Trend of nonstandard contracts - Brescia 
 
Source: Elaboration from INPS data, 2005-2009. 
Note: data on labour outsourcing and occasional work are missing in this elaboration 
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Figure 13 Trend of irregular contracts found by inspection - Brescia 
 
Source: Elaboration on labour department data – Cagliari 
Note: percentage are calculated on the total workers involved in inspections every year and are not biased by the call center 
campaign.  
 
 
3.2.3.3 Enterprise by size and sector - Brescia 
 
Similarly to the first case study, small enterprises are the most involved in these 
types of irregularities also in Brescia (Figure 15). The sectors (Figure 16) most affected 
are the service sector (general private services), Catering and Shops, and the Wholesale 
and Retail trade. A differentiate data compared to the case of Cagliari is that also the 
industrial sector is highly involved in these types of irregularities. This is likely to be 
due to the high number of industrial districts in the territory (see Table 11). 
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Figure 14 Size of enterprises - Brescia 
 
Source: elaboration on labour department data – Brescia 
 
Figure 15 Sectors involved - Brescia 
 
Source: elaboration on labour department data - Brescia 
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BOX 4: Illegal labour outsourcing: the case of irregular cooperatives 
 
The territorial area of Brescia is characterized of heterogeneous clusters of large and medium enterprises 
performing among 9 different industrial districts.  
In this specific local area inspections have found a high irregularity rate among the practice of labour 
outsourcing. For the 50% illegal outsourcing have concerned irregular cooperatives providing general services 
to firms. What emerged from inspections is that in these cases the provision of services was actually translated 
into the illegal provision of the workforce to the user firm, whereby the worker ended up being directed and 
organized by the latter and not by the cooperative, in violation of the art. 29 of dlg.s 276/2003 (see chapter 3, 
Section 1). 
Opinions of inspectors have been particularly useful to draw a clearer analytical picture of the phenomenon. 
“Very often companies, in order to elude legislation on dismissal, chose the outsourcing option. This is not 
precisely because there is a real need to outsource, but because they attempt to avoid the obligations arising 
from hiring additional workers. In fact, being the worker essential to the company, he turns to be directed and 
organized by the user firm and not by the cooperative, and here, therefore, the violation of the art. 29 of dlg.s 
276/2003” (inspection coordinator). More specifically, “the irregular practice can be generated because of the 
following reasons: a) attempt to Circumvent the law on working time through the irregular use of cooperative 
workers b) Reasons related to the regional tax IRAP which can be discounted through an higher use of 
outsourced labour force, b) The difference between the possible gain and the penalty imposed is motivating: 
12.50 Euro per day penalty for every employee” (inspector).   
According to the opinion of the union representative (Cgil Brescia), around 30% of CGIL-NIDIL activity on 
irregular contracts in Brescia concerns illegal outsourcing. The phenomenon is due to manager’s wider space 
of action provided by the ambiguity of the law 276/2003, which substituted the previous law 1369/1960 on  
labour subcontracting”.  
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4 The relevance of the empirical findings 
 
The empirical research has provided an analysis of characteristics and dimensions 
of irregularities in nonstandard contracts in the two case studies. The findings indeed 
contribute to a better understand of these particular forms of irregular work. This is 
basically for two reasons: 
Firstly, even if the statistical results cannot be representative, they are based on 
original data, therefore many aspects and details of the findings on the two case studies 
are exclusive. 
Secondly, The results seem to be in contrast with the common assumption that the 
increasing use of numerical flexibility through nonstandard contracts would discourage 
irregular work. Contrarily, our research findings suggest that that a wider use of 
nonstandard contracts may provide a more room in employment relations for the 
emergence of different types of irregularities.  
What is more, we assume that the extent of these types of irregularities found by 
the inspection activity within the local contexts of Cagliari and Brescia is rather an 
underestimated dimension of the phenomenon. This is because of the difficulty for 
detective institutions to distinguish the legal use of some nonstandard contracts from the 
abuse, and, at the same time, to gather required evidence of those irregularities. 
Likewise, we may reasonable believe that the phenomenon is widespread in the whole 
Italian context, although in different dimensions among different territorial contexts 
(Lucifora 2003; Isfol 2010, Samek Ludovici and Zanzottera 2002). However, only 
further empirical researches could definitely confirm this assumption. 
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In the following sections, we will discuss the research findings and draw some 
conclusive statements on the base of the hypotheses discussed in chapter 3. 
 
4.1 The paradox of the trade-off between flexibility and irregular work 
 
Departing from the recent debate on the phenomenon of irregular work in Italy, 
our analysis questioned what in literature is often taken for granted, namely that the 
increased use of nonstandard work has always a positive effect on the reduction of 
irregular work. Conversely, the research findings show that nonstandard forms of 
employment may be de-facto characterized by many forms of irregularities. 
The improper use of flexible contractual arrangements by employers, often aimed 
to lower labour costs and to conceal full-time subordinated employment, resulted as an 
important phenomenon in the two case studies. Irregularities in nonstandard contracts 
are quantitatively relevant in the both case (in average respectively 27,5% and 25,2% of 
the total irregular workers, and the 7,44 and 7,23 of all workers involved in inspections 
in Cagliari and in Brescia). Moreover, the trend of enterprises using irregular 
nonstandard workers increased from 2006 to 2009 in both cases (Tables 7 and 12).  
 
The main theoretical outcome of the research is that an increasing number of 
nonstandard contracts may generate new rooms for the emergence of irregular 
employment practices. Therefore we can argue that irregular and nonstandard work can 
be seen as non-inversely proportionated as well as non-mutually exclusive spheres 
(according to the hypothesis 1, Chapter 3). The flexibility-irregularity nexus finds here 
some empirical support stressing that they can be linked by a complementary 
relationship in the Italian context. 
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Furthermore, consideration of the economic sectors affected by these kinds of 
irregularities lead us to draw a further theoretical implication in relation to the theories 
of segmentation between primary-formal and secondary-informal segments of the 
labour market (Doering and Piore 1971). 
Our research revealed that irregularities are not just a constitutive part of the 
marginal and informal sectors of the economy, but are diffused also in the most 
advanced sectors such as in advanced service sector in the fields of advertisement and 
business (call centers).  
As a conclusion, we may reject the hypothesis of a parallel economy when 
watching at the phenomenon of irregular work today. From our perspective a more fluid 
labour market has created more space for communication and interchange between 
primary and secondary segments of the labour markets. As a result, phenomena of 
irregularities in employment relations turned to be no longer only an exclusive feature 
of the secondary segment of the labour market. Primary labour markets in advanced 
sectors requiring high-skilled workers present also a high irregularity rate (within the 
inspection activity). 
 
4.2 The importance of the local economy 
 
The second finding of the research is that the flexibility-irregularity relationship 
assumes different form depending on the territorial contexts in which irregular work 
performs.  
The general character of the phenomenon of irregular work in the two case studies 
is in line with the differentiation identified by the literature on undeclared work in Italy 
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(Bonolo and Lucifora 2002): a prevalence of semi-irregular work in the North and a 
dominance of totally undeclared work in the South (Figure 5 and 11). In addition, when 
looking more closely at the irregularities in nonstandard work, we find other important 
differences across territorial contexts.  
 
The province of Brescia is constituted of a high number of industrial districts. 
Sector specialization and horizontal integration between small firms is highly 
developed, and the production is characterized of a decentralized process that requires a 
high level of collaboration between specialized subcontractors and buyer firms. In this 
context, irregularity of work is constituted in particular by the phenomenon of irregular 
labour outsourcing. A high number of local cooperatives originally aimed to provide 
various services to firms, turned to be in reality providing a certain amount of 
workforce to be directly and illegally organized and managed by the user firm. 
  
In the province of Cagliari the most relevant type of irregularity among 
nonstandard work resulted to be the irregular self-employment, in particular related to 
the abuse of project-base employment. The research findings revealed that the 
phenomenon mostly concerned the activity in the call-center sector (especially in 
outbound activities), whereby a high number of project-base workers, despite being 
formally self-employees, were used as subordinate workers. According to the data 
collected at the Labour department and according to the opinion of the inspectors, the 
territory of the province of Cagliari resulted to be particularly attractive for call center 
investitors. In line with Acquino’s argument (2006), economically depressed areas and 
rural areas may represent a profitable locational factor for outsourcing call center 
activities. They generally find a positive attitude by the local institutions principally 
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because they may stimulate additional employment opportunities and new skills and 
competencies. Moreover, such economic activities in those regions easily match the 
labour supply increasingly represented of high-skilled but unemployed young people. 
The economic downturn in the province of Cagliari and the high unemployment rate 
among the youngest (45%, Istat 2011) might have therefore contributed to the diffusion 
of outbound activities, and consequently, to the abuse of the self-employment contracts 
among those activities.  
 
4.3 New employers’ strategies and workers’ new social risks  
 
Focusing on the behaviour of actors at the level of employment relations, our 
analysis opens new theoretical possibilities concerning the actors’ strategies on the use 
of nonstandard contracts and the social consequences at the individual level.  
As we already discussed in Chapter 2, sociological literature has stressed several 
possible disadvantages for the management of a broad use of nonstandard work, i.e. 
difficulties in relying on specific human resources with specific skills when needed; an 
increase of work force coordination and management costs; the risk that contingent or 
peripheral workers will be less committed to the firm and unreliable in their work; the 
risk that the quality of products or services will deteriorate. In this perspective, it has 
been mentionated the emergence of a dualistic model of work organization based on the 
internal segmentation between nonstandard workers employed from time to time in 
order to satisfy temporary needs of production, and a group of more stable workers, 
employed permanently in the firm (Rubery and Wilkinson 1994, Regalia 2006).   
However, from what it has emerged by the content analysis of inspection reports 
and conciliation practices, often enterprises, in particular operating in service sector, 
 
 
130 
adopt improperly flexible workers within the core workforce with tasks and 
requirements of very subordinated and/or full time workers (project-base workers in call 
centers). Moreover, it may also happen that the core workforce is entirely constituted of 
nonstandard workers (such as in some cases of call centers).  
The use of nonstandard workers as very subordinated and/or full time workers 
may correspond to a specific strategy allowing the management to maximize the 
advantages of the use of the numerical flexibility. Firstly, it allows the firm, to maintain 
those costs advantages directly linked to the properties of nonstandard contracts and, 
secondly, to enjoy the ‘free rider advantages’ by escaping from taxation duties.  
At the same time, this strategy significantly reduces the disadvantages related to 
the negative effects of nonstandard employment on work coordination and management 
costs. An irregular use of nonstandard workers permits to have the maximum flexibility 
for immediate resources allocation given the constraints-avoidance in employing 
promptly workers with specific qualification and human resources when needed. 
Therefore, from the standpoint of the demand side, it is clear that irregular use of 
nonstandard employment represents indeed an alternative strategy to better balance the 
advantages and disadvantages of the use of external flexibility within the work 
organization.  
 
On the side of workers, these forms of irregularities seem to represent a 
unintended outcome of their nonstandard contract. A high number of inspections and 
conciliation practices followed an official denouncement by workers involved in such 
irregularities (60% in Brescia and 47% in Cagliari, see Table 4 and 9). From the content 
analysis of conciliation reports it emerged that in most of cases of those irregularities 
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derived from an imposition by the employers in order to elude the payment of social 
security contributions (See box 1). 
This has been mostly evident in the cases of false self-employment (45% in 
Cagliari and 65% in Brescia), irregular part-time (70% in Cagliari and 63% in Brescia) 
and irregular apprenticeship (52% in Cagliari and 58% in Brescia), as shown in Tables 
10 and 15. 
 
This denotes that nonstandard workers involved in such irregularities are subject 
to a twofold social risk. On the one hand, the risk related to the non-reliability of the 
contracts applied, in terms of lack of guarantees that the factual employment 
relationship will correspond to the characteristics of the nonstandard contract applied. 
This risk might be reflected in a general worsening of the working conditions, 
especially in terms of job satisfaction and work-life balance.  
On the other hand it regards the non-equivalence between the real work 
performance, which in many case assumed the form of typical-standard work, and the 
payment of contribution for social security. The consequences on the individual profile 
of those workers involved in such irregularities is that they are excluded from full 
citizenship social rights and to those benefits (unemployment benefit and pensions) they 
would benefit if their activity was properly declared. This is indeed a relevant 
implication for the academic and political debate on the concept, dimensions and forms 
of precariousness (Barbieri 2008; Guy 2011; Sacchi et all 2010).  
 
It has been discussed in the literature (Regalia 2004, Williams 2001) that irregular 
work is often based on mutual convenience of both employers and employees, given 
that it might provide both actors a certain profit in the short run by avoiding 
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institutional and tax-related constraints.  This outlook might be particularly true for the 
case of totally undeclared work, but it doesn’t appear realistic in the cases of 
irregularities in nonstandard work, which, instead, respond to a different logic. The 
research has revealed that these forms of irregularities mainly stem from a conflict 
position of the two actors, employers and workers. On the one hand, they represents a 
strategy for employers to gain further advantages in nonstandard employment relations, 
while, on the other hand, it denies workers to fully receive their social entitlements and 
it generates new forms of workers risks. As a consequence, they turns to be profitable 
for one actor, the employer, but not for them both. 
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Chapter 5 Implications for policies and practices: the 
challenges of fighting against irregular work 
 
1 Introduction 
 
This chapter intends to discuss the main policy implications of the research 
findings, with a critical approach to different recent policies issued at the European and 
the national level to tackle the phenomena of different forms of irregular work. As 
shown by the empirical research, irregularities in nonstandard employment have serious 
implications on the issue of the regulation of employment relations given the emergence 
of new social risks for workers involved. The topic is increasingly becoming relevant 
for institutional actors, such as the social partners, but also for policy makers.  
Along the policy analysis we try to find out a) whether the issues of irregular 
work and nonstandard employment have ever been addressed together by an integrated 
policy approach and consequently b) whether policy strategies in Italy and in Europe 
have properly been dealing with the problem of irregularities in nonstandard 
employment. 
To answer these guiding questions we have firstly looked at the policy measures 
adopted in Italy in the last two decades to tackle the phenomenon of irregular work 
(Section 2). This Section will be followed by a short assessment of the recent labour 
market reform (Riforma Fornero 2012), with a particular focus on the measures adopted 
to prevent the abuse of nonstandard contracts (Section 3). Following we transpose the 
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questions to the European level. We firstly provide an analysis of the policy strategies 
recommended by the European Commission aimed to contrast the phenomenon of 
undeclared work (Section 4). Then we look at our object of research from a perspective 
of the regulation of nonstandard employment relations with particular focus on the 
concept of European Flexicurity (Section 5). In the last Section we draw some 
conclusions on the various approaches to the issue of irregular nonstandard employment 
and will claim the need for an integrated and multilevel approach able to properly 
address the phenomenon. 
 
 
2 Tackling irregular work in Italy: different phases and directions 
The process of modernization and globalization of the economy, the process of 
flexibilization and deregulation of the labour market and, finally, the consideration of 
economic and social environment of different local contexts are the starting point for an 
analysis of policies aimed at combating the different forms of irregular work in Italy. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2 Italy is one of the "worst" in Europe, as the incidence 
of the underground economy in 2007 was estimated at around 22.3% of GDP, second 
only to Greece (25.1% of GDP). Starting from the end of the eighties various phases of 
intervention have been adopted, at first mainly by initiative of the social partners, 
especially trade unions, and later by public policies. 
In this section we provide a short assessment of national policies combating the 
phenomenon of irregular work from the perspective of this research. Mainly our 
argument is that policy approaches have been mainly focused on the emersion of the 
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traditional type of undeclared work, while overlooking the forms the phenomenon can 
assume within different ways of regulating employment relationships.  
Policies combating undeclared work in Italy can be traced in four distinct phases, 
each having different outcomes.   
1) 1989-2003: Direct policies. Gradual alignment agreements (389/1989; 
608/1996), Regularization campaign (383/2001); 
2) 2003-2006: A new framework. The Biagi reform 276/2003 and reform of 
inspection activity 124/ 2004; 
3) 2006-2007: The Bersani Decree: an innovative approach to the phenomenon.  
4) 2007-2012, The Sacconi Reform on inspection activity: a service-oriented 
approach. 
Following, we deepen separately on each phase. 
 
2.1 The Failure of direct emersion policies (1989-2003) 
 
The first real direct instrument for the emersion of undeclared work in Italy was 
represented by the gradual alignment agreements (608/1996). Through a triangular 
exchange between companies, trade unions and public authorities, the measure tried to 
encourage the emergence of irregular work with a program of gradual regularization.  
The system was based on agreements between the social partners at the territorial 
level intended to enable firms employing irregular work to adjust wages and social 
security contributions to the levels set by sectoral collective agreements, in exchange 
for tax credit to the employers for hiring of new employees. 
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The distinctive feature of these agreements was the importance given to the 
decentralized collective bargaining and the role of the unions. This strategy can be 
described as a way between a mere relaxation of normative rigidity and strategies 
intended to assign the unions a role of control and an enforcement of the standards set 
by collective agreements. At a local level the Trade Unions of each sector and the 
corresponding Employers’ Associations were called to set up a starting wage and the 
way in which it will be realigned to the wage in the National Collective Agreement for 
that sector. However, the outcomes were moderately promising. Companies that have 
joined have not exceeded 2000 units and the employees involved have been around 
12,698 (Semenza 2010). 
 
In 2001 the law n.383 known as the “Regularization Campaign” was enacted. 
This law allowed employers and workers to regularize their position with respect to tax, 
labour safety and social security contributions. In exchange, employers paid reduced 
sanctions and reduced taxes and social contributions for three years, while the workers 
could pay reduced pensions contributions. In comparison to the realignment contracts 
the law didn’t provide the mediation of the social partners. All employers had the 
opportunity to join the program bypassing the communication to trade unions.  
The campaign was based on local level experiments intended to foster learning 
processes and encourage the devising of projects to boost local development, as well as 
to tighten local audits and sanctions. The program has produced unsatisfactory results: 
only 1029 companies, and 3854 workers involved. 
The Law n.266/2002 has modified the program with the revitalization of the 
"Network" of the so-called local Committees for emersion (Cles) already constituted by 
the law 448/1998. The creation of these networks has enforced the fight against 
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irregular work in a more targeted and localized approach. The European Commission, 
in its document on undeclared work in 2004, has categorized such a measure as a good 
practice. According to the European Commission, the constitution of local boards 
dealing with the problem of undeclared work had the advantage of being more able to 
perform within contextualized socio-economic realities.  
 
In this phase, while some measure presents some positive aspect to combat the 
underground economy, especially the construction of institutional coordinated 
Networks in 1998, the direct policies so far adopted, aimed to a gradual regularization 
of working positions through tax incentives and contribution, have not been effective in 
reducing irregular work. According to some authors (Lucifera 2003, Semenza 2010) the 
reason are the following: 
a)  The failure to address the causes of irregular work and the non-exhaustive 
consideration of environmental factors and social norms that regulate informal 
networks; 
b)  The widespread perception that tax incentives in the short term could be 
translated into a kind of self-report of undeclared tax contributions and other 
irregularities; 
c)  The opportunistic behaviour over realignment contracts by many employers 
who have chosen the gradual regularization for a temporary reduction in labour costs 
and to remedy situations of irregularity discovered by inspections. 
d)  The non-consideration of different categories of individuals involved in 
irregular work and their different needs. 
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2.2 A new framework (2003-2006) 
 
In Italy the phenomenon of irregular work was particularly related to the 
difficulties of specific social group (mainly youngest, low educated and women) to 
enter in the labour market. The “Biagi Law” in 2003 has been proposed as a way to 
increase the employment chances of those groups traditionally less represented in the 
Italian labour market. Flexibilization of the labour market was expected to lower the 
high (youth) unemployment levels by eliminating the rigidities to enter into the labour 
market and easing the transition from school to work. This expectation was particularly 
strong for the South of Italy, where youth unemployment rates were among the highest 
in Europe.  
Despite the reform, data available on the trend of irregular work in Italy show that 
the most recent decrease of the irregularity rate was observed in 2002 and 2003. This is 
almost entirely due to a reduction in the number of undeclared immigrant workers 
produced by the amnesty of immigrants introduced in 2002. Apart from such an 
amnesty, no clear declining trend in the size of irregular work has been registered at the 
national level (See chapter 3, Section 1).  
 
Complementary to the Biagi law, a reform of inspection services was issued in 
2004 (124/2004) to conform the role of inspections to the new rules. 
Briefly, the main characteristics of the reform are the following: 
- Increase control by local inspection units and coordination between the various 
audit institutions. 
- Promotion and prevention in the field of labour and social security in the 
productive plants. 
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- In case of administrative violations the procedure provides a delay for sanctions 
(diffida accertativa), allowing the employer to regularize its position, within a certain 
time range.  
- Introduction of conciliation practices, providing the possibility to resolve 
disputes through a conciliation agreement between the employer and the worker. 
 
In this measure, while the first two points are undoubtedly an important step 
toward an improvement of the services also in logic of prevention, the last two presents 
some critical aspects. With regards to the third point, the possibility provided by the 
reform to rectify the irregularities without undergo any immediate sanctions implies a 
weakening of a deterrent function of inspections. As demonstrated by some empirical 
studies (Bonaventura 2005), from a perspective of the employer’s economic playoffs, 
the option to irregular activity would increase with a decrease of the "weight" of 
sanctions. Such a choice doesn’t appear to be a step torwards the fight against irregular 
work also in light of the recommendations of the European Commission (see European 
commission communication on undeclared work 2007), which instead promoted a 
stronger deterrence approach and a strengthen of the effectiveness of sanctions
25
.  
As regards to the introduction of conciliation practice, we can have a twofold 
outcome.   On the one hand, it has a positive impact on the propensity of workers to 
denounce irregularities, basically because it presents an easier and faster administrative 
procedure to resolve the disputes in comparison to the inspection procedure. This is also 
favourable for the emersion (in economic and statistical terms) of those irregularities 
that wouldn’t be reported otherwise.  
                                                          
25
 European Commission Communication in 2007 (COM (2007) 628).  
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On the one hand, similarly to the previous point, the conciliation practice turns to 
be a a weak deterrent in tackling irregularities in nonstandard contracts given that it 
allows employers to regularize the employees’ position without being subject to 
administrative sanctions.  
 
2.3 An innovative approach (2006-2007) 
 
The changes in the labour market occurred by the Biagi law, the continuous 
increase of the trend of irregular work and at the same time the risks of a 
disproportionate abuse of the new contractual arrangement has lead the government in 
2006 to introduce some measures (the so-called Decreto Bersani 248/2006) aimed to 
tighten the controls over the right application of employment law in the workplaces. As 
compared to the old law – which considered an irregular worker as an “employee who is 
not recorded in the accounting and compulsory administrative books” – the law 
extended the definition to self-employment and new forms of nonstandard work. In 
particular, an irregular worker is one who is not registered in the firm’s “wage” and 
accounting books and who is not known to the authorities (INPS, INAIL and job 
centres) due to the non-notification of the employment relationship (which applies also 
to irregular nonstandard workers). 
In addition the Decree has set that: 
a) Work can be suspended and construction sites can be shut down in case the 
percentage of totally undeclared workers in a workplace is more than 20%, or in case of 
reiterated breach of legislation on working times. 
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b) The hiring of a new worker has to be communicated to the National 
Assurances for Work Injuries (INAIL) and to the National Institute of Social Security 
(INPS) the day before the worker starts the work activity (mainly to avoid the practice 
to officially hire the worker, in case of injury, the day the accident occurs); 
c) The minimum “civil” penalty for the missing payment of social 
contributions in case of totally undeclared workers is set at EUR 3,000. This penalty has 
to be paid both to the INAIL and the INPS, in addition to the reimbursement of the 
whole amount of social contributions due for each irregular worker; 
d) The firms condemned for irregularities in health and safety matters are 
excluded from contributions incentives.  
In the same period a joint proposal to fight against irregular work has been 
advanced by the three main trade unions (CGIL, CISL, UIL). This proposal concerned 
a) the creation of a fund for the “emersion” of undeclared work (Fondo nazionale per 
l’emersione), with the aim of (partially) financing bonuses for regularizing workers and 
firms involved in local “emersion plans” (Piani locali di sistema per l’emersione); b) 
the financing of the “emerging” workers’ social contributions (Piani di ricostruzione 
delle carriere contributive); c) the construction of a unique database for incentives and 
facilities (local, national, communitarian) for firms who want to regularise their 
positions; d) a strengthening of coordination between local inspective departments, and 
greater economic and technological support for inspections; e) measures for immigrant 
workers: acknowledgement of the worker status to all immigrant workers and a 
residence permit for the irregular immigrant workers who denounce their employers; vi) 
a campaign to promote a culture of legality. 
 
Overall, this phase has seen the development of a new “wave” for the fight 
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against irregular work. In particular, the Bersani decree indeed represented an important 
innovative measure. For the first time the new forms of irregularities were included into 
an integrated policy constituted of preventive and repressive actions and aiming to 
enhance the role of social partners and local actors.  
 
2.4 A service-oriented approach (2007-2012) 
 
A different approach has been adopted in the following “reform of the of 
inspection activity” (Direttiva Sacconi September 2008), which amended the 
institutional role of labour inspectors and certification procedures. The main aim of the 
reform was to readdress inspection activity toward a new preventive and promotional 
role and set up new guidelines for inspectors (Semenza 2010). Main features of the 
reform are the following: 
- Inspections over non standard contracts are allowed only to the “non-certified 
contracts”; 
- Non-admissibility of anonymous complaints by workers; 
- Decentralization of inspection plans at the local level, which takes into account 
specific conditions and economic characteristics of the territorial context; 
- Strengthening the role of conciliation practices: in case of “workers complaints” 
inspection can take place exclusively after the attempt of the conciliation procedure; 
- Inspection’s disclaims of irregular contracts should not involve irregular micro-
enterprise. 
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The reform has raised many criticisms within the academic and political debate. 
In particular, it has been underlined that the directive negatively affects the whole 
inspection activity and generates de facto a loosening of controls. The consequence is a 
shifting of the institutional role of inspections from a punishment-oriented to a service-
oriented logic (Tiraboschi 2009, Rossi 2010).  
Within the scientific and political debate it remains open the question whether 
such a more service-oriented approach is effective in combating the phenomenon of 
various forms of irregular work in different territorial context.  
Our empirical research has revealed that the capacity of territorial labour 
departments to be effective on tackling irregular work depends for an important extent 
on the way the “service-oriented” activity, especially in regards to the conciliation 
service, is internally organized. As shown in Box 5, when conciliation practices are in 
charge by all inspectors and not organized in a specific administrative conciliation units 
(such as in the case of Brescia), it may negatively affect the overall inspection activity, 
in terms of amount of inspection conducted in the years and in terms of its capacity to 
be present in the territory as a deterrent institution.  
We argue that a service-oriented approach, in order to maintain its capacity of 
intervention in a specific territorial context, should be first of all accompanied by 
strategic plans of efficient internal organization, which means more financial, 
technological and human resources. As promoted by the European Commission
26
, a 
service-oriented approach needs to be complementary to an enforced deterrence 
approach (which was an important feature of the Bersani Decree in the previous phase) 
and not substitutive, as in this last phase. 
                                                          
26
 European Commission Communication in 2007 (COM (2007) 628).  
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Box 5: An assessment of the labour departments’ internal functioning. 
 
The functioning of the DPL and its effectiveness on inspection activity depends on endogenous factors such as the internal 
organization as well as the normative orientation and ability of every single inspector. Following a more qualitative approach, 
the Table below summarizes some important feature of the two labour departments.  
 
Functioning or Labour departments in Cagliari and Brescia 
 Cagliari Brescia 
Awareness of inspectors on new workers 
risks and new irregularities.  
  
high 
 
high 
  
Inspectors Specialization on new form of 
irregularities  
  
Low 
  
High (irregular outsourcing) 
  
Impact of Conciliation practices on 
inspection activities 
  
Inspection activities are not affected by 
the growing number of conciliation 
practices.  
A specific conciliation office has been set 
up, hence, inspectors are discharged 
from conducting conciliation practices.  
Inspections trend 2008-2009:  +12% 
Inspection activity is negatively affected 
by the growing number of conciliation 
practices.  
Any inspector is assigned to conduct 
conciliation practices.  
Inspections trend 2008-2009: -38% 
Conciliation practices have a low deterrent effect on tackling irregularities on non 
standard contracts, but they have a positive impact on the emersion of those 
irregularities. 
Statistical gathering of irregular 
nonstandard contracts: 
  
Uneffective Uneffective 
Software currently used: “Stinger”. It does not provide data on all irregular non 
standard contracts.  
New softwares (FATO in Cagliari and DB in Brescia) are currently available but not 
authorized by the central department. 
 
 
Based on the field study conducted inside the DPL and according to the interviews to the inspectors, a high level of 
awareness about new workers risks and new forms of undeclared work among the inspectors has resulted as a common 
feature of the departments of Cagliari and Brescia. Tackling the abuse of nonstandard contracts concern to a relevant extent 
the inspectors’ activity. However, specialization of inspectors on the type of irregularity most relevant in the province (illegal 
labour outsourcing in Brescia and irregular self employment in Cagliari) has not been pursued to the same extent in the two 
departments. While in Brescia a certain number of inspectors specialized in the resolution of illegal outsourcing disputes, in 
Cagliari inspectors’ activity continues to be variegated for all type of irregularities including those non directly related to the 
type of contracts (such as irregularity on payments and contributions).   
Another very important issue directly affecting the quality and the amount of inspections is the internal organization and 
management of conciliation procedures. According to legislative decree 124/2004, conciliation practices should be 
conducted by inspectors as an ordinary activity of the labour department. This would affect the amount of inspections yearly 
planned by the DPL. Nonetheless, organization on conciliation practices presents crucial differences between the two 
structures. In Cagliari it has been set up a specific office designated to conduct conciliation practices, hence inspection 
activity is not affected. Conversely, in Brescia conciliation practices are conducted by all inspectors and this has negatively 
affected the inspection activity in particular after 2008 (in 2009 number of inspections decreased by 38%).   
Issue of statistical gathering of new type of irregularities is of crucial interest for the labour department. The overall 
performance of the provincial department, which have to be yearly reported to the central departments at regional and 
national level, mainly depend on the extent to which the inspection activity is statistically reported. However, the statistics 
elaborated by the labour departments are much focused on the amount of taxes and social contributions recovered by 
inspections than the trends and the characteristics of the different types of irregularities.  
New data input softwares (FATO in Cagliari and DB in Brescia) including systems of recording the new type of irregularities 
are available at the departments, but those softwares have not been authorized by the central department. As a result, 
internal statistic elaboration didn’t properly account for new type of irregularities so far.  
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3 The recent reform of the labour market: a step forward  
 
The Fornero labour market reform (Law n.92/2012) has been approved after 
months of discussions, amendments and controversy in 28 June 2012. The new rules 
intend to govern in the first place the execution of the employment relationship and 
introduce new important features particularly into the legislative framework of 
nonstandard employment contracts.  
Article 1 of the reform is based primarily on the concept of the "inclusive and 
dynamic" labour market in which the priority must be given to permanent work as a 
common form of employment relationship (so called "dominant contract"). Art. 1 gives 
also an explicit effort to the protection of flexible employment with the declared aim of 
combating the abuse of nonstandard contracts
27
. This effort is particularly reflected in a 
framework providing a more strict regulation for those contractual arrangements that 
are particularly in risk of abuse. Following, we scroll separately the different changes 
provided in the reform in regard to the nonstandard contracts considered in this research.  
 
Firstly, significant changes have concerned the apprenticeship contracts. The 
intention of the government is to make apprenticeship the dominant channel of access 
to the labour market for young people up to 29 years old. According to the law, this 
form of contract must have a minimum duration of six months, except for contracts for 
seasonal work. Other regulations concern the number of apprentices in a firm. From 1 
January 2013 the total number of apprentices that an employer can hire (directly or 
through temporary work agencies) cannot exceed the ratio of 3 to 2 with respect to 
                                                          
27
 Disegno di legge recanti disposizioni in materia di riforma del mercato del lavoro in una prospettiva di 
crescita (DDL n. 5256/2012) Art 1. See specifically points  C) and E). 
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permanent workers, while the ratio is 1 to 1 for enterprises with less than ten employees. 
Another new element is determined by the fact that the hiring of new apprentices is 
subject to stabilization of at least 50% of apprentices in the 36 months before the new 
hire. The apprentices taken in violation of the rule are considered employees for an 
indefinite period from the date of the constitution of the employment relationship (these 
constraints do not apply to employers who employ less than ten units)
28
.  
These new rules concerning the apprenticeship contracts seem to move toward a 
limitation of the abuse of apprenticeship contracts. This is particularly expressed by the 
numerical constraints to the use of apprentices and by the hiring process, which must 
respect a stabilization of a certain percentage of workers before hiring new apprentices.  
However, the reform did not intervene on the risk that those apprentices could be 
still used as subordinate workers. The time range in which apprentices can be stabilized 
to allow new hires is three years. For a professional growth of the apprentices 3 years is 
a disproportionate and unjustified period, given that many types of job may present a 
very limited professional content, which in most cases it can be learn in few weeks. In 
this period, therefore, there is the risk that the apprentice can be assigned tasks usually 
related to “typical” work. This aspect appears to be totally contradictory with to the 
objectives of this reform, which in art. 1 states that the general form of employment 
relationship should be represented by the permanent-subordinate work (Tiraboschi and 
Rausei 2012).  
 
The labour reform also has concerned the fighting against the improper use of 
self-employment. As regards the project-base work, the margins of use of this form of 
contract have been reduced through some amendments to the Legislative Decree no. 
                                                          
28
 Disegno di legge recanti disposizioni in materia di riforma del mercato del lavoro in una prospettiva di 
crescita (DDL n. 5256/2012) Art 5. 
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276/2003. In the new legislative framework, the so-called co.co.pro must be related to 
one or more projects (and no longer to a work program or one of its phases
29
) 
determined by the client and managed independently by the employee. The project 
cannot involve the performance of purely executive or repetitive duties, but it shall be 
traceable to a final result that must be different from the general activity of the firm. 
Finally, the payment cannot be less than the minimum wage laid down by collective 
agreements for each sector of activity.  
These amendments seem to represent an important contribute to the fighting 
against false self-employment. The project-base contract should be now qualified by the 
results that in any case must be different from the activity of the firm, and by the fact 
that the work performance must not imply repetitive and executive tasks. This may 
prevent to set up a project in an ambiguous and under-determined form. 
 
Important changes have been made with regards to the fixed-term contract.  The 
minimum interval between two fix-term contracts within the same enterprises has been 
increased from 10 to 60 days for contracts which duration is less than six months and 
from 20 to 90 days for longer contracts. Collective agreements can identify the specific 
conditions under which these minimum interval can be subject of a reduction.  
A crucial issue of the labour reform was to determine the maximum duration of 
fixed-term contract, which was set at 36 months. The first contract of no longer than six 
months can be signed without the indication of the “objective reasons” (organizational 
and productive) for which this type of contract is applied. In this case, the contract 
cannot be subject of an extension. 
                                                          
29
 Disegno di legge recanti disposizioni in materia  di riforma del mercato del lavoro in una prospettiva 
di crescita. (DDL n. 5256/2012)  Art. 8. 
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The consequences of the amendments contemplated for fix-term contracts can be 
twofold. On the one hand the longer minimum intervals (60 days for contracts which 
duration is less than six months and 90 days for longer contracts) for the constitution of 
two contacts can be favourable in terms of prevention against the abuse of successive 
fix-term contracts.  On the other hand, the legislation, liberalizing the first contract and 
eliminating the existing regulatory framework, has legitimized the use of fixed-term 
employment even in the absence of an objective reason, accepting the risk that this may 
derive an uncontrolled use of this type of contract. The consequence is that, the overall 
uncertainty may be significantly increased, with the increased risk of the abuse of fixed-
term contracts, repeatable without limit for the same worker in another company or by 
changing the characteristics of its job. Moreover, in the case of a first contract not 
presenting “objective reason”, the worker can be fired without the need to indicate the 
precise reason (technical, productive and organizational) for the dismissal. Therefore, 
such openness can encourage a high turnover, by signing more contracts with different 
temporary workers, especially in relation to those professional positions that are not 
particularly qualified and do not require specific training. 
 
As far as the part-time contracts are concerned, the legislation didn’t seem to have 
gone forward to the fighting against the irregular use of part-time work. The text of the 
reform up to May 2012 had set the obligation of the preventive communication by the 
employer to the public authorities, in the event of a change in working hours of the 
employee, five days before the modification of the contract. This would have been 
undoubtedly beneficial for preventing an unjustified use of part-time workers outside 
the working-time schedule. In addiction, it would have been favourable for the 
inspectors’ activity when searching for the evidence of such irregularity. However in 
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the new text promulgated in august 2012 this clause has been removed. This decision 
has shown an unreasonable step backward of the legislation addressing the abuse on 
part-time work. It appears to be completely in contradiction with the purpose of the 
reform  “to protect flexible employment with the declared aim of combating the abuse 
of nonstandard contracts“ stated in article 1.   
 
Finally, for what concerns the issue of irregular Labour outsourcing, the most 
interesting aspects regards the judicial procedure with respect to the responsibility for 
irregular outsourcing. The new version of paragraph 2 art. 29 Legislative Decree n. 
276/2003 provides that the client (the user firm) can be sued together with any other 
contractor and subcontractors. The worker may claim the whole of each debtor and 
therefore, hypothetically, he could sue only against the user firm without involve the 
contractor. This would represent a form of deterrence against the illegal inclusion of the 
outsourced workers within the organization and direction by the user firm.  
With regard the methods and procedures for monitoring and verification, the 
legislation have left the social partners greater freedom to identify the tools and criteria 
that could be better suitable in each specific sector by collective agreements, also at the 
sub-national level. In this perspective, it would seem to be particularly beneficial the 
recourse to the certification of contracts (Title VIII, Chapter I, of Legislative Decree no. 
N. 276/2003), through which companies may submit to a concrete control their 
activities with respect to the procedures provided by collective bargaining. 
 
Overall, we may reasonably argue that the Fornero reform has relatively 
improved the legislative framework in the direction of preventing the abuses of 
nonstandard work. From the point of view of this thesis, particularly appropriate seems 
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to be the amendments provided within the framework of self-employment, especially in 
the direction to prevent the abuse of project-base workers by the provision of more 
strict rules for the definition of the project contracts. However, many aspects still 
remain ambiguous and open to possible unintended consequences. The legislative 
framework for preventing irregular part-time work has been (inopportunely) unaltered, 
while some doubts may arise with respect to the new directives regarding fix-term and 
apprenticeship, which still present a wide room for employer’s to abuse of such 
contracts.  
 
4 Fighting irregular work at the European level: a weak strategy 
 
The purpose of the present Section is to provide an analysis of the recent 
measures developed at the European level to contrast irregular work.  
Irregular work is a complex phenomenon with multiple drivers and therefore calls 
for a balanced approach of prevention, law enforcement and sanctions. High levels of 
taxation and social security contributions and a heavy administrative burden are 
traditionally seen as the drivers of the phenomenon. Recently different forms of 
irregular work are also increasing in the whole Europe, especially forms of irregular 
sub-contracting and false self-employment
30
. In addition, in certain Member States, the 
application of transitional arrangements towards workers of the new Member States 
(posted-workers) has exacerbated the recourse to irregular work (Cremers 2009). 
                                                          
30
 Recently there has been a joint conclusions and recommendations of the European social partners in the 
construction indutry that raised the concerns  on bogus self-employment in Europe.  
http://www.mutual-learning-
employment.net/uploads/ModuleXtender/Trscontent/46/Joint_paper_construction_industry_on_selfemplo
yment.pdf 
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In recent years a comparative research on the composition and motivations of 
undeclared work in Europe has been promoted at the European level (Eurobarometer 
survey 2007). The results have shown that the extent and the nature of undeclared work 
differ among the Countries. In Central Europe undeclared work is estimated between 
6% -7% of GDP, in Northern Europe is below the 5% GDP, while in Southern Europe 
the rate of undeclared work is higher, more than 16% of GDP. What emerges from the 
specific Eurobarometer survey (2007) is that in while in Central and Eastern and 
Southern undeclared work is mainly constituted of those workers that have difficulties 
to find a job in the regular labour market, in the Nordic countries and continental 
Europe it rather concerns self-employment workers often engaging in irregular work for 
convenience. 
 
European level institutions has mainly used the term “Undeclared work” rather 
than Irregular work (see chapter 1), indicating "any paid activities that are lawful as 
regards their nature but not declared to the public authorities, taking into account 
differences in the regulatory system between Member States". In recent years, efforts at 
European level on the issue of undeclared work has intensified and has produced a 
series of reports and statements from the European Commission, of which we will 
mention the most important: The Delors report of 1993, the Flynn report 1998, the 
report "undeclared work in an enlarged union" of 2004, and the Communication of the 
European Commission in 2007. 
These documents present a strong call for a stricter compliance with the rules, to 
raise social awareness and recognition that undeclared work is also the result of new 
patterns of work and organization of enterprises. However, until 2007 European 
strategy focused mainly on preventive and punitive policies, neglecting the importance 
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of measures and incentives that encourage local economic development, and the 
inclusion of institutional actors at various level.  
A step forward was made with the communication of European Commission in 
2007, which addressed the problem of undeclared work to be faced by the Member 
States for the achievement of the Lisbon Strategy goals. 
In this communication five guidelines are identified: 
1) Reduce the attractiveness of undeclared work with interventions also on 
social security systems and find a better balance between incentives for regular work 
and disincentives against undeclared work (through adequate means of income and 
contributions support); 
2) Simplification of administrative procedures, including a simplification of 
labour law and the computerization of databases for information exchange between 
institutional actors; 
3) Improvement of audits and increase sanctions, involving the social 
partners and improving cooperation between the bodies in charge of taxation, 
employment and immigration; 
4) Cross-border cooperation within the EU to control the working 
conditions of posted workers; 
5) Rising of public awareness both with respect to the risks related to 
irregular work as well as the positive effects of full payment of taxes. 
 
The guidelines indeed seem to suggest the adoption of a policy strategy that is 
able to combine promotional and preventive interventions with repressive actions and 
sanctions. The aim was to identify a good combination of "mixed policies" to 
discourage undeclared work on the one hand, and to encourage forms of regular work 
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on the other hand. Certainly implementation of mixed policies will vary from state to 
state, as an appropriate strategy will depend very much on the socio-economic context 
in which the policy is applied (Renooy 2008).  
After the communication in 2007, there have been no further relevant steps 
addressing the problem of undeclared work at the European level. The topic has also 
been excluded from the new strategy so-called "Europe 2020" announced in March 
2010.   
Although the new strategy seems to represent an important step toward the fight 
against undeclared work, it is far to represent an effective and strong tool to properly 
contrast the phenomenon.  The European Commission has essentially adopted a 
persuasive approach, proposing guidelines and nonbinding opinions, avoiding to set 
minimum goals to be reached within a specified period of time (Semenza 2010). 
Moreover, we argue that the approach is still bind to a broad-spectrum definition 
of the phenomenon and it neglected to properly look at the different forms of semi-
irregular work emerging in the European labour markets. Consequently, it also overlook 
the opportunity to adopt diversified strategies for each case, taking into account the 
social and economic mechanisms representing the drivers for those forms of irregular 
work.  
In this last Commission Communication, undeclared work is mainly understood 
as an “extreme case of labour market segmentation”. As a consequence the Commission 
proposes to integrate concerns about undeclared work in the common principles for 
flexicurity currently being developed: “member States are invited to give due attention 
to undeclared work when deciding on the pathways they intend to follow in 
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implementing the common principles of flexicurity” 31, which is considered the best tool 
to reduce labour market segmentation. In this view, combating undeclared work 
basically means implementing a policy strategies aimed to reduce the labour market 
segmention between protected and non-protected workers. In particular a crucial role is 
assigned to flexicurity policies, supposed to be able to increase social inclusion and 
security for all.  
Lately, in the communication of the European commission in 2010, “An Agenda 
for new skills and jobs: A European contribution towards full employment” it is 
mentioned that “Undeclared work, including misclassification by employers of 
employees as independent contractors, continues to expand and increasingly gains a 
cross-border dimension: further efforts are needed to strengthen cooperation at EU level 
between labour inspectorates and other bodies whose mission is to control the 
application of employment law”32.  
For the first time, Undeclared work is here understood as a phenomenon also 
generated by a “misclassification by employers of employees as independent 
contractors”, which must be contrasted trough a further strengthen of controls toward 
the application of employment law. Besides this brief and concise statement, the issue 
of the various form of irregular work emerging with the continuous evolving of labour 
markets in Europe, still need to be insert into a integrated strategy at the European level. 
 
                                                          
31
 European Commission Communication in 2007 (COM (2007) 628). 
32
 European Commission Communication in 2010 (COM (2010) 682 final) 
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5 Informal employment practices as a challenge for the European 
Flexicurity
33
 
 
In this Section we introduce the topic of Flexicurity as it has represented in recent 
years the main strategy adopted by the European Union to prevent the risks deriving 
from a more flexible labour market and combat segmentation and precariousness. We 
provide a critical assessment of the concept of flexicurity from the perspective of our 
research. We argue that the concept of Flexicurity, as it is conceived today, is not the 
appropriate solution to prevent the emerging of new social risks deriving from 
nonstandard employment. This is basically because it focuses on the macro-institutional 
framework but it neglects to properly look at the behaviours of individual actors in 
employment relations and the power gap between employers and workers in a context 
of conflicting interests, from which abuses and irregularities in nonstandard contracts 
may emerge. Following we introduce the concept of Flexicurity as developed at the 
European level, and successively we develop a conceptual critique.  
 
5.1 The European strategy for balancing Flexibility and Security 
 
In recent times, economic policy within EU have faced a tension between 
demands for greater labour market flexibility on the one hand and the need to provide 
adequate levels of social protection for workers on the other hand.  Flexible labour 
                                                          
33
 This section has been developed during the period of study at the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced 
Labour Studies, University of Amsterdam (See Annex 12), under the supervision of prof. Maarten Keune. 
The period of study has yielded  the working paper “ An individual level perspective to the concept of 
Flexicurity” (forthcoming), and a review published in the CLR news  series (4/2011) “The precarious 
nature of knowledge professionals in Italy?”.    
 
 
156 
markets are supposed to be beneficial for job creation and for needs of firms operating 
in a broader, more uncertain and more unstable economic context, but at the same time 
they tend to reduce the level of security that workers have traditionally enjoyed in the 
employment relations. Within the academic and political debate it has been broadly 
recognized that a widespread consequences of the processes of flexibilization and 
deregulation of labour markets has been the rise of different forms of insecurity for 
nonstandard workers and the so-called phenomenon of precariousness. Precarious work 
is rapidly becoming the biggest obstacle to the construction of a European Social 
Model. Every day, more and more workers find themselves in precarious jobs where 
they have no right even to join a union and are let alone to bargain collectively with 
their employer. Some are formally excluded because basic rights are denied in law. 
Others have rights on paper, but no rights in fact because laws are not enforced.  
In this context, the concept of flexicurity - the balance between flexibility and 
security - has gained a prominent place in the European Policy debate as a solution 
against labour market segmentation and precariousness. Already since the mid-2000s, 
the European Commission included the concept of flexicurity in the European 
Employment Strategy under the general purpose to achieve full employment, improving 
quality and productivity at work and strengthening social cohesion in each Member 
states.  
Wilthagen and Tros defined flexicurity as: ‘a policy strategy that attempts, 
synchronically and in a deliberate way, to enhance the flexibility of labour markets, 
work organization and labour relations on the one hand, and to enhance security – 
employment and social security – notably for weaker groups in and outside the labour 
market, on the other hand’ (Wilthagen and Tros 2004). The concept is based on the idea 
of efficient co-ordination and synchronization of employment and social policies. 
 
 
157 
Assuming that there can be a positive sum-game between regulations increasing 
flexibility and those reinforcing security in the labour market, it suggests that one or 
more types of flexibility can be positively combined with one or more types of 
security
34
. Such combinations should lead to a win-win situations in which social 
partners in the labour market benefit from high levels of flexibility, which is expected 
to be crucial for economic dynamism and employment creation, accompanied by high 
levels of security for workers.  
According to the principles of flexicurity stressed by the Commission in 2007
35
, a 
flexicurity framework should include flexible contracts that would increase the 
performance of the labour market while effective Active Labour Market Policies 
(ALMPs) and Life-Long Learning programs (LLLPs) should help individuals to reduce 
their risk of unemployment and facilitate job-to-job transitions.  Modern Social security 
provisions would simultaneously reduce the risk for nonstandard workers to completely 
loose a decent level of income. 
According to this main view, flexicurity allows employers to enhance their 
competitiveness through rapid responses to the vicissitudes of the market, expanding 
and contracting the workforce with relative ease, while moderating the increased 
exposure of workers to the risks associated with the de-standardization of the labour 
market through rigorous labour market activation programs and effective social security 
provisions.  
 
                                                          
34
 Literature on flexicurity commonly subdivides mainly into four types of Flexibility: external numerical 
flexibility, internal numerical flexibility, functional flexibility, wage flexibility; and four type of security: 
Job security, employment security, combination security, income security (Wilthagen and Tros 2004). 
35
 In June 2007 the Commission developed the so-called “common principles” of flexicurity: (i) flexible 
and reliable contractual arrangements; (ii) Comprehensive lifelong learning strategies (LLL); (iii) 
Effective active labour market policies (ALMPs); (iv) modern social security provisions; (v) social 
dialogue (European Commission, June 2007). 
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5.2 Shortcoming of flexicurity: disjunction between the institutional framework and 
the employment practices 
  
We strongly question that the concept of flexicurity, as it is conceived today, 
could represent a real solution against the increase of workers’ social risks and 
precariousness. Some authors have already argued that the Commission’s interpretation 
of Flexicurity particularly emphasizes the increase of nonstandard arrangements while 
security is largely limited to employability measures, which are seen as the key for 
individuals to be able to make transitions from job to job, and from unemployment or 
inactivity to employment (Keune and Jepsen 2007, Tangian 2009).  
From the perspective of the thesis, the mainstream view of flexicurity presents an 
important problematic aspect. Flexicurity is an institutional configuration of policies 
assumed to be able to transpose the balance between flexibility and security directly to 
the level of the individual employers-employees relationships. However, in our opinion, 
the effective functioning of the institutional framework of flexicurity may be strongly 
mediated by individual actors adopting strategic behaviours in employment relations. 
Implementation of a flexicurity involves a necessary process of change in 
readjustment of employment practices. An Individual actor will formulate strategies 
exploiting a certain space of action and will attempt to use the institutional framework 
in a way to guarantee a certain advantage in employment relations vis a vis the other 
actor (Streeck and Thelen 2005).   
In this perspective a re-interpretation of the rules by actors may be reflected in the 
emergence of informal practices among nonstandard employment relations. As we 
demonstrated by the empirical research on the irregular use of nonstandard contracts in 
Italy (see chapter 4), employers may strategically use flexible contractual arrangements 
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to gain further advantages in employment relations.  This may undermine the effective 
access of workers to social security schemes (see chapter 4.4).  
In a context of conflicting interests, the extent to which individuals can use the 
institutional framework to pursue their own interests will depend on their capacity to 
mediate the rules according to their power and their normative and cognitive 
preferences (see chapter 2.3). However, given the asymmetry of the bargaining power 
between employers and employees in employment relations, we argue that the final 
outcomes of flexicurity may result more favourable for employers rather than workers. 
On the one hand, employers may have the power to strategically adopt nonstandard 
forms of employment through informal practices to gain further advantages. On the 
other hand, institutional security provisions for workers may turn out to be ineffective if 
they do not have the power and the capabilities to “act out” those institutions (Keune 
and Burroni 2011). As G. Schmid (2010) outlines, the concept of Flexicurity lacks of a 
clear normative orientation. Its usual appeal to a ‘win-win-game’ doesn’t consider the 
still existing power gap between the two main social partners. The metaphor of 
‘balancing’ flexibility and security remains void without taking account of such 
differences.  
The consequence, therefore, might be a disjunction between the institutional and 
the micro level and at the same time an atomization of (formal and informal) 
employment practices within the same institutional framework. Individual strategies in 
employment relations may create the conditions for a heterogeneous configuration of 
practices whereby actors dynamically combine formal and informal norms and exploit a 
number of possibilities within the same macro institutional framework.  
A clear example is given by the multiform use by the employers of the so-called 
‘project contract’ in Italy, showed by the empirical research presented in Chapter 4. In 
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fact, as we have seen in the previous chapters, the definition of the “project” in the 
written contract can be ambiguous and open to discretional interpretation by individual 
actors. This leaves space for employers to strategically use project workers in different 
ways in each case according to their interests, sometimes also outside the sphere of the 
legal rules. As a consequence, an inconsistency between the type of contract applied 
and the factual employment relationship may emerge.  
In this case, an institution increasing external flexibility represents a lever for the 
emergence of informal employment practices whereby the level of social security for 
workers will decrease to the extent that the factual employment relationship diverges 
from the formal contract and to the extent that contributions for Social Security are not 
proportionated to the effective work performance. In few words, the way a flexible 
regulative framework is implemented at the micro level may be different in each case 
depending on strategies of employers in employment relations and the social security 
framework may be not able itself to guarantee an appropriate level of social security to 
all workers under the same contractual regime.  
 
Other two examples of strategic implementation of the institutional framework 
are provided by other empirical research shortly described in Box 6 and Box 7. The first 
is a research conducted by Sacchi, Berton and Richiardi in 2009 on the case of the 
(regular) use of temporary employment in Italy. The second is a research conducted by 
Hester Howing in 2011 on Temporary Agency Workers in the Netherlands. Both cases 
show a disjunction between the institutional framework and the behaviour of actors at 
the empirical level.  Employers have a higher power to “address” the institutional 
framework in favour of their own interest than workers. As a consequence, the extent to 
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which nonstandard workers are able to access the institutional entitlements will depend 
on the effective mode they act at the empirical level. 
 
In conclusion, we argue that flexicurity is not an appropriate and accurate solution 
to effectively loosen the tension between Flexibility of the labour market and workers’ 
social risks emerging from a differentiated and unexpected use of nonstandard contracts. 
It is then unlikely that the institutional framework alone is able to guarantee 
nonstandard workers the effective access to their entitlements and rights, unless a 
balanced endowment of resources to both employers and nonstandard workers, 
including bargaining power and structural resources to enforce their “capability to act 
and interact”, are at least formally provided.  
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Box 6 The temporary employment in Italy  
 
The strategic use of temporary employment by employers undermines the access of employees to Social 
Security schemes in Italy. A system of Unemployment Benefits formally covers all types of temporary 
employment (including part-time and Fix-term workers). All employees have the right to 
Unemployment Benefits if they have paid at least a weekly contribution for UB at least two years before 
the unemployment (insurance requirement) and if they contributed for 52 weeks along the two years 
before the unemployment (contributive requirement). A unique regime for unemployment benefits 
contribution covers all subordinated employees including temporary employees, whereby 77% of those 
contributions are the burden of the employer
1
. However, employers may strategically use vertical part-
time, fixed-term and temporary agency work only in short periods in order to satisfy peaks of production 
and at the same time avoid the high costs for UB contributions. If this period is shorter than 52 weeks 
within two years before the period of unemployment the workers are likely to meet insurmountable 
obstacles in accessing the ordinary Unemployment Benefits. An empirical study conducted by Sacchi et 
al. (2009) shows that 30,3 % of Part Time workers and 57% of Fix term workers are excluded from 
Unemployment Benefits.   
In this case it is clear that the access of employees to Social Security provisions provided by the 
Unemployment Benefit System depends only in part on the macro institutional setting. The strategic use 
of those temporary contracts applied by employers at the employment relation level directly affects the 
access of those employees to the National Security scheme.  
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Box 7  Temporary Agency Workers in the Netherlands.   
 
Based on the introduction of the Flexibility and Security law (F&S law) in 1999, the Netherlands has recently been 
regarded as an example of Flexicurity (European Commission 2007). The F&S law contains a phase-system for 
Temporary Agency Workers. Phase A concerns a trial period of 26 weeks: once workers have completed 26 weeks 
with the agency they have a right to participate in a pension scheme. Moreover, the agency has to discuss the training 
needs of the worker (Phase B). After another six months, they will be offered a fixed-term employment contract. After 
18 months of work at the same client firm or after 36 months of work at different client firms this contract will be 
converted into a permanent contract (Phase C). The original purpose of the law intended to guarantee a “stepping 
stone” process towards more stable employment for the employee. However, as explained by Hester Houwing (2010), 
the interaction of actors and strategic behaviours at the individual level among the actual application of the phase 
system has turned in peculiar outcomes. At this level, the use of Temporary Agency Workers has to be regarded in 
relation to a pure cost-benefits computation concerning the costs for employment risks, i.e. costs for dismissal and 
costs related to sickness and disability of employees. With the F&S Law both risks of absence of work and sickness 
are shifted from the user firm to the agency when an agency worker is in phase B or C, i.e. hired by the agency on the 
basis of a Fix-Term or open-ended contract.  
As a consequence, strategies of the agency can be twofold:  
a) When the agency worker is at the point of entitlement for a fixed-term or open-ended contract, the agency will 
evaluate the risks associated with offering the worker a contract. In this case, when the demand for agency work or 
work in general is low, the agency might be inclined to prevent workers to ever reach a phase B or C contract and 
prevent risks for themselves in the case that there is no more available work for the worker. In some cases, the user 
firms were also advised by the agency to replace a worker that was entitled to an FT-contract with another one that is 
in phase A.  
b) Agencies ask a higher price to user firms for agency workers in phase B or C because of the increased risks they 
run. This may generate a break of the contract between the agency and the user firms, and often between the agency 
and the worker. 
An empirical research regarding the termination of FT-contracts has shown that in about one-thirds of the cases, the 
employment relationship between the agency and the agency worker ended because an agency worker is entitled to a 
phase B (FT) contract. Furthermore, in almost 83% of the cases, the employment relationship ended because the FT-
worker was entitled to a phase C (open-ended contract) (Knegt et al. 2007).  
This case shows that both the agency and the user firms in the Netherlands may strategically apply the Phase System 
for TAWs to lower production costs. The consequence is that a decrease of security for TAW may occur. The extent 
to which the Phase System works as a “stepping stone” process towards more stable employment is not self-evident 
but it depends undeniably on strategic behaviour of the actors at the individual level.  
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6 Need for an integrated and multilevel policy approach  
 
Overall, what has emerged from the policy analysis provided in the previous 
chapter is that irregularity and flexibility of the labour markets have been mainly 
considered separate. On the one hand the approach toward the fight against irregular 
work at the European level is still bind to a broad-spectrum definition of the 
phenomenon and neglected to properly address the phenomenon of different forms of 
semi-irregular work in nonstandard employment. On the other hand, we have argued 
that the flexicurity framework, as it is understood today, is not an appropriate solution 
to guarantee a broader protection to nonstandard workers for the risks emerging by the 
irregular application of nonstandard contracts.  
 
Hence it seems that the problem of irregularities in nonstandard contracts still 
needs to be addressed by a proper policy strategy that opportunely tries to integrate 
flexibility and irregularity in the same analytical interface.  
Some “lines” toward a development of such strategy is here proposed. Departing 
from the policy strategies previously analysed, we claim that they should be 
complemented by two further theoretical approaches.  
First, they need to be accompanied by a multilevel governance approach.  The 
term ‘governance’ is used to indicate the various means by which the behaviour of the 
actors within institutions is regulated (Burroni and Crouch 2008; Crouch 2005; 
Hollingworth et al 2002). In this perspective, territorial disparities between regions as 
well as informal regulations must be taken in account. This approach emphasizes the 
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interaction of various mechanisms of regulation at the local level such as associations, 
market, firms, networks, community and the state (Crouch 2005).  
Most important, a proper attention must be given to the level of employment 
relations and the individuals’ space of action provided by the regulative framework. 
Considering the results of the empirical research showing the relevance of the abuse of 
nonstandard contracts in some territorial contexts in Italy, we may argue that an 
increase of regulative space in individual bargaining should be only carefully promoted 
unless a balanced endowment of bargaining resources to both employers and employees 
are provided. This means to take seriously in consideration the still existing power gap 
between the two actors, and develop a strategy to reinforce “capability to act and 
interact” of nonstandard workers. 
 
Second, they need to be coordinated and included within a more integrated 
approach, able to put together into a common interface the problem of irregular work 
and the issue of Flexibility of the labour market. 
In this regards, some elements of the theory of Transitional Labour Markets  
(Schmid and Gazier 2002), may here be worth for stepping up such a strategy. TLM 
theory redefines the social dimension of the labour market by focusing on solidarity 
through ex ante risk sharing instead of only compensating ex post the losers of market 
dynamics through more or less generous transfers. In this perspective, Active Social 
Securities – understood as legally guaranteed social rights to participate in decisions 
over work and employment arrangements and to share equally their fruits as well as 
their risks – are an essential condition for un increase of effective nonstandard workers 
security (Schmid 2006).  
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In conclusion, adopting an “integrated and multilevel approach” is here needed 
in order to properly look at the complexity of the issue of irregularity in nonstandard 
employment.  This would mean to develop new policy strategies that simultaneously 
(and not separately) take into account the following advises:  
 
- Provide positive incentives enhancing interactional capabilities to individuals in 
employment relations: endowment of more resources to strengthen nonstandard 
workers’ bargaining power, as well as their rights of information and participation at 
work. 
- Adjust the labour law in the direction of preventing the abuse of nonstandard 
contractual arrangements.  
- Reinforce the enabling approach: expand information campaigns aiming to 
condition individual’s normative orientation and encouraging compliant behaviour in 
specific sectors and territorial contexts.  
- Intensify the deterrence approach: provide labour inspectorate more 
organizational and technological resources to better perform at the local level and 
enhance coordination between different audit institutions. 
 
These “lines” are meant to be developed through a pattern of highly coordinated 
“mixed policies”, which are able to intervene horizontally in the fields of industrial 
relations, labour market, social policy and labour inspections.  This Indeed would go far 
beyond the traditional policy approach on the fight against irregular work on the one 
hand, and the common understanding of the balance between flexibility of the labour 
market and security for nonstandard workers, on the other. A more integrated and 
multilevel approach, instead, may be reflected into the development of a more 
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sustainable and effective strategy to enhance social inclusion, adjust the discrepancies 
generated in a more volatile labour market and provide an effective response to the 
social risks emerging within nonstandard forms of employment. 
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 Conclusive Remarks 
 
Departing from the recent debate about the effects of the spread of nonstandard 
employment on the extent of Irregular work in Italy, our analysis questioned what in 
literature is often taken for granted, namely that the increased use of nonstandard work 
has always a positive effect on the reduction of undeclared work, considered as a 
phenomenon isolated and separated from the formal work regulation. Conversely, the 
research addressed the analysis on the close link between flexibility of the labour 
market and irregular work: specifically it focused on those nonstandard work situations 
de-facto characterized by different forms of irregularities. 
The theoretical framework taken in consideration did not imply a unique field of 
studies, but involved different perspectives and approaches, due to the multidisciplinary 
character of the object of research. It has been necessary to assess, on the one hand, the 
literature dealing with the issue of irregular work, and on the other hand, the 
sociological literature focusing on the effects of labour market flexibilization on 
individual risks and opportunities. The link between flexibility and irregularity in 
employment relations has been studied only recently and still there remain considerable 
doubts about its nature. This is for the following reason. The literature has generally 
considered irregular work as a uniform phenomenon, generally constituted of those 
working positions entirely not declared to the public authorities. This outlook has led 
the literature to assume that an increase of flexibility of work would reduce the extent of 
irregular work, basically because it would represent an incentive for both the demand 
and the supply side to engage in the regular rather than irregular employment. In this 
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sense the two elements are considered as two separated spheres and never overlapping, 
and influenced by external mechanism determining their quantitative dimension.  
However, The empirical research has shown that “unintended consequences” have 
emerged throughout the spreading of nonstandard contracts. Often the improper use of 
nonstandard contractual arrangements were aimed to conceal full-time subordinated 
employment, in order to lower labour costs in employment relations.  
The development of these forms of irregularity in nonstandard employment 
definitely challenges the theoretical assumption of a trade-off between irregularity and 
nonstandard work. The main argument stressed in this research, is that the relationship 
between flexibility and irregularity in Italy is not only characterized by an inverse 
proportionality, meaning that an increase of nonstandard work would reduce the extent 
of irregular work. We argued that flexibility and irregularity may be complementary to 
each other, given that an increase of nonstandard contracts can imply an increase of 
different forms of irregularities.  
Moreover, an important finding of the research is that the territorial factors are 
determinant in shaping the forms of irregular work. The empirical research on the two 
case studies has revealed that in Brescia irregular work has emerged mainly within the 
process of labour outsourcing while in Cagliari the abuse on the so-called project work, 
in particular in call center activities, resulted to be the most relevant type of irregularity 
among nonstandard work. These territorial specificities reflect the different 
organizational architecture of firms, the productive contexts and the regulatory 
mechanisms of the two different cases. 
The research attempted to add some theoretical contribution within the debate on 
the consequences of flexibilization of the labour market in Italy. Focusing on the 
individual employment relation we underlined the emergence of new actors’ strategies 
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on the use and abuse of nonstandard contracts to gain further advantages in employment 
relations and reduce labour costs. This strategy is reflected in the rise of new social 
risks on the side of workers, in terms of difficulties to access to social security schemes 
and in terms of non-reliability of the contracts applied.  
 
In Italy the phenomenon of new forms of irregularities in nonstandard 
employment is becoming an increasingly relevant issue especially for inspective 
institutions. Several endogenous factors may directly affect the effectiveness of 
inspection activity and the extent to which it is able to cutch up irregularities in non 
standard contracts much depend on the administrative as well as political “directions” 
inspection activity is strategically given. The debate on the role of inspective 
institutions has been quite controversial especially with regards to the last reform in 
2007 (Direttiva Sacconi), which shifted the role of inspections from a punishment-
oriented to a service-oriented role, de facto weakening its deterrent function within the 
territory.  
From an European level perspective, no doubts, irregular work in Europe appears 
to be an extremely relevant and problematic topic for what it concerns the issue of 
workers’ social risks, especially in the perspective of constructing an ‘European Social 
model’ of industrial relations.   
The political as well as the academic focus on the mechanisms of irregular work 
linked only to unemployment, immigrants and the non-recorded workers, would explain 
only part of the story. As a consequence, policy solutions based on this misleading 
approach would be partially effective, while different forms of irregular work are 
emerging.  
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If there is growing recognition that the central issue for European policy makers is 
how to ensure better working condition at a time of rapid change of structures of 
production, deregulation of the labour markets and rising of new social risks of workers, 
there is nevertheless little or no consensus on the means by which this goal might be 
achieved. At the European level it has been often argued that Flexicurity policies would 
be the solution for ensure high employment rate and social integration and at the same 
time loose the tension between more flexible contractual arrangements for workers and 
the social risks deriving from it. In this thesis, we have emphasized that the 
implementation of flexicurity policies at the individual level may generate unintended 
outcomes. A strategic interpretation of rules by individual actors accompanied by an 
unbalanced bargaining power between employers and employees and specific 
individuals’ normative orientation may create the condition for the emergence of 
informal employment practices in which flexibility, rather than security, is stressed at 
the individual level.  
It is then highly improbable that “flexicurity” institutional arrangements alone 
will be able to effectively balance flexibility and security at the micro level, unless a 
balanced endowment of resources to both employers and nonstandard workers, 
including bargaining power and structural resources to enforce their “capability to act 
and interact”, are provided.  In this context, the concept of Flexicurity is not an 
appropriate and accurate solution against the risks deriving from a widespread use (and 
often an abuse) of nonstandard contracts.  
Our perspective proposes the idea that positive incentives to handle the 
unintended consequences of flexibilization of the labour market would come through 
other strategies that deeply take into account actors’ preferences and behaviors in 
employment relations. This would mean to adopt a new integrated and multilevel 
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approach for policies enabling participation and consultation for workers, information 
campaigns positively encouraging compliant behaviour or affecting contextual 
normative orientation, and not least, an enforcement of inspective institutions. This 
perspective considers the opportunity that enhancing labour market flexibilization 
should not only be accompanied by ex post compensations for workers more at risk. 
Instead, more efforts to improve the quality of nonstandard employment by more 
guarantees and balanced opportunities should be promoted and brought forward. Finally, 
social cohesion and more job satisfaction can be intended as an important aspect, and 
not as a trade-off, of a better performance of the economy and the labour markets. 
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Annexes 
 
Annex 1. The database structure 
 
 
Cases: enterprises with irregular workers at the moment of inspection 
Variables:  
 Label Enterprise 
 Number  
 COLL: archive position  
 REF: Reference number in the digital archive 
 Name of inspector 
 Date of inspection  
 Date of certification 
 Year of inspection 
 CONC / ISP conciliation practice or inspection  
 VIP / RI:  official denouncement of workers or inspection programmed by the department 
 size of enterprise 
 sector 
 activity of the enterprise  
 Total number of irregular nonstandard workers involved   
 self-employment 
 part-time 
 Labour outsourcing 
 occasional work  
 fixed-term contract  
 apprenticeship  
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Annex 2. Inspections input-data prospect - Brescia and Cagliari   
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Annexes 3. List of  interviews 
 
Cagliari 
Type of 
interview 
Name occupation Place of interview Date 
Non-structured Persod 
Alessandra 
Data Center 
Operator 
Labour department 
Cagliari 
January 2010 
Non-structured Scarteddu 
Stefania 
Inspector Labour department 
Cagliari 
April 2010 
Non-structured Deplano Luciana Inspector Labour department 
Cagliari 
April 1010 
Non-structured Pittalis Virgilio Inspector Labour department 
Cagliari 
April 1010 
Non-structured D’arpino 
William 
Inspector Labour department 
Cagliari 
June 1010 
Non-structured Marrocu Stefano Inspector Labour department 
Cagliari 
June 1010 
Non-structured Cocco Valeria Inspector Labour department 
Cagliari 
June 1010 
Non-structured Paolo Addis Conciliation 
practices Officer 
Labour department 
Cagliari 
June 1010 
Semi-structured Marongiu Nicola CGIL Cagliari Telephone interview November 
2011 
Semi-structured  Enrica Mulleri ALAI-FELSA-
CISL Cagliari 
Telephone interview November 
2011 
 
Brescia  
Type of 
interview 
Name occupation Place of interview Date 
Non-structured Loda Angelo Data Center 
Operator 
Labour department 
Brescia 
Decembrer 
2010 
Non-structured Papalia Rosa Inspections 
Coordinator 
Labour department 
Brescia 
December 
2010 
Non-structured Russo Antonella Inspector Labour department 
Brescia 
Febrary 2011 
Non-structured Pezzulo Pia Maria Inspector Labour department 
Brescia 
Febrary 2011 
Non-structured Lapenta Antonio Inspector Labour department 
Brescia 
Febrary 2011 
Non-structured Ciaccia Giuseppe Inspector Labour department 
Brescia 
Febrary 2011 
Non-structured Cafarella Antonio Inspector Labour department 
Brescia 
Febrary 2011 
Non-structured Crapiz Mauro Inspector Labour department 
Brescia 
Febrary 2011 
Non-structured Vitale Annamaria Inspector Labour department 
Brescia 
Febrary 2011 
Semi-structured Cardin Simone NIDIL-CGIL 
Brescia 
Telephone Interview November 
2011 
Semi-Structured Pedrazzani 
Lucciano 
CGIL 
Lombardia 
Telephone Interview November 
2011 
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Annex 4. Semi-structured telephone interview - Questionnaire 1 (Italian).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dallo studio empirico svolto attraverso l’analisi dei dati delle ispezioni del lavoro nella provincia di 
Cagliari emerge che la fattispecie contrattuale trovata irregolare dall’attività di vigilanza (cioè i 
lavoratori con un contratto di lavoro dichiarato non genuino e quindi disconosciuto dagli ispettori del 
lavoro e in molti casi convertito in contratto subordinato) che risulta essere quantitativamente più 
rilevante nella vostra provincia è il contratto a progetto. In proporzione, la percentuale di irregolarità 
di tale contratto è sostanzialmente superiore in comparazione alla provincia di Brescia, che 
rappresentava l’altro studio di caso della mia ricerca.  
Il questionario che trova sotto è inteso a dare una interpretazione della diffusione di tale fenomeno. 
 
Questionario.  
 
1) Avete avuto delle vertenze o dei casi che riguardavano specificatamente i lavoratori 
parasubordinati irregolari? 
2) Cosa in specifico, in questi casi, lamentavano i lavoratori?  
3) Dalla mia ricerca empirica è emerso che le irregolarità sui contratti atipici più rilevanti nella 
provincia di Cagliari sono quelli riguardanti i lavoratori a progetto. Secondo lei quali sono i 
motivi per cui nella provincia di Cagliari il fenomeno dei parasubordinati irregolari è più 
diffuso che in altre provincie?   
4) Tali irregolarità sono emerse soprattutto attraverso la “campagna di ispezioni della DPL sui 
call center nel 2007-2008”. In particolare, un dato interessante è che molte di queste aziende 
non avevano sede legale in Sardegna e avevano esternalizzato i servizi di call center a 
Cagliari. Secondo lei perché molte aziende avrebbero interesse a esternalizzare i servizi di 
Call center a Cagliari? 
5) Avete un rapporto di tipo collaborativo con il servizio ispettivo della Direzione Provinciale 
del Lavoro?  
6) Secondo lei quali strategie possono essere messe in campo per combattere il fenomeno 
dell’abuso dei contratti non-standard di lavoro e in particolare, a Cagliari, del lavoro 
parasubordinato? 
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Annex 5. Semi-structured telephone interview - Questionnaire 2 (Italian)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dallo studio empirico svolto attraverso l’analisi dei dati delle ispezioni del lavoro nella provincia di 
Brescia emerge che l’irregolarità che risulta essere quantitativamente più rilevante nell’ambito 
dell’attività di vigilanza nella vostra provincia è la somministrazione irregolare e fraudolenta (molte 
cooperative prestavano irregolarmente la manodopera ad altre imprese). In proporzione, la 
percentuale di irregolarità di tale contratto è particolarmente superiore in comparazione alla provincia 
di Cagliari, che rappresentava l’altro studio di caso della mia ricerca empirica.  
Il questionario che trova sotto è inteso a dare una interpretazione della diffusione di tale fenomeno. 
 
Questionario.  
 
1) Avete avuto delle vertenze o dei casi che riguardavano specificatamente i lavoratori 
parasubordinati irregolari o i lavoratori somministrati irregolari? 
2) Cosa in specifico, in questi casi, lamentavano i lavoratori? 
3) Dalla mia ricerca empirica è emerso che le irregolarità sui contratti atipici più rilevanti nella 
provincia di Brescia sono quelli riguardanti i lavoratori somministrati. Secondo Lei quali 
sono i motivi per cui nella provincia di Brescia il fenomeno dei somministrati irregolari è più 
diffuso che in altre provincie?   
4) Avete un rapporto di tipo collaborativo con il servizio ispettivo della Direzione Provinciale 
del Lavoro?  
5) Secondo lei quali strategie possono essere messe in campo da parte del sindacato per 
combattere il fenomeno dell’abuso dei contratti non-standard di lavoro e in particolare, a 
Cagliari, del lavoro parasubordinato? 
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Annex 6. Inspection Report. Fac-simile 
 
 
Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 
Direzione Provinciale del Lavoro – Servizio Ispezione del Lavoro 
Via  E. Pirastu n. 2 - 09125  Cagliari  
 Telefono 070.6059 – 070.6059199 – 070.6059299 
Fax 070.6059331 – 070.6059329 
E mail: dpl-cagliari@lavoro.gov.it 
                                                                                                                               
Cagliari _______________ 
 
  
Alla Ditta  XXXX s.r.l. 
Via Cremona n. 2 
35010 Vigonza (PD) 
 
 
 
  VERBALE DI ISPEZIONE IN MATERIA CONTRIBUTIVA  
(ai sensi e per gli effetti dell'art. 116  della Legge n. 388/2000) 
 
 
 La  sottoscritta Cordedda Vanessa Maria, in qualità di Ispettore del Lavoro, in servizio presso la Direzione Provinciale del Lavoro - Servizio Ispezione del Lavoro di 
Cagliari, a seuito degli accertamenti del giorno 15/01/2010 nei confronti della ditta XXXX s.r.l., esercente call center con sede legale in XXXX  ha accertato che il Sig.XXXX, 
nato a Venezia il 17/01/70  residente in XXXX via Cremona n. 2 nella sua qualità di socio unico, è incorso nelle seguenti violazioni.  
 
 Ha omesso di  presentare le  denunce obbligatorie all’INPS e all’INAIL e di versare i relativi contributi e  premi dovuti in favore di n. 5 lavoratori, non registrati sui 
regolamentari libri obbligatori,  per i periodi sotto riportati. 
 Ha omesso di  presentare le  denunce obbligatorie all’INPS e all’INAIL e di versare i relativi contributi e  premi dovuti in favore di n. 7 lavoratori, registrati sui 
regolamentari libri obbligatori con contratto Co Co Pro disconosciuto da questo Ufficio,   per i periodi sotto riportati.  
 Si rappresenta che l’inadempienza sarà comunicata all’INPS e all’INAIL di  Cagliari  per le conseguenti sanzioni civili da applicare in relazione alle suesposte ipot 
 
N. COGNOME E NOME LUOGO / DATA NASCITA RESIDENZA 
PERIODO CCNL / QUALIFICA / LIV. 
ORARIO DI LAVORO SU BASE                        
GIORNALIERA E SETTIMANALE 
 
DAL AL 
 
1 XXX n. Cagliari il 16/09/89 Via Tevere,  18 - Assemini 
Periodo CCNL Commercio Terziario 
Operaio liv. 6° 
- dal lun. al sab per 4 ore al giorno 
Occupato in totale scopertura assicurativa nei gg. 
sottoindicati e con CoCoPro disconosciuto in 
quanto  prestazione lavorativa svolta con le 
modalità del lavoro subordinato,  nel periodo dal 
16/01/09 al 13/02/09 
24/11/08 13/02/09 
gg. 24/25/26/27/28/29 nov. 08; 01/02/03/04/05/06/09/10/11/12/13/15/16/17/18/19/20/22/23/24/27/29/30/31 dic. 08; 
02/03/04/05/06/12/13/14/15 gen. 09 – 
2 XXX n. Cagliari il 16/07/89 Via Manzoni, 6 - Dolianova 
Periodo CCNL Commercio Terziario 
Operaio liv. 6° 
- dal lun. al sab per 4 ore al giorno 
Occupato  con CoCoPro disconosciuto in quanto  
prestazione lavorativa svolta con le modalità del 
lavoro subordinato, 
26/01/09 28/02/09 
 
3 xxxx n. Cagliari il 18/05/88 Via Vico Dritta, -  8 Soleminis 
Periodo CCNL Commercio Terziario Occupato in totale scopertura assicurativa nei gg.  
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Annex 7. Conciliation Report with positive resolution. Fac-simile 
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Annex 8. Conciliation report with negative resolution – Fac-simile 
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Annex 9. Letter of Agreement Between the University of Milan and the Labour Department of 
Cagliari 
 
 
DIPARTI MENTO DI STUDI DEL LAVORO E DEL WELFARE 
 
VIA CONSERVATORIO 7 – 20122 MILANO    
TEL. +39.02.503.21163/4/6/8  FAX.+39.02.503.21165/7 
E-MAIL: dslw@.unimi.it  
 
 
IL DIRETTORE 
 
 
LETTERA DI  ACCORDO FRA  IL DIPARTIMENTO DI  STUDI 
DEL LAVORO E DEL WELFARE, FACOLTÀ DI  SCIENZE 
POLITICHE, UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI  MILANO, 
 E LA  DIREZIONE PROVINCIALE DEL LAVORO DI CAGLIARI  
 
 
 
 
Il Dipartimento di Studi del Lavoro e del Welfare, Facoltà di Scienze Politiche dell’Università degli 
Studi di Milano concorda con la Direzione Provinciale del Lavoro (DPL) di Cagliari quanto segue: 
  
le Parti si impegnano ad avviare un’attività di collaborazione, che si espliciterà attraverso la 
consultazione della documentazione e dei dati inerenti alle irregolarità rilevate dalla Direzione 
Provinciale del Lavoro della Provincia di Cagliari durante le attività ispettive presso i luoghi di 
lavoro. A ciò farà seguito la predisposizione di un data base e la stesura di un report sui risultati 
dell’analisi dei dati, che siano di interesse comune e di rilevanza scientifica nell’ambito del 
dibattito corrente sul contrasto al lavoro irregolare. 
 
Pertanto si chiede che 
 
lo studente Antonio Firinu, dottorando in corso presso il PhD Programme in Labour Studies 
(LABS) della Graduate School of Social Economic and Political Studies, Facoltà di Scienze 
Politiche dell’Università degli Studi di Milano, che, sotto la supervisione della prof.ssa Renata 
Semenza, coordinatrice del corso di laurea magistrale in Scienze del lavoro (LAV), sta preparando 
un progetto di ricerca su “Il rapporto tra la flessibilità del lavoro e il lavoro irregolare” 
 
possa utilizzare i dati messi a disposizione dalla DPL relativi alle irregolarità nei rapporti di lavoro 
rilevati per mezzo dell’attività ispettiva e i dati relativi alle pratiche di conciliazione delle 
controversie individuali e plurime per i seguenti obiettivi: 
 
- individuazione dei dati rilevanti ai fini della ricerca; 
- predisposizione di un data base di raccolta dei dati, riguardanti in particolar modo le irregolarità 
rilevate nei contratti “atipici”; 
- approfondimento, analisi dei dati, e stesura di un documento di sintesi che descriva i risultati della 
ricerca e il percorso progettuale seguito. 
  
 
Firme 
 
DPL di Cagliari                             Tutor e coordinatrice LAV                Direttore del Dipartimento e 
       Coordinatrice PhD LABS  
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Annex 10. Letter of Agreement Between the University of Milan and The Labour Department of 
Brescia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DIPARTI MENTO DI STUDI DEL LAVORO E DEL WELFARE 
 
VIA CONSERVATORIO 7 – 20122 MILANO    
TEL. +39.02.503.21163/4/6/8  FAX.+39.02.503.21165/7 
E-MAIL: dslw@.unimi.it  
 
 
IL DIRETTORE 
 
 
LETTERA DI  ACCORDO FRA  IL DIPARTIMENTO DI  STUDI 
DEL LAVORO E DEL WELFARE, FACOLTÀ DI SCIENZE 
POLITICHE, UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI MILANO, 
 E LA  DIREZIONE PROVINCIALE DEL LAVORO DI CAGLIARI  
 
 
 
 
Il Dipartimento di Studi del Lavoro e del Welfare, Facoltà di Scienze Politiche dell’Università degli 
Studi di Milano concorda con la Direzione Provinciale del Lavoro (DPL) di Cagliari quanto segue: 
  
le Parti si impegnano ad avviare un’attività di collaborazione, che si espliciterà attraverso la 
consultazione della documentazione e dei dati inerenti alle irregolarità rilevate dalla Direzione 
Provinciale del Lavoro della Provincia di Cagliari durante le attività ispettive presso i luoghi di 
lavoro. A ciò farà seguito la predisposizione di un data base e la stesura di un report sui risultati 
dell’analisi dei dati, che siano di interesse comune e di rilevanza scientifica nell’ambito del 
dibattito corrente sul contrasto al lavoro irregolare. 
 
Pertanto si chiede che 
 
lo studente Antonio Firinu, dottorando in corso presso il PhD Programme in Labour Studies 
(LABS) della Graduate School of Social Economic and Political Studies, Facoltà di Scienze 
Politiche dell’Università degli Studi di Milano, che, sotto la supervisione della prof.ssa Renata 
Semenza, coordinatrice del corso di laurea magistrale in Scienze del lavoro (LAV), sta preparando 
un progetto di ricerca su “Il rapporto tra la flessibilità del lavoro e il lavoro irregolare” 
 
possa utilizzare i dati messi a disposizione dalla DPL relativi alle irregolarità nei rapporti di lavoro 
rilevati per mezzo dell’attività ispettiva e i dati relativi alle pratiche di conciliazione delle 
controversie individuali e plurime per i seguenti obiettivi: 
 
- individuazione dei dati rilevanti ai fini della ricerca; 
- predisposizione di un data base di raccolta dei dati, riguardanti in particolar modo le irregolarità 
rilevate nei contratti “atipici”; 
- approfondimento, analisi dei dati, e stesura di un documento di sintesi che descriva i risultati della 
ricerca e il percorso progettuale seguito. 
  
 
Firme 
 
DPL di Cagliari                             Tutor e coordinatrice LAV                Direttore del Dipartimento e 
       Coordinatrice PhD LABS  
 
 
 
LETTERA DI ACCORDO FRA IL DIPARTIMENTO DI STUDI DEL LAVORO E DEL 
WELFARE, FACOLTA’ DI SCIENZE POLITICHE  DELL’UNIV RSITA’ EGLI STUDI DI 
MILANO E LA DIREZIONE PROVINCIALE DEL LAVORO DI BRESCIA 
 
Il Dipartimento di Studi del Lavoro e del Welfare, Facoltà di Scienze Politiche dell’Università degli Studi 
di Milano, e la Direzione Provinciale del Lavoro di Brescia,  si impegnano ad avviare un attività di 
collaborazione che si espliciterà attraverso la consultazione da parte del dott. Antonio Firinu, dottorando 
di ricerca alla Graduate School of Social, Economic and Political Sciences, delle pratiche  e dei dati 
statistici inerenti le irregolarità sui contratti atipici di lavoro rilevati durante le attività ispettive presso i 
luoghi di lavoro dalla Direzione Provinciale del Lavoro di Brescia. A ciò farà seguito la predisposizione 
di un data base e la stesura di un report sui risultati dell’analisi dei dati, che siano di interesse comune 
alle parti. 
 
DPL di Brescia    
 
Tutor progetto di ricerca 
 
Dipartimento Studi del Lavoro e del Welfare 
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Annex 11. Draft Communication Letter to the Data Protection Authority 
 
 
 
 
All’attenzione dell’Autorità Garante dei dati Personali,  
 
Nell’ambito della collaborazione tra la Direzione Provinciale del Lavoro di …. e l'Università degli Studi di 
Milano, Dipartimento di Studi del Lavoro e del Welfare, Facoltà di Scienze Politiche,   
 
si comunica che il trattamento dei dati personali rilevati attraverso l’analisi del contenuto dei Verbali 
d'ispezione da parte del dott. Antonio Firinu,  dottorando in Labour Studies alla Graduate School of Social 
Economic and Political Sciences, avverrà in conformità  degli artt. 39 comma 1, 104 e 105 del d.lgs 
196/2003. 
Pertanto i dati personali utilizzati ai fini scientifici saranno trattati rigorosamente in forma anonima. 
 
data 
 
                                                                                                                          Direttore DPL  
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Annex 12 Figures. Elaboration of Labour departments data 
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Annex 13 Figures. Elaboration of Labour departments data 
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